Ideology, Truthmaking and Fundamentality by Fisher, Anthony Robert James
Syracuse University 
SURFACE 
Philosophy - Dissertations College of Arts and Sciences 
8-2012 
Ideology, Truthmaking and Fundamentality 
Anthony Robert James Fisher 
Syracuse University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://surface.syr.edu/phi_etd 
 Part of the Metaphysics Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Fisher, Anthony Robert James, "Ideology, Truthmaking and Fundamentality" (2012). Philosophy - 
Dissertations. 71. 
https://surface.syr.edu/phi_etd/71 
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Arts and Sciences at SURFACE. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Philosophy - Dissertations by an authorized administrator of SURFACE. For more 
information, please contact surface@syr.edu. 
i 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
In chapter 1 I outline two conceptions of ideology: ideological pessimism and ideological 
realism. Ideological pessimism is the view that ideological inquiry has dim prospects insofar as 
ideology is tied to meaning. Ideological realism is the view that there is a fact of the matter about 
which ideology is taken as primitive when attempting to describe reality correctly. I respond to 
an argument on behalf of ideological pessimism, develop ideological realism, and then defend it 
against an objection that attempts to derive the unpalatable consequence that a main dispute in 
the metaphysics of properties is verbal. 
In chapter 2 I argue that we should uphold the traditional understanding of the ideology/ontology 
distinction in light of ideological realism. I then argue against the doctrine that certain disputes 
about composition have the epistemic consequence of providing no grounds for us to believe in 
one theory over another.  
In chapter 3 I argue that truthmakers do not necessitate the truths they make true. They either 
grounds their truths or make true their truths and nothing else can be said about the connection 
between truth and reality. It is to be taken as primitive that truthmakers make true the truths they 
make true. 
In chapter 4 I explore two versions of truthmaking as a theory of fundamentality. I argue against 
the first and defend the second against various objections and problems. I argue that if we adopt 
truthmaking as a theory of fundamentality, then we should believe in the second version. 
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Introduction 
 
W.V. Quine (1951) famously drew the distinction between ideology and ontology. The ontology 
of a theory is whatever the theory says exists, while the ideology of a theory is the collection of 
ideas that are expressed by the language of the theory. For Quine every metaphysical theory has 
an ontology and ideology as equally important parts. 
The ideology/ontology distinction is well-known in metaphysics and is overwhelmingly 
present in many metaphysical disputes. The distinction also shows up in the philosophy of 
mathematics, especially in debates about the existence of abstract entities. Recently in 
contemporary metaphysics there has been much discussion about the methodology of 
metaphysics and the notions of ideology and ontology.  
The basic project of this dissertation is to explore the notion of ideology in contemporary 
metaphysics. A major part of this project involves the methodology of metaphysics and questions 
such as: how should we understand the notion of ideology? How should we interpret the virtue of 
ideological parsimony? How should we understand the ideology/ontology distinction? Before we 
can answer these methodological questions, we need to answer questions that directly bear on the 
notion of ideology such as: what is ideology? What role does it play in a metaphysical theory? 
These questions are important for understanding metaphysics and need urgent attention.  
Another part of this project is to argue for a certain methodological framework and then 
apply it to certain first-order debates in metaphysics. As a result, I discuss at length many current 
debates in metaphysics. In particular, debates in the metaphysics of composition, properties, 
truthmakers, grounding and fundamentality. The overall structure of the dissertation can be seen 
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as two distinct chapter-pairs (ch. 1 + 2; ch. 3 + 4); the first of which applies its methodological 
conclusions to the second. 
Although the notion of ‘ideology’ and the work that it can do in metaphysical theorising is a 
topic that is very much up for debate, and indeed some of these debates are at the heart of the 
present work, the following illustration will serve as a provisional understanding of the notion of 
ideology for the purposes of getting started.  
Suppose that all there is is a world of two black cans. Call this world w1. If we wanted to 
create a list of what there is, we should write down that there is one thing and there is another 
(and perhaps that there is nothing more; but I leave this issue to one side). The question of ‘what 
there is’, as Quine famously noted, is a question about ontology. If the ontology of a theory is 
whatever the theory says exists, then our list of what exists comprises our ontology. In the 
present case, our ontology contains two entities. However, just saying what exists does not 
provide a complete description of w1. After all, both cans are black. Thus, we require a device of 
expression to help express the fact that both entities are cans and are both black. We require the 
predicate ‘… is black’ and ‘… is a can’ to say what these entities are like. A theory’s ideology is 
comprised of the terms of the theory. Since these predicates are classified as terms, they are part 
of the ideology of the theory. If we restrict our theory to predicates, then our ideology will just be 
a list of the predicates of the theory. In the present case, the ideology is comprised of ‘… is a 
can’ and ‘… is black’.  
This provisional characterisation of ideology is enough to make it vivid why questions about 
ideology are relevant to metaphysics. As this example shows, our theories require an ideology to 
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tell us what the world is like. There are however several ways in which we can understand what 
ideology is primarily concerned about and what the study of ideology ultimately amounts to. 
For the Quinean (although the characterisation to follow may not be attributable to Quine 
himself), the study of ideology is primarily an inquiry about the meaning of the terms in a theory. 
However, the theory of meaning, according to Quine, is bankrupt in many ways. Since ideology 
is tied to meaning, the Quinean thinks, ideological inquiry has dim prospects.  
In contemporary metaphysics this kind of pessimism towards meaning is virtually non-
existent. So, if we still accepted that ideology is primarily about meaning, then ideological 
inquiry would be an acceptable enterprise. However, in metaphysics the emphasis on ideology is 
less about the meaning of terms and more about how and what ideology represents or helps 
describe. To illustrate using the example of the two black cans, if it is a fact that the first can 
resembles the second can, then our ideology better capture this by introducing a term that 
correctly describes in what respect the cans resemble each other. Without this ‘resemblance’ 
predicate we fail to correctly describe reality. We fail to capture in our theory the fact that the 
two cans resemble each other. This emphasis on providing descriptions and capturing facts about 
reality is what has fuelled the recent focus on ideology in metaphysics. 
If the project about providing descriptions of the world captures the claim that metaphysics is 
about what there is and what it is like, then metaphysics not only involves ontology but also 
ideology. Ideology therefore is just as important to metaphysics as ontology.  
This metaphysical project is about providing descriptions of the world but this is admittedly 
done by first noting that the world had some kind of unique complexity that is to be captured in 
the descriptions we hope to provide. The world has to be a certain way for us to characterise it 
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using (in part) a predicate, operator or connective. The facts have to be there so to speak for us to 
construct a theory that describes them; to do otherwise amounts to some kind of linguistic 
idealism.  
In metaphysics today there is a strong aversion to most kinds of linguistic idealism. 
Metaphysicians are attracted to a realist and objectivist picture of reality. They believe that there 
is an objective structure to the world that is independent of what we say and think and 
independent of language simpliciter. Now, because there is this objective structure ‘out there’ in 
reality so to speak, our best theories should aim to describe it correctly. Our theories should 
contain certain devices of expression of what I shall also call ‘pieces of ideology’ because the 
world is a certain way and has a certain structure.   
But at the same time the descriptions we hope to provide are not mere descriptions. Instead 
they are fundamental descriptions of reality. This programme can be understood roughly as 
follows. In metaphysics we propose fundamental descriptions of the world. This can be 
understood in a complete and incomplete sense. In the complete sense, we are asked to envisage 
that ‘all God has to do’ is lay out the fundamental truths and everything else follows (in a 
specified sense). This fundamental description determines the correct logic, the fundamental 
truths, and what primitive (i.e., unanalysable) terms are included in the ideology of the theory, 
that is, the primitives of the theory that ‘carve nature at its joints’. Some statements are special. 
They are of the form ‘there are Fs’ and these truths will contain a general kind, say, F. 
The primitive expressions of this fundamental description show us something about the 
world, they are used to describe the fundamental structure of reality, and they express the 
fundamental ‘ideas’ of the theory. As a result, questions of ontology are understood in terms of 
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the most fundamental sense of the quantifier(s), that is, the quantifier(s) of the fundamental 
theory. Questions of ideology are understood in terms of the primitive expressions that ‘carve 
nature at its joints’. On this conception, the ideology of the theory takes on a more metaphysical 
role. What is primitive is a matter of fact, not a question of convention.  
The conception of ideology that falls out of this discussion is, what I call, a realist conception 
of ideology. A realist conception of ideology says that there is a correct ideology that must be 
used to provide a complete description of reality. A major goal of this thesis is to spell out this 
realist conception of ideology in detail and defend it against an objection that has been 
unaddressed in the literature.  
Another distinction that is at work in this conception of ideology is the distinction between 
primitive and non-primitive ideology. The ideology of a theory is comprised of its terms, but its 
primitive ideology is comprised of its primitive terms. The primitive terms are the unanalysable 
terms of a theory. The word ‘unanalysable’ means ‘admits of no further analysis’. Thus, how we 
understand the project of analysis will affect how we understand what it means for a term to be 
primitive. This in turn affects our notion of ideology. To briefly illustrate, if we thought that the 
project of analysis was to provide an account of the meaning of terms, our analysis would 
encapsulate a semantic project. The primitives of the analysis would be semantic primitives and 
so semantically unanalysable. If we thought the project of analysis was not semantic, then our 
primitive terms need to be characterised differently. I leave this point open-ended here. I return 
to this issue in more detail in chapter 1. 
Why are such reflections on the notion of ideology important and how is this relevant for the 
methodology of metaphysics? The notion of ideology is at heart of the methodological issues I 
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discuss in this thesis. For instance, how we understand the ideology/ontology distinction will 
depend on how we understand the notion of ideology and ontology. In addition, how we interpret 
the virtue of ideological parsimony will also depend on how we understand the notion of 
ideology.  
Let us demonstrate the importance of ideology in the context of ideological parsimony. 
Ideological parsimony is a theoretical virtue that is typically regarded as a methodological 
principle or constraint that guides us in our construction of metaphysical theories and in 
comparing metaphysical theories to determine which theory we ought to believe or assign greater 
credence to. The whole point of invoking ideological parsimony is similar to the reasons why we 
appeal to the virtue of ontological economy to determine which theory we ought to prefer. 
Roughly, in the case of ontological economy, if two theories account for the same 
phenomena or ‘philosophical data’ but one theory posits an extra kind of entity that the other 
does not, then we should believe in the theory that posits less kinds of entities. To provide a 
concrete example, consider dualism and materialism from the philosophy of mind. If we suppose 
that materialism can account for exactly the same phenomena or data as dualism, phenomena 
such as our belief reports, activity of mental states, etc, then we should prefer materialism on 
grounds of ontological economy. Materialism has provided an equally adequate theory in terms 
of explanation but by positing one less kind of entity than dualism.  
Likewise, in the case of ideological parsimony if we have two theories that purport to explain 
the same set of facts or data but the first theory uses extra “pieces of ideology” that the second 
does not use, then we should prefer the latter theory. In the case of ontological economy, it is 
intuitively clear that what is being counted or weighed are kinds of entities (although economy 
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can be about the number of entities; I leave this issue to one side here). But what is a ‘piece of 
ideology’? Without a more detailed picture about what pieces of ideology are the virtue of 
ideological parsimony remains drastically unclarified. If we said more about what ideology is, 
and provided some systematic treatment of the notion of ideology, etc, then we can begin to see 
what ideological parsimony amounts to. Therefore, the notion of ideology is at the heart of the 
issue of parsimony. Without clarifying ideology we cannot clarify ideological parsimony.  
So we must have some proper understanding of ideology to make sense of ideological 
parsimony and the ideology/ontology distinction. Indeed, it seems that if we are to make any 
sound judgement about method in metaphysics, we need a proper understanding and fleshed-out 
view of the notion of ideology. This is the underlying reason why I take the basic project of this 
dissertation to be worthy of discussion. 
For the sake of clarity it will be helpful to provide a chapter summary to indicate to the 
reader the rough dialectic of the dissertation and how it is structured. The following summary 
also contains what conclusions are argued for and how they are defended from objections along 
the way. I also give an indication of how these conclusions fit together.  
In chapter 1 I introduce in more detail the notion of ideology as it is inherited from Quine. I 
outline, what I call, the Quinean conception of ideology (which is not to be confused with 
Quine’s actual view on ideology). According to the Quinean, ideological inquiry is connected to 
the theory of meaning since the study of ideology consists in providing an account of the 
meaning of the terms of a theory. I then provide another way to understand the notion of 
ideology that is connected to the project of describing reality’s structure. On this view, there is a 
fact of the matter about which primitive ideology ought to be used to correctly describe reality. 
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This is, what I call, the realist conception of ideology or ideological realism. I have spelled out a 
lot of the details above and won’t reiterate them here. In chapter 1, I also look at ways to ‘take 
ideology seriously’. Taking ideology seriously simply amounts to taking ideology to be about the 
world and as important to a metaphysical theory as the study of ontology. I then defend 
ideological realism against an objection that has yet to be addressed in the literature.   
Having defended ideological realism, I consider its methodological consequences in chapter 
2. The first consequence is that the virtue of ideological parsimony is actually a guide to truth 
(cf. Sider ms). More parsimonious theories are most likely to be true. They are more likely to 
provide the correction description of reality. The notion of ideology also affects how we 
understand the distinction and difference between ideology and ontology. In chapter 2, I defend 
the traditional understanding of the ideology/ontology distinction. I state as a methodological 
maxim that primitive ideology is ontologically innocent and hence does not correspond to the 
entities in our ontology. Thus, when we have an ideological cost (i.e., accepting a primitive 
term), it does not follow that there is a direct one-one ontological cost. If the predicate ‘... is F’ is 
primitive according to theory T, then the ontology of T does not contain Fs.  
This is not to say that there are no cases in which we have both an ontological cost and an 
ideological cost. There can be ideological costs when there are ontological costs. But such 
ideological costs will not be in a direct one-one correspondence with the ontological costs of a 
theory. If the ontology of theory T contains complex entities, then our ideology should contain a 
device to describe the structure of those complex entities. To illustrate, suppose there are 
complex objects made up of parts. Examples include: tables, chairs and cats. These complex 
entities stand in a certain relation to their parts. Let us call this the ‘parthood’ relation. To help 
describe the fact that this tail is part of this cat we require a device of expression, namely, the 
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‘parthood’ predicate ‘… is part of …’. If our ontology contains such complex objects, then our 
ideology should contain the ‘parthood’ predicate.  
Part of my defence of the traditional understanding of the ideology/ontology distinction 
derives from a concern to preserve the fact that ideology can be traded off with ontology and 
vice-versa. If a theory has the primitive p, then by introducing talk of entities of some kind K, we 
can analyse p in terms of quantification over objects of kind K. To illustrate, we may start out 
with the primitive operator ‘’ (which means ‘necessarily, ...’) in our ideology yet realise we can 
easily do without it by quantifying over possible worlds. There are cases where the reverse is no 
less plausible. For instance, we could start out with a theory that says numbers exist and come to 
the conclusion that we can eliminate talk of these entities we call numbers by introducing a 
modal operator into our ideology. 
I argue that the uniqueness of this relationship between ideology and ontology ought to be 
preserved. As part of the recurring theme in this thesis, we will examine various disputes in 
which the trade-off between ideology and ontology takes centre stage. It figures at the centre of 
disputes concerning the existence of properties, possible worlds, numbers, holes and much more. 
This is no accident. The relationship between ideology and ontology must be understood in this 
way to make sense of these disputes. (I do not suggest that all debates in metaphysics hinge on 
the trade-off between ideology and ontology.) 
In trading ideology for ontology we seem to be switching between linguistic expressions and 
the existence of entities. If they are wholly distinct from one another, it seems that the reasons 
behind believing in the existence of entities are disconnected from the reasons behind accepting a 
certain number of primitive terms in our theory. Ideological realism provides the common 
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ground for our reasons to believe in the existence of entities and the terms of our theory. 
Ideology tells us just as much about the world as ontology. So, the term that helps us describe the 
world matters just as much as the entities that the theory says exist. Ideological realism justifies 
our traditional understanding of the relationship between ideology and ontology. It explains why 
we are able to, and should, compare linguistic expressions with the existence of entities. That is, 
why we should regard a primitive predicate in equal standing with talk of entities.  
In the final section of chapter 2, I argue against the metametaphysical claim that the debate 
over whether there are composite objects provides no justification to believe in one competing 
theory over the other. I use ideological realism and the methodological consequences I have 
extracted to and apply it to this particular dispute about composite objects. 
In chapter 3, I focus on the theory of truthmaking and critically discuss the leading accounts 
of what it is for something to be a truthmaker for a truth. I discuss the main arguments for the 
orthodox explanation of truthmaking, which claims that what it is for a truthmaker to make true a 
truth is for it to necessarily be the case that if the truthmaker exists then the truth is true (also 
known as truthmaker-necessitation). I consider arguments against truthmaker-necessitation and 
conclude we are better off rejecting truthmaker-necessitation. I then present two further accounts 
of truthmaking. The first says that what it is for a truthmaker to make true a truth is for it to be 
grounded in a truthmaker. This view has recently been defended by Jonathan Schaffer. The 
second is a primitivist view about truthmaking. On this view, the two-place predicate ‘… makes 
true …’ is taken as a piece of primitive ideology. I evaluate the costs of these final two theories 
and claim that the former has far higher ontological costs than the latter, but that the latter has 
ideological costs that the former lacks. I tentatively conclude this chapter with the claim that 
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amongst the accounts of truthmaking on offer either Schaffer’s view or primitivism is the best 
account of truthmaking on offer. 
In chapter 4, I consider the theory of truthmaking as a theory of fundamentality. I outline the 
conditions a theory must meet in order to be a serious contender as a theory of fundamentality. I 
critically discuss two theories of truthmaking as theories of fundamentality and look at the 
various obstacles that arise for each theory. In the later sections of chapter 4, I provide a defence 
one version of the theory of truthmaking as a theory of fundamentality. The position I ultimately 
prefer is a theory according to which there are universals and particulars and a primitive 
‘instantiation’ predicate in the ideology of the theory. I also introduce the primitivist account of 
truthmaking from chapter 3. Hence, I add a primitive ‘makes true’ predicate that applies to 
truthmakers and truths. This version of truthmaking is known as moderate truthmaking since 
only some truths have truthmakers and the truths that do not have truthmakers have a 
metaphysical semantics that is derivable from the truths that do have truthmakers. My goal in 
this last chapter is to provide a defence of this kind of truthmaker theory of fundamentality 
against relevant objections from the literature. 
No thesis or book is without presuppositions. In discussing fundamentality I presuppose that 
there is a fundamental language or that there are candidate fundamental languages and that it is 
intelligible to think of fundamentality in these terms. In particular, I assume that fundamental 
ontology is the component of a theory that quantifies over certain kinds of things in the most 
fundamental sense (see Dorr 2005; Sider 2011). These are the entities that fundamentally exist.  
I presuppose metaphysical realism. I take metaphysical realism to be the view that there is an 
objective structure independent of what we say and think and independent of language 
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simpliciter. Metaphysical realism is used in chapter 1 to provide some sort of justification for 
ideological realism. If the thesis could tolerate a subtitle, it would be “A Study in Metaphysical 
Realism”. I also assume that debates in metaphysics are substantive. Hence I do not engage in 
recent work by Eli Hirsch (2011) and others who reject that certain disputes are substantive. 
I assume that the enterprise of ‘metaphysical explanation’ is legitimate however unclarified. 
Opposition does exist to such an assumption: (Daly 2005; Hofweber 2009). To what extent it is 
clarified, I take a metaphysical explanation to be an account of some fact or other in a theory. For 
instance, if what it is for a to be F is for a to instantiate some universal U, then we have 
explained why a is F. We could say the fact that a is F holds in virtue of the fact that a 
instantiates U. The thought generalises to entire theories which provide accounts of a wide-range 
of phenomena or ‘philosophical data’ using entities of the same kind with a handful of primitive 
terms. Thus, I take Lewis’ (1986b) modal realism as falling under the umbrella of metaphysical 
explanation and thus taken as a legitimate explanation which competes against rival theories. 
As a consequence, I assume that the theoretical virtues of ideological parsimony and 
ontological economy are legitimate virtues. They provide some reason for us to believe that 
theories which have such virtues are most likely to be true. I do not combat the claim that these 
virtues are merely pragmatic and that pragmatically virtuous theories only satisfy our desire for 
simplicity (cf. Bricker 2008, 119).   
Before we begin it will also prove helpful to mention some of the key terms that are being 
used throughout the thesis. My statements of these terms however are not meant to be definitions 
of the terms as in almost every case no one provides a definition of the term I am using. First, 
there is the term ‘primitive’. The word ‘primitive’ is understood as ‘unanalysable’. The word 
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‘primitive’ is usually attached to ‘ideology’. So ‘primitive ideology’ refers to the unanalysable 
terms of a theory. The word ‘primitive’ is not to be confused with ‘fundamental’. Although I do 
not give an analysis of ‘fundamental’, I attach it to two other words: 1) ‘truth’ and 2) ‘entity’. 
Thus, a ‘fundamental truth’ is a truth that holds in virtue of no other truth. For instance, the truth 
that the can is black is fundamental if it holds in virtue of no other truth. A ‘fundamental entity’ 
on the other hand is an entity that does not ontologically depend on any further entity. An 
Aristotelian might say that quality (whiteness) ontologically depends on substance (Socrates). I 
say in several places that a state of affairs ontologically depends on a universal and particular. 
The term ‘grounding’ also gets used but it means the same thing as ‘ontological dependence’. 
Another term that I use a lot is ‘fact’. This just means ‘true proposition’. Lastly, the word ‘truth’ 
just means ‘true proposition’ or ‘true sentence’. 
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1 
Two Conceptions of Ideology 
 
The notion of ideology plays an important role in contemporary metaphysics. However, the 
notion of ideology is admittedly obscure and has received little attention in the literature. At first 
glance, ideology is about the ‘ideas’ or concepts that are expressed in a theory. But in order to 
express ideas in a theory, we require some device of expression. For example, to express the idea 
of one thing being part of another we require a predicate such as ‘… is part of …’. This way of 
understanding ideology dates back to W.V. Quine (1951). Quine understood ideology as 
primarily associated with questions about the meaning of the terms that are used to express 
‘ideas’ in a theory. But for Quine, if ideology falls within meaning, it also inherits the decrepit 
state of the theory of meaning. There are however other ways to understand the notion of 
ideology. Recent developments in metaphysics provide a way to interpret ideology as playing a 
descriptive role that helps state the basic truths of a theory. On this latter conception of ideology, 
there is a fact of the matter about which ideology should be used to accurately describe the 
world. In this chapter, I explore both conceptions of ideology, provide some motivations for 
taking ideology seriously (i.e., to take ideology as not being merely about our concepts) and 
respond to an objection against the latter conception of ideology.  
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1.1 The Concept of Ideology 
 
One of the most widely used distinctions in metaphysics is the distinction between ideology and 
ontology. Quine told us that the study of what there is consists in answering the question: ‘what 
entities are the variables of quantification to range over if the theory is to hold true?’ (1951, 14). 
The study of what there is just is the study of ontology. The ontology of a theory is nothing more 
than the values of its bound variables.1 On the other hand, the ideology of a theory, according to 
Quine, consists in answering the question: ‘what ideas can be expressed in it?’ (ibid). The ideas 
of a theory are expressible in a given language using predicates and other devices of expression. 
Questions of ideology are thus concerned with two things: 1) what ideas are primitive and 
derivative and 2) what predicates or other devices of expression such as an operator (e.g., ‘it was 
the case that …) are taken as primitive and defined. The distinction between ideology and 
ontology divides a theory into two separate and exhaustive components.2 
To illustrate this distinction, consider a theory of natural numbers. Call this theory T. 
According to T, there are the natural numbers 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, …, and so on. Now, consider the 
following sentence of T: 
 ‘the number 1 exists’ 
This sentence can be regimented into, say, first-order classical logic as follows (let ‘1’ denote 
1): 
 ‘($x) x = 1’ 
                                               
1 Hence the slogan: to be is to be the value of a variable. See (Quine 1939; 1953b, 15; 1966a); for discussion see 
(Alston 1958; Azzouni 1998; Bar-Elli 1980; Brogaard 2008; Hodges 1972; Humphries 1980; Jubien 1972; Melia 
1995; Orenstein 1990; C. Parsons 1970; Skidmore 1973; Szabo 2003). 
2 Quine introduces the distinction in (1951) and uses/mentions it in (1953a, 1966b, 1966c, 1976, 1983). 
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Given that the ontology of T is whatever entities are the variables of quantification of T, 1 is 
an item of the ontology of T. As Quine famously claimed, ‘to be is to be the value of a variable’ 
(see note 1). T is made up of further sentences that say what exists according to T. There are 
sentences which can be regimented in line with our above example which tell us that according 
to T: there exists the number 2, there exists the number 3, etc. On the other hand, the ideology of 
T is the collection of ideas that are expressed in T via the devices of expressions of T. Quine 
describes ‘the ideology of a theory vaguely as asking what ideas are expressible in the language 
of the theory’ (1951, 15). Let us suppose that according to T the items of its ontology can be 
manipulated in such a way that some procedure takes one or more natural numbers as input and 
produces a third number as output. For example, binary operations take two input numbers and 
produce a single output number. Now suppose we wish to express the idea of adding two 
numbers together to produce another number. To do this we introduce the binary operation of 
‘addition’ into the ideology of T. To illustrate, the number 1 and the number 2 can be ‘added’ 
together to ‘produce’ a single third number, namely, 3. The idea of addition can be represented 
using the plus sign ‘+’ and we can write our example of adding 1 and 2 together to yield 3 as 
follows: 
 ‘1 + 2 = 3’      
We can express further ideas about other relationships between the natural numbers through 
this method of introducing “pieces of ideology” to represent operations on the natural numbers. 
If we wanted to express the idea of one number being subtracted from another to yield a further 
number, we introduce the binary operation of ‘subtraction’. Theory T would then contain an 
ideology with two operations, namely, ‘addition’ and ‘subtraction’. It is important to note that 
the ideology of T is in no simple correspondence to the ontology of T since the ideas of 
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‘addition’ and ‘subtraction’, as Quine points out, ‘need not have any ontological correlates in the 
range of the variables of quantification of the theory’ (1951, 14).     
To sum up the main points of this illustration, the ontology of T contains the natural numbers 
and the ideology of T contains the ideas about the relationship between the natural numbers. In 
other words, the ontology of T tells us what the theory says exists, while the ideology tells us 
about what the entities of the ontology are like. The ideology, for instance, plays a role in telling 
us that: 1 when added to 2 yields 3. 
The notion of ontology is well discussed in the literature. Contemporary metaphysics has 
focused heavily on ontology, ontological commitment and issues surrounding quantification. On 
the other hand, the notion of ideology and its exact role in metaphysics has received little 
attention. This is unfortunate as there is widespread use of the ideology/ontology distinction in 
debates about properties,3 mathematical entities,4 modality,5 truthmaking,6 composition,7 
material constitution,8 and more. More often than not parties to such debates appeal to the 
ideology/ontology distinction when they construct arguments that uncover a violation of the 
theoretical virtue of ontological economy or ideological parsimony.9  
To illustrate, consider the debate between a realist about universals and a realist about tropes. 
Universals are repeatable entities that are multiply instantiated at different times and places by 
                                               
3 For example, (Forrest 2006). 
4 For a survey and critique of this distinction in this dispute, see (Shapiro 1997, §7.5 ff.). 
5 Lewis is the well known example, see (Lewis 1986b).  
6 See (Armstrong 2004b); for a methodological critique of truthmaking, see (Daly 2005). 
7 See (Bennett 2009) for a survey of this debate using the ideology/ontology distinction. 
8 Again, see (Bennett 2009). 
9 Throughout my entire thesis I reserve the word ‘economy’ and its cognates for the ontological variety of simplicity 
and I reserve the word ‘parsimony’ and its cognates for the ideological variety of simplicity. For example, if I say a 
theory is not economical, then I am referring to the ontological variety. In places where ambiguity may rise I hope to 
specify which variety I am referring to.  
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distinct particulars. The mouse pad and the stapler (say) instantiate the very same property of 
blackness. Tropes on the other hand are non-repeatable entities—known as particularised 
properties—that are instantiated by only one particular (or perhaps they are the fundamental 
building blocks that make up particulars). This mouse pad has its own blackness. The trope is the 
mouse pad’s blackness and nothing else can have this blackness.10 D.M. Armstrong, a devout 
realist about universals, rejects tropes because trope theory requires extra primitive predicates 
(e.g., ‘… resembles … to degree …’) to capture specific axioms of resemblance that hold 
between certain tropes. According to the realist about universals, these axioms are reduced to 
axioms of identity. As a result, the trope theorists incurs an extra ideological cost because of the 
primitive two-place predicates it requires to account for facts about resemblance (Armstrong 
1997a, 170-1). The number of primitives required by trope theory makes the theory ideologically 
extravagant when compared to realism about universals. This ideological extravagance is a 
reason to reject trope theory in favour of realism about universals. 
Methodological arguments of this kind depend on the ideology/ontology distinction. Realism 
about universals is able to reduce axioms of resemblance in terms of axioms of identity because 
universals explain certain facts about resemblance. They therefore have a less ideologically 
extravagant theory but at some further ontological cost. Armstrong’s argument thus relies on 
some distinction between ideology and ontology. The distinction itself depends on the respective 
notions of ideology and ontology. The notions of ideology and ontology affect how we 
understand the ideology/ontology distinction. It is important to better understand the notion of 
ideology because of its involvement in a large amount of disputes in metaphysics.  
                                               
10 The non-transferability of tropes has been contested; see (Dodd 1999, 150). 
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However, the notion of ideology has not received direct attention at length in the literature. 
The above example, which involved a simplified theory of natural numbers, shows us that 
ideology is about the ideas that are expressed in a theory. So it seems ideology is about the 
concepts or notions at work in a theory. For instance, the concept of addition was introduced to 
represent how two numbers are added together to yield a single third number. But at the same 
time we require devices in order to express these ideas, devices such as the binary operator of 
addition. Such devices are really ‘bits of language’ which are typically labelled as terms or 
expressions. This suggests that ideology is also about the terms or symbols of a theory. For 
instance, suppose there is a world in which there exists two black cans. If we wish to construct a 
theory that accurately represents this world, we need to take the two particulars as the values of 
quantification and introduce predicates such as ‘… is black’ and ‘… is a can’ into our theory. 
Consider the following:  
‘($x)($y) x is black and x is a can, and y is black and y is a can, and x ¹ y’ 
The ontology of this theory are the two particulars, while the ideology is comprised of the 
predicates ‘… is black’, ‘… is a can’ and other logical expressions from first-order classical logic 
(such as ‘identity’ and ‘negation’ assuming that ¹ is defined in terms of ‘not’ and ‘identical to’). 
The above sentence states the fact that these two entities are black cans and so accurately 
represents the world in question. However, it seems the ideology of this theory is more about the 
predicates than about the concepts that are expressed by the predicates of the theory. This theory 
is more about predicates or terms because we are concerned with stating a fact about what 
entities exist in a certain world and what these entities are like. My remarks at this stage 
regarding what ideology is mostly concerned about will remain undecided between concepts and 
terms taking centre stage. I do not see this as a major setback since predicates for instance 
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express concepts. If a theory contains the predicate ‘… is black’, then we can presumably 
suppose that ‘… is black’ expresses the concept of blackness. Therefore, the devices and what 
they express are not completely alien from one another. Indeed, this inter-connection between 
concept and term explains why Quine and many others who appeal to the notion of “ideology” 
move seamlessly back and forth between concepts and terms. 
There is a further distinction that is typically drawn within the ideology of a theory. This 
distinction is between primitive and non-primitive ideology. As Chris Daly remarks, ‘a theory’s 
ideology comprises each term that the theory uses…and a theory’s primitive ideology comprises 
each term that the theory takes as a primitive term’ (2005, 87). Quine also has a similar 
distinction in mind when he writes, ‘[in] ideology there is the question of what ideas are 
fundamental or primitive for a theory, and what ones derivative’ (1951, 14). If we assume that 
terms express ideas or concepts, then it is plausible to suppose that a primitive term expresses a 
fundamental or primitive idea.  
But what does the word ‘primitive’ mean in this context? Presumably, ‘primitive’ means 
‘unanalysable’. But what does ‘unanalysable’ mean? ‘Unanalysable’ at first pass may be said to 
mean ‘admits of no analysis’. Thus, if a term is unanalysable, then it admits of no analysis (or is 
unable to be analysed). But what does ‘admits of no analysis’ mean? The question now turns on 
what one takes the project of analysis to really consist in. For the Quinean (which may not be 
truly representative of Quine’s views), the phrase ‘admits of no analysis’ most likely means ‘no 
further analysis in terms of other predicates or terms in the given theory’. But Quine further tells 
us that ‘the ideology of a theory is a question of what the symbols mean’ (1951, 14, my italics). 
The project of analysis is thus one that involves the terms of the theory and the meanings of the 
terms in the theory. It is a project of semantic analysis. A primitive term—and therefore a piece 
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of primitive ideology—is thus semantically unanalysable in a theory. (We will see later that the 
project of analysis can be interpreted in such a way that it is not concerned with meanings and 
semantic theory.) 
These remarks are the beginnings of what I call the Quinean conception of ideology. To be 
clear from the outset I explicitly and intentionally call this view ‘Quinean’ and not ‘Quine’s 
view’ for while I have found in Quine doctrines that support what I am calling the Quinean 
conception, I have also found other remarks in Quine’s work that support the view that ideology 
is, to quote Quine, ‘where the metaphysical action is’ (1976, 504). Therefore, I am hesitant to 
attribute this view of ideology to Quine despite the fact that I mention his views to motivate and 
explicate it. 
The Quinean conception of ideology understands ideology as a question about the meaning 
of symbols in a given theory. The symbols of a theory just are the theory’s predicates and other 
devices of expression. As was established earlier, predicates and other devices of expression do 
not fall under the variables of quantification. Therefore, they do not ontologically commit us to 
any items of ontology. Ontology, for the Quinean, is whatever entities are among the variables of 
quantification. Ontology is the doctrine of ‘what there is’ and this is sufficiently captured by the 
existential quantifier of first-order logic. On this Quinean view, ideology and ontology amount to 
‘distinct domains of inquiry’ (Quine 1951, 14). Ideology falls within the theory of meaning and 
its associated concepts: analyticity, syntheticity, synonymy, significance, entailment, intension 
and necessity. By contrast, ontology falls within the theory of reference and its associated 
concepts: truth, denotation, extension, naming, coextensiveness and values of variables.  
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Insofar as ideology falls within the theory of meaning, the purported analysis of a set of 
terms within a theory offers a semantic analysis. If no semantic analysis is given of some term 
and it is taken as primitive, then the unanalysed term is regarded as a semantic primitive. A 
semantic primitive can also be used to define up other terms in a theory in virtue of the primitive 
expressions accounting for the meaning of non-primitive expressions. According to the Quinean, 
this type of project strictly speaking does not count as ontological inquiry; rather it should be 
understood as ideological inquiry. But as Quine writes, 
Now the question of the ontology of a theory is a question purely of the theory of reference. The 
question of the ideology of a theory, on the other hand, obviously tends to fall within the theory 
of meaning; and, insofar, it is heir to the miserable conditions, the virtual lack of scientific 
conceptualization, which characterize the theory of meaning (1951, 15). 
Quine thought that the theory of meaning was in an irredeemable state of disrepair and that 
the concepts involved formed a definitional circle that cannot be broken in order to explain 
meaning (see Quine 1953c). He also repudiated attempts to explain meaning by postulating 
language-independent entities such as propositions, given that they are intensional in nature and 
so cannot be a part of our theory without violating the extensionality of our language or 
drastically revising first-order logic (something we ought to avoid) (see Quine 1960, ch. 6). 
According to the Quinean, ideology and the prospects of ideological inquiry appear very dim; 
and especially dim for metaphysics insofar as in metaphysics we are attempting to determine 
which pieces of ideology ought to be primitive and which pieces of ideology ought to be non-
primitive.  
If the question of ideology boils down to questions about the meaning of terms and which 
terms are semantically unanalysable and which terms are non-primitive, then since there are no 
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meanings or there isn’t any such thing as meaning, the Quinean has to reject the project of 
determining primitive and non-primitive ideology based on facts about the meaning of terms and 
the meaning of sentences in a theory. A sceptical view towards meaning results in a sceptical 
view towards primitive ideology. Call this view about ideology, ideological pessimism. 
A few things need to be said about this view. First, it is a not an anti-realist claim about 
ideology. The kind of Quinean conception on offer here does not claim that there is no fact of the 
matter about what terms ought to be taken as primitive, which is a view typically associated with 
Rudolph Carnap. This sort of Carnapian view is best labelled as ideological anti-realism. 
Ideological pessimism is not a form of ideological anti-realism. Second, the view is better 
understood as occupying a sceptical position towards ideological inquiry if ideological inquiry is 
a matter about the meanings of expressions and more importantly about the question of which 
primitive expressions account for the meanings of non-primitive expressions. The impossibility 
of a theory of meaning rules out any possible account of explaining the meanings of non-
primitive expressions in terms of the primitive expressions of a theory.  
Moreover, if we are sceptical that there is a relation of synonymy, we might also be sceptical 
about whether there is even a distinction between primitive and non-primitive terms. A non-
primitive term, on the semantic project, is a term that is synonymous with some complex term 
that is composed of primitive terms. So, if there are no facts about synonymy, there won’t be any 
facts about which terms are primitive and which terms are non-primitive.   
In short, ideological pessimism as construed here is a form of scepticism about the prospects 
of primitive ideology accounting for the meanings of non-primitive expressions simply because 
such an account depends on the theory of meaning. The source of scepticism for the ideological 
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pessimists originates from scepticism about the theory of meaning. In other words, if ideological 
inquiry is bound to the theory of meaning, it inherits the problems that plague the theory of 
meaning. 
Ideological pessimism rests on the crucial claim that the theory of meaning has no prospects 
as a subject of inquiry. In today’s environment this kind of scepticism towards meaning has 
waned drastically for the following reasons. First, the clarification of modal concepts brought 
about by the axiomatic development of modal logic provides one clear instance of an intensional 
notion that was made respectable for further inquiry. Second, the theory of meaning as a 
‘semantic theory’ which assigns semantic contents to expressions of a language has become 
acceptable over the last twenty years or so in the philosophy of language. For example, one type 
of ‘semantic theory’ assigns propositions as the meanings of sentences. Third, the postulation of 
propositions as entities which play an explanatory role in a theory has also become more 
common. And finally, many reject the Quinean critique of intensional notions such as analyticity 
and the attacks in ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’ against the analytic/synthetic distinction and its 
epistemological significance.    
Now, Quine himself can concede the claim that the theory of meaning is a subject worthy of 
philosophical and scientific investigation. Quine would simply divorce ideology from the theory 
of meaning and claim that ideology and ‘ideological study can be usefully pursued thus within 
the theory of reference’ (Quine 1951, 15). I am happy to accept this response on behalf of Quine 
in order to show that his views on ideology can be favourably understood. But such a response 
simply changes the Quinean conception I articulated above. I am more interested not in Quine’s 
actual doctrines here (and there are many doctrines that I glossed over in my presentation of 
Quine), but rather in the Quinean conception of ideology I sketched above since I fear it is part 
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of the reason why many people today do not explicitly discuss the notion of ideology. I also 
think there are other ways to understand Quine and his views on ideology. For instance, in 
‘Ontology and Ideology Revisited’ Quine (1983) revisits the notion of ideology and attempts to 
incorporate it into this doctrine of observation sentences. This approach would also be one 
further way to reconcile Quine’s views on ideology. But I cannot do full justice to Quine here 
unfortunately. 
If the impossibility of a theory of meaning is rejected, then talk of meanings as entities which 
play the role of the semantic content of sentences provides one way to sketch the beginnings of a 
conception of ideology that is somewhat more optimistic than the Quinean conception sketched 
above. Put briefly, if propositions are the meanings of sentences, then we have some way of 
taking talk of meanings as legitimate. If we have legitimate talk of the meaning of sentences and 
expressions, then some non-primitive ideology can be given a respectable semantic analysis in 
terms of the primitive ideology of a theory. Thus, the project of analysis as a semantic project 
becomes a respectable line of ideological inquiry. 
However in the next section I consider another way to understand the notion of ideology that 
focuses more on what truths are stated or what facts are expressed in a theory. This second way 
of understanding ideology should be seen as a reaction to ideological pessimism rather than as a 
direct competitor or an outright denial of pessimism. I argue that ideology plays an important 
descriptive role in a theory and that if metaphysical realism is true, there is a fact of the matter 
about which expressions or terms ought to be taken as primitive in our best metaphysical 
theories.  
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1.2 Ideological Realism 
 
Let us begin with the idea that ideology plays a serious role by figuring in the descriptions of 
reality according to a theory. In effect ideology plays a role in stating the truths of a theory. Put 
briefly, on this view ideology is involved in stating truths or expressing facts in a theory.  
To illustrate, consider the following theory T*. According to T* the world is a world of 
concrete particulars. A concrete particular is a non-repeatable entity that occupies a region of 
spacetime (in what follows I set aside the qualification of particulars occupying regions). A 
concrete particular for instance cannot be wholly present in more than one region of spacetime 
(although there might be exceptions or far-fetched possibilities that I am ignoring here). An 
entity that is non-repeatable is to be contrasted with an entity that is repeatable such as a 
universal. A universal can be wholly present in more than one place at the same time. The 
universal of being red may be instantiated over there and here at the same time and therefore is 
wholly present over there and here at the same time. T* rejects the existence of universals. 
According to T* there exists concrete particulars such as black cans, red letterboxes and 
negatively charged quarks. Therefore the ontology of T* only contains concrete particulars. T* is 
one form of nominalism. T* rejects not only universals but also classes, sets, possibilia, states of 
affairs, etc.  
Now suppose there is a world (call it w1) in which there are three concrete particulars: two 
black cans and a negatively charged quark. In order for T* to provide an accurate description of 
w1 it is insufficient for T* to merely list the things that there are. To provide an accurate 
description of w1 T* must describe the contents of w1 correctly. T* cannot say what w1 is like 
without using predicates. T* must say which entities are black and which entities are negatively 
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charged. Further, T* must say which entities resemble each other and which entities do not. This 
is where the role of ideology steps in. Ideology helps us describe the contents of w1. Ideology 
helps us say what the world is like. In this particular case, we require the predicate ‘… is black’, 
‘… is a can’, ‘… is negatively charged’, and ‘… is a quark’. Now according to T* we have the 
sentence:11 
‘($x)($y) x is black and is a can, y is black and is a can, and x ¹ y’. 
The above sentence states the truth that there two wholly distinct black cans. We might 
innocuously assume that if the above sentence is true, then we can simply call the sentence a 
truth or say that it takes the form of a truth. (This assumption retains the spirit of nominalism.) 
Now, if there exists two wholly distinct black cans, presumably they resemble each other. So in 
w1 T* should contain the sentence: 
‘($x)($y) x resembles y’. 
Therefore, we need to introduce into the ideology of T* the predicate ‘… resembles …’ in 
order to accurately describe w1. If we did not include this ‘resemblance’ predicate, we would be 
failing to describe w1 correctly. 
Let us pause here to point out a couple of things. First, predicates and other pieces of 
ideology have a serious descriptive function in our theories (Melia 2005, 68). There is no reason 
to think that in order to truly describe something the relevant predicate or term must refer to 
some entity. The realist about universals should also accept this result since according to most 
realist theories about universals the ‘instantiation’ predicate does not correspond to a universal of 
instantiation. Second, because ideology plays a role in stating truths according to a theory, 
                                               
11 The following sentence may require the qualification ‘In w1, …’. But I am ignoring that here. 
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ideology is a ‘worldly matter’. The ideology is as significant or important as the ontology of a 
theory. I take this to be the same intuition that Sider expresses when he says that ‘a theory’s 
ideology is as much a part of its worldly content as its ontology’ (2011, 13). 
Let us now return to world w1 and theory T*. In w1 we said that one of the sentences of T* 
states the truth that x resembles y. According to the proponent of T* however, this resemblance 
truth is not taken as a fundamental truth, or at least it ought not to be taken as a fundamental truth 
if we can give some constitutive account in terms of more fundamental truths. We should have a 
preference for reducing truths where possible insofar as a fundamental truth is understood as a 
brute or unexplainable truth. Multiplying brute or unexplainable truths ought to be avoided. The 
proponent of T* claims that the truth that x resembles y holds because x is black and y is black. 
The more fundamental truth is that x and y are both black.  
This type of project however is markedly different from the semantic project that was 
associated with the Quinean conception of ideology. But following Melia we can draw a useful 
distinction: 
The project of analysis can be understood in two different senses. On the one hand, an analysis 
may be offered as a semantic thesis about what a certain part of language does or should mean. 
On the other hand, an analysis may be offered as a metaphysical or constitutive thesis. For 
instance, Tarksi’s analysis of ‘A logically implies B’ as ‘for all models in which A is true, B is 
true’ can be interpreted either as a proposal about how we should define ‘logical consequence’, or 
a proposal about what the relation of logical consequence really is (2005, 70). 
The proponent of T* interprets the project of analysis as metaphysical or constitutive. Thus, 
what it is for x to resemble y is for x to be black and for y to be black. But what it is for x to be 
black and what it is for y to be black is taken as fundamental according to T*. The fact that or the 
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truth that x is black holds in virtue of nothing. It is an unexplained truth according to T*. The 
realist about universals—just to illustrate a contrast—does provide a further metaphysical 
account of such monadic truths. According to the realist about universals, what it is for x to be 
black is for x to instantiate some universal U. The realist thereby reduces monadic truths about 
concrete particulars to facts about the instantiation of universals by particulars. The predicate ‘… 
is black’ which is taken as primitive according to T* is thereby given an analysis according to 
the realist and is thereby no longer primitive. The realist, of course, introduces the ‘instantiation’ 
predicate as a piece of primitive ideology, a predicate that the nominalist repudiates. On the 
metaphysical construal of the project of analysis ‘… instantiates …’ according to the realist 
about universals is metaphysically primitive.  
This distinction between different interpretations of ‘the project of analysis’ should not be 
understood as mutually exclusive. If we endorse the metaphysical construal of analysis, we are 
entitled to endorse the semantic construal of analysis as well. For instance, we may accept that ‘x 
resembles y’ is semantically primitive and metaphysically primitive. That is, we may believe that 
‘… resembles …’ admits of no semantic analysis and that it is a fundamental fact that x 
resembles y. The point of the distinction is to show that we can embark on two distinct projects 
of analysis. We should also be weary of slipping between the two projects or making inferences 
from conclusions that are drawn in one project to conclusions in the other. For instance, even if 
‘… resembles …’ is semantically primitive, it does not follow that it is a fundamental truth that x 
resembles y. For we may adopt the view that x resembles y because x and y are both black (Melia 
2005, 71). Similarly, even if the truth that x resembles y is taken as fundamental, it does not 
follow that no semantic analysis of the ‘resembles’ predicate can be given or that we must accept 
‘… resembles …’ as semantically primitive. 
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In contemporary metaphysics there has been growing focus on the metaphysical construal of 
the project of analysis. It has been increasingly common to ask questions such as “What is it for 
f to be ψ?” and receive an answer in the form:  
what it is for f to be ψ is for f to be χ.  
The answer if it is one that involves fundamental truths will involve some primitive ideology 
(χ will be partially made up some piece of primitive ideology). To illustrate, consider the 
question: what is it for x to be black? The realist replies: what it is for x to be black is for x to 
instantiate some universal U. The following portion of this answer “to instantiate some universal 
U” involves the primitive ‘instantiation’ predicate. As noted above the ‘instantiation’ predicate is 
metaphysically primitive according to the realist about universals. The sense of ‘primitive’ that is 
being used here has been labelled by others as the ‘interesting sense’ of ‘primitive’ (Nolan 2008, 
191). Cian Dorr thinks this interesting sense of ‘primitive’ is the sense of ‘primitive’ that is at the 
heart of metaphysics. He writes,  
I regard the question of which predicates are primitive in this sense as the most fundamental 
question of metaphysics. Traditionally, metaphysics aspires not just to answer a long list of 
questions of the form ‘are there Fs?’ but to understand the ultimate structure of reality. This 
aspiration should be understood, I think, as equivalent to the quest for a complete list of primitive 
predicates (2004, 155-6, his italics). 
The notion of ‘metaphysical analysis’ and the associated notion of ‘in virtue of’ are 
admittedly obscure. I will not attempt to provide answers about how the precise details ought to 
be filled out. Such a task would require a longer discussion than I can provide on the subject and 
I think the answers are yet to be fully worked out by metaphysicians. At the moment many 
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contemporary metaphysicians are exploring various research programmes aimed at discovering 
the underlying details of this metaphysical project of analysis. What is common ground amongst 
metaphysicians is that this talk of ‘what it is for f to be ψ’ and this talk of ‘in virtue of’ is not 
something that must be outright banished from our theorising. 
What is relevant from this discussion is the claim that the notion of ideology plays a specific 
and important role in this metaphysical project and that the role it plays has to do with 
contributing to expressing facts in a theory and being part of the descriptions of the world or 
reality according to a theory. The distinction between primitive and non-primitive ideology 
roughly maps onto the distinction between fundamental and nonfundamental truths. Primitive 
ideology (that is, the metaphysically unanalysable expressions) of a theory figures in sentences 
that express fundamental facts according to a theory. This is the powerful and important 
descriptive role that primitive ideology plays in fundamental metaphysics.    
Now, contemporary metaphysics for the most part operates on the assumption that 
metaphysical realism is true. Metaphysical realism is the view that there is an objective structure 
to reality that is independent of what we say and think (and independent of language simpliciter).  
When metaphysicians put forth a metaphysical theory, their aim is to represent this objective 
structure. If the theory is true, then it represents the structure of the world correctly. We should 
add the qualification that the type of theory on offer is one that involves a certain type of 
inference, namely, inference to the best explanation. Inference to the best explanation is usually 
contrasted with deductive and inductive inferences. Deductive inferences make an inference 
based on logical entailment, whereas inductive inferences make a judgement based on past facts 
about a given phenomena. Inferences to the best explanation infer that given some phenomena 
this is the most likely (and most lovely?) explanation on offer. At any rate, if metaphysical 
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realism is true, then some theories that represent the structure of the world will be wrong and 
others will be right. If this sounds too strong, we can say a theory is either more likely to be true 
or more likely to be false. Metaphysical realism provides the insight that there is a correct way to 
describe or represent the structure of the world.  
Now, given the claim that ideology plays a serious descriptive role in a metaphysical theory 
as demonstrated above and given the claim that metaphysical realism is true, it follows that there 
is a correct ideology that helps accurately describe the structure of reality. There is a correct 
description of the world that tells us what there is and what it is like. Our primitive ideology 
contains the predicates, operators, etc, that it does because the world is objectively speaking a 
certain way and has a certain structure independent of how it is described or what we say and 
think about it. Sider (2011, ms) has recently expressed this sort of view about ideology. He 
writes, ‘[ideology] represents the world as having structure corresponding to its primitive 
expressions’ (2011, viii). To use one of Sider’s examples, if a theory contains the primitive 
modal operator ‘necessarily, …’ which is represented as ‘’, then the theory is committed to 
representing the world as having modal structure.   
If you think that ideology represents the world as having structure and that there is an 
objective structure to reality independent of what we say and think, then there is a fact of the 
matter about which expressions ought to be taken as primitive in a metaphysical theory. Call this 
ideological realism. Ideological realism says that there is a correct ideology that plays a part in 
providing an accurate description of reality’s structure.    
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Here is one last example to illustrate ideological realism. Suppose vagueness obtains in the 
world and further suppose it is metaphysically vague that God is on top of Mount Everest.12 We 
might think this tells us that there is vagueness and perhaps we would subscribe to such a claim 
if we endorse the view. However, any ontological claim is restricted to ‘there is some thing or 
entity such that it ...’ where we insert the appropriate predicate. Therefore, the ontological claim 
that there is vagueness does not provide the right description of reality since we want to capture 
some fact about a certain portion of reality. If we introduce a ‘vagueness’ predicate, we would 
still fail to properly describe how the world is. For we don’t want to say God or Mount Everest is 
vague. In addition, to say the world is vague fails to capture the specific claim that over there 
high in the mountains vagueness obtains. Certain pieces of ideology can fix this problem. One 
way to capture the claim that there is vagueness or that vagueness obtains in the world is to 
introduce a vagueness operator ‘V’ that attaches to whole propositions or sentences to make new 
sentences. In the theory the sentence ‘V(p)’ expresses the fundamental fact that it is vague that p. 
This piece of primitive ideology plays a descriptive role in the theory in virtue of being part of a 
description. In order to state the truth that it is vague that p we need ‘V’. Of course, whether or 
not this operator is introduced into the theory is based on whether vagueness objectively obtains 
in reality.13 Sometimes—usually in a negative way—ontology helps determine the stock of terms 
in our theory. To illustrate using a different example, if we discovered that there are no parts, we 
would not need a ‘parthood’ predicate to describe when one thing is part of another. Similarly, if 
there is no vagueness, there is no need for ‘V’.  
                                               
12 The example is adopted from (Heller 1996). 
13 You might think for this theory to be correct it cannot be the case that it is vague that it is vague that p; but 
because vagueness obtains, the theory characterises all fundamental facts as vague, which will include the fact that 
there is vagueness. I won’t dwell on this here. 
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To summarise this section, let me outline the main stages of the discussion that led up to 
ideological realism. I first began with the task of showing how ideology has a descriptive role to 
play in our theories. Given this role, ideology is not just about our concepts but rather about 
being part of descriptions of the world. Part of this descriptive role, I argued, is to state the basic 
truths or fundamental facts of a theory. Second, I introduced the metaphysical construal of the 
project of analysis that attempts to provide accounts of the form ‘what it is for f to be ψ is for f 
to be χ’. This is contrasted with the semantic project of analysis. Third, I showed that from this 
rough framework of ‘metaphysical analysis’ we can understand the idea that primitive terms play 
a role in stating basic truths or expressing fundamental facts of a theory. Fourth, I introduced the 
assumption that metaphysical realism is true. Metaphysical realists believe that there is an 
objective structure to the world that is independent of what we say and think. Finally, we arrived 
at the idea that the primitive ideology of our theory is involved in representing reality’s structure 
and that because there is an objective structure ‘out there’, there is a fact of the matter about 
which primitive ideology should be used to help accurately describe reality.  
   
1.3 Motivations for Taking Ideology Seriously 
 
All pieces of primitive ideology, as Melia notes, ‘play a meaningful role in sentences stating 
basic truths about the world’ (2005, 68). This is what it is to take ideology seriously. But since 
predicates do not harbour ontological commitment many people have not taken ideology 
seriously. This, I say, is a mistake. Although a predicate or term does not harbour ontological 
commitment, it does not imply that the predicate or term should not be taken seriously. A 
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primitive predicate may lack a referential function but it still has a descriptive function. The 
descriptive function, as argued above, plays an important role in a metaphysical theory.  
There are many ways to not take something seriously. For instance, if we do not take 
morality seriously, we could take this to mean that morality is not about the world but rather 
about us and our expressions of preference and emotion towards a particular act. Likewise, if we 
do not take ideology seriously, we could take this to mean that ideology is not about the world 
but rather about our concepts and what concepts are basic to our conceptual scheme. Indeed the 
word ‘ideology’ brings with it bad connotations (as Quine remarked when he first introduced it 
in (1951)). The word ‘ideology’ suggests it is about the study of ‘ideas’ or ‘mental entities’.  
In this section I discuss considerations in favour of taking ideology seriously. Some of the 
discussion is aimed at motivating the claim that ideology is about the world and not solely about 
our concepts. My goal is rather modest. I do not attempt to provide full-blooded motivations for 
ideological realism. Therefore, I do not take the conclusions of this section to motivate the claim 
that there is a fact of the matter about which terms ought to be taken as primitive in our theory. 
Nor do I take the conclusions of this section to motivate the claim that there is a correct primitive 
ideology required to describe reality’s structure or state the basic truths. I am only interested in 
motivating the claim that the ideology of a theory ought to be taken seriously because ideology is 
just as much about the world as the ontology of a theory. Ideology is not solely about our 
concepts or the ideas expressed in a theory.   
Our first consideration involves the status of quantifiers as they are typically construed in 
contemporary metaphysics. Quantifiers are ontologically significant because they determine the 
domain of our ontology; they are the ‘gateway’ to ontology so to speak. Some of Quine’s early 
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remarks on ideology suggest that the ontology of a theory can be detected by determining the 
meaning of its quantifiers. He writes, ‘[t]he ontology of a theory may indeed be considered to be 
implicit in its ideology; for the question of the range of the variables of quantification may be 
viewed as a question of the full meaning of the quantifiers’ (1951, 14). Given that quantifiers are 
devices of expression that are taken to be no different—in this particular respect—to predicates 
and operators, we have an instance of one piece of ideology that is about the world.14  
Our second consideration is more complex. Putnam provides insight into the claim that 
predicates tell us something about the world just as much as the objects in our ontology in his 
attempt to critique, inter alia, Quine’s criterion of ontological commitment. Consider two 
theories: T and T′. Theory T says there are physical objects such as fundamental particles. T 
quantifies over physical things and so has an ontology of physical objects. Theory T′ on the other 
hand says there are integers such as the number 1. T′ quantifies over integers and so has an 
ontology of numbers. Putnam (1975) invites us to consider a ‘proxy function’ that operates as a 
mapping device from physical things to numbers. This proxy function implies that any theory 
that quantifies over physical objects can be replaced with a theory that quantifies over integers, 
provided that the predicates of the first theory are replaced with appropriately corresponding 
predicates. For instance, T can be replaced with T′ by dropping quantification over particles, 
introducing quantification over integers, and replacing predicates such as ‘... is spin up’ with ‘... 
is the number which is assigned to an object which is spin up’. T and T′ are therefore ‘inter-
translatable’ (Putnam 1975, 184). Given that T and T′ quantify over different objects, their 
ontologies differ. However, as Putnam concludes, 
                                               
14 This is more of an innocent observation than a genuine motivation since it should be uncontroversial that 
quantifiers are ontologically significant. But in any case a quantifier is still a piece of ideology. So by that standard it 
is a piece of ideology that is about the world. 
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‘[i]t seems to me that a theory may presuppose objects as much through the predicates it employs 
as through the objects it quantifies over; and that, intuitively T′ in the above example has an 
ontology of material objects just as much as T does’ (1975, 184).     
The intuition here is that the ideology of a theory in some cases tells us something, however 
little, about the world or what is in it. In the example above, it is clear that the predicate ‘... is the 
number which is assigned to an object which is spin up’ involves the extra notion of a physical 
object, for what else could ‘assigned to an object which is’ be about? But other cases highlight 
this intuition equally well. For instance, the predicate ‘... is a chair’ presumably applies to a 
certain kind of object, namely, a material entity. If a theory contains such a piece of ideology, it 
is natural to think that the theory is also committed ontologically speaking to material objects. Of 
course, we might wish to reduce physical objects to sets and regions of spacetime such that a 
physical object is identified with some coordinate of spacetime. We might press on regardless 
and reduce regions to pure sets (such as Quine 1976). Such a theory quantifies over sets but 
replaces ordinary monadic predicates like ‘... is a chair’ with ‘chair of the region whose 
coordinates are’ that applies to some set or set of sets. The insistence on replacing the ordinary 
predicate further illustrates that there is something counter-intuitive about the predicate ‘... is a 
chair’ applying to sets and not material objects, which is to say that ‘... is a chair’ intuitively 
applies to material objects. 
But let us extend Putnam’s intuition and make the underlying point vivid by considering the 
following theory. Let us entertain a toy theory of frog-leaping, where ‘Fx’ represents ‘x is a frog’ 
and ‘Jxy’ represents ‘x jumps over y’. The following axioms are now introduced: 
a) ("x)("y)((Fx Ù Fy) É (Jxy Ú Jyx)) 
b) Ø("x)("y)("z)((Fx Ù Fy Ù Fz) É ((Jxy Ù Jyz) É Jxz)) 
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c) Ø("x)(Fx É Jxx) 
The theory says if any two things are frogs, then either one jumps over the other; but if the 
first frog jumps over the second and the second frog jumps over a third, it does not follow that 
the first frog jumps over the third; and lastly no frog can jump over itself. It is true that the theory 
of frog-leaping involves quantifiers that range over some kind of entity. But, what kind of entity 
it is said to quantify over can be determined by the predicates ‘... is a frog’ and ‘... jumps over 
...’. Simply considering the predicates alone, I say, yields a prima facie reason to think that the 
theory ‘assumes the existence’ of material objects that stand in spatial relations.15 Of course, to 
properly represent this state of affairs we must quantify over such kinds of entities. This is part of 
Quine’s insistence that we regiment our theories to determine their ontological commitment.  
But the point is that ideology sheds light on facts about the entities that are quantified over. 
As mentioned earlier, the predicates fulfil a descriptive function by being part of the descriptions 
of the world according to a theory (see Melia 2005, 67-8). It is through the predicates, operators, 
logical constants, etc, that a theory represents the structure of the world. This is not to say that 
‘the structure of the theory’ tells us what the structure of the world is, but rather ‘the structure of 
the theory’ offers an ‘intended structure’ (Wilson 1981, 412). The theory, after all, may be false.  
There is a way to vastly misunderstand the conclusion just drawn. For instance, Putnam 
argues that the cases above show us there is something wrong with Quine’s criterion of 
ontological commitment. Putnam seems to think that the predicates ‘presuppose objects just as 
much as quantifiers’. Therefore, if ontological commitment is understood in terms of 
quantification, we rule out the possibility of predicates playing any role in determining the 
                                               
15 If we are adverse to saying there are spatial relations that the frogs stand in, I am happy with the weaker claim that 
the theory assumes the existence of whatever the predicates apply to—in this case, frogs. 
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ontological commitments of a given theory. The objection concludes, this result does not sound 
at all plausible given the examples just considered. So Quine’s criterion should be rejected. But I 
think this is a misunderstanding for the following reasons. Firstly, Quine drew a distinction 
between the ontological commitments of a theory and its ontology. He reminds us that ontology 
is nothing more than the ‘range of the variables’ of a given theory whereas the ontological 
commitments involve the values that are ‘common to all ranges of interpretations of the given 
quantifiers’ (Quine 1969, 315). Therefore, it is Quine’s conception of ontology and not his 
criterion of ontological commitment that Putnam is really calling into question (cf. Wilson 1981, 
420). But more importantly, and this is the second reason, it does not follow that the criterion of 
ontological commitment should be rejected, but rather that our criterion of ideological 
commitment should be brought to the fore as a commitment on a par with our ontological 
commitments. In other words, ideological commitment should be understood as just another 
form of metaphysical commitment.16  
To be clear, we should conclude the following: 1) ideological commitments are treated on a 
par with ontological commitments, 2) our conception of ideology is about the world but only 
insofar as it represents the world having a certain ‘intended structure’, and 3) the way ideology 
represents the ‘intended structure’ of a theory is via expressing facts or true propositions and not 
by ontologically committing us to entities that must reside in our ontology.    
Our third consideration in favour of taking ideology seriously stems from a particular 
understanding of the role of concepts and conceptual analysis in metaphysical theorising. Frank 
Jackson, for instance, argues that ‘... conceptual analysis is the very business of addressing when 
                                               
16 Again, ‘metaphysical commitment’ is the broader phrase that encompasses ideological and ontological 
commitment. This is backed by the idea that metaphysics is ideology and ontology. 
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and whether a story told in one vocabulary is made true by one told in some allegedly more 
fundamental vocabulary’ (1998, 28). To illustrate using Jackson’s example, the justified-true-
belief account of knowledge is a thesis that the terms ‘belief’, ‘truth’, and ‘justification’ are used 
in an account to make true some other account that uses the word ‘knowledge’. According to 
Jackson, in explaining how a story told in one vocabulary makes true another story told in some 
less fundamental vocabulary, we entertain possible cases to search for counter-intuitive results. 
In the current illustration, Edmund Gettier (1963) showed us that the standard account of 
knowledge did not intuitively satisfy certain situations where accidently true beliefs were in fact 
justified. For Jackson, entertaining possible situations in this way amounts to conceptual analysis 
or at the very least to a kind of conceptual investigation that helps to provide an account such 
that one set of terms or vocabulary of a language is made true by some more fundamental 
language.17 
What is relevant for our purposes here is the claim that entertaining concepts in this way 
leads to 1) exploring the content of concepts we possess, and 2) providing an account of non-
fundamental vocabulary in terms of fundamental vocabulary.18 1) is mostly relevant because 
exploring the content of our concepts shows us something about the world or the way the world 
(or some portion of it) might have been, etc. If we think that concepts show us something about 
the world, then the predicates that are used to express them also show us something about the 
world. Again, we do not thereby ontologically commit ourselves to some ontology, for we are 
yet to determine what exactly makes those sentences true. But at the very least ideology on the 
Jacksonian view is about the world. So ideology ought to be taken seriously.  
                                               
17 If conceptual analysis is permitted to introduce talk of entities, then we have secured the claim that conceptual 
analysis is about the world.  
18 To what extent we consider 2) to be properly motivated depends on whether fundamentality is relative or absolute. 
I note this subtlety here. I do not have space to discuss it. 
41 
 
 
I am not endorsing Jackson’s thesis but I do take his proposal as one way to motivate the 
claim that ideology should be taken seriously. He has shown that concepts expressed by 
predicates and other devices of expression within the ideologies of our theories are ‘worldly’ in a 
sense that is relevant to metaphysical inquiry. Of course, if you are adverse to Jackson’s thesis or 
related claims (which I did not mention) concerning, say, two-dimensional semantics, then this 
motivation for taking ideology seriously is not for you. 
A fourth and final consideration brings doctrines from the philosophy of language to the fore. 
We might be attracted to the idea that there are Russellian propositions out there in the world, 
perhaps as abstract entities that have properties, objects and relations as their constituents. If I 
utter the sentence ‘the goat is in the argan tree’ I thereby express a proposition which has as parts 
some goat, that argan tree over in Morocco and the in relation. On such a picture the sentence 
‘gets at’ the world via this abstract entity, i.e., the Russellian proposition. If the sentence is true 
in virtue of the proposition it expresses, and the predicate and subject are components of the 
sentence, then the predicate and subject also ‘get at’ the world just as much as the sentence. If we 
think pieces of primitive ideology ‘get at’ the world somehow, then we should be attracted to the 
thought that ideology is about the world and not merely about our concepts. 
I sum, I take these four considerations to be various considerations in favour of the claim that 
ideology ought to be taken seriously. What it means to take ideology seriously is to believe that 
ideology is not only about our concepts or our conceptual scheme but also about the world. A 
device of expression, as I have shown, does not need to refer to an entity to be taken seriously. 
To reiterate, these considerations do not count in favour of ideological realism. In the final 
section of this chapter I discuss an objection against ideological realism.  
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1.4 The Forrest Objection to Ideological Realism 
 
Ideological realism is subject to an objection that attempts to show, as an unpalatable 
consequence, that a certain dispute in the metaphysics of properties comes out verbal or non-
substantive. I assume that this particular debate should not be regarded as verbal or non-
substantive. So, ideological realism ought to be rejected. Call this the Forrest objection. In this 
section I present the Forrest objection and provide a response which I believe successfully 
defends and helps clarify ideological realism. 
Before we consider the Forrest objection we need to understand the debate that is said to be 
verbal or non-substantive. To understand the two parties to the debate, we need to look at Ostrich 
Nominalism. Ostrich Nominalism is the view that there are only concrete particulars and all 
predicate are taken as pieces of primitive ideology. According to Ostrich Nominalism, the 
predicate ‘… is red’ applies to this letterbox but there is no further fact that explains why this 
letterbox is red. That the letterbox is red is just a brute fact, a fundamental truth according to 
Ostrich Nominalism.  
Forrest invites us to consider a certain breed of nominalist who adopts ideological realism. 
He calls the corresponding view ‘paranominalism’. Paranominalism is the nominalist competitor 
against realism about universals in the particular debate that Forrest thinks is merely verbal. 
Paranominalism is similar to ostrich nominalism in that both views take predicates such as ‘... is 
F’ as pieces of primitive ideology and claim that such predicates apply to certain particulars in 
virtue of nothing. The difference between the two is that paranominalism ‘takes predicates and 
modalities with the utmost seriousness’ (1993, 57) whereas ostrich nominalism does not. In some 
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fundamental language B, the paranominalist provides quantificational statements that tell us 
about their fundamental ontology, but they also provide ‘lists of the fundamental categories of 
predicates, lists of the fundamental modalities, and so on. These [ideological categories] would 
all be treated with just the same seriousness or objectivity as the ontology’ (ibid). Therefore, in 
B, sentences that possess predicational structure such as ‘a is F’ are taken as metaphysically 
significant and on a par with the ontology. This is more or less what ideological realism amounts 
to. 
Forrest sets up the major premise by considering a dispute between paranominalism and 
realism about universals in the context of the following project of ontological reduction. Suppose 
we have some language L which is reduced to some fundamental language B. The dispute is 
restricted to some non-fundamental language L which only contains subject-predicate sentences 
of the form ‘a is F’ (this is for simplicity’s sake). Now suppose the sentences of L are true 
because of the true sentences of B. We might say this reduction can be ‘expressed by means of 
schemata of the form: ‘S’ is true if P’ (Forrest 1993, 57), where ‘S’ is a truth of L and ‘P’ is a 
truth of B. 
The realist about universals says that sentences in L such as ‘a is F’ are true because 
particular a instantiates universal F. The fundamental language B would therefore contain the 
primitive dyadic predicate ‘... instantiates ...’ and be ontologically committed to two ontological 
categories, namely, particulars and universals that saturate either side of the ‘instantiation’ 
predicate. The paranominalist, by contrast, presents the fundamental language B as being 
ontologically committed to one category, namely, concrete particulars but retains ‘a long list of 
predicates’ that describe the ideology (Forrest 1993, 58). The dispute is set up such that the 
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realist says the predicates of the paranominalist correspond to their universals. Therefore, Forrest 
concludes, 
[t]his dispute is, I suggest, a verbal or conceptual one, not one concerning matters of fact. The 
long list of predicates required by the paranominalist stands in one-to-one correspondence with 
the category of repeatables [universals] of the realist, and these predicates show us as much about 
the world as do the repeatables [universals] (1993, 58). 
There is no difference between paranominalism and realism about universals. If there is no 
difference between the two, then the dispute is verbal or conceptual. It is verbal or conceptual 
because there is a difference based on us given that what view we adopt depends on whether we 
choose metaphysically significant predicates over properties out there in the world. There is 
nothing else to discuss. But as metaphysical realists this debate between realism and nominalism 
is substantive and not verbal. If we cannot accept this dispute as verbal, ideological realism is 
false and we should, at Forrest’s behest, reject views like paranominalism.   
The most appropriate response to the Forrest objection is to question the comparison between 
the two views, as this is required to show that the dispute is verbal. There are some 
complications with the comparison, as Forrest (1993, 58-9) notes. For instance, if we consider 
complex instances of resemblances between properties such as ‘red resembles orange more than 
blue’, the paranominalist will require further paraphrases. But this won’t undermine the 
comparison; it just makes the comparison more convoluted. There are other potential 
complexities involving ‘causal regularities’, which likewise can be set aside by restricting our 
focus to the simple example set above.     
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The difference between the two views can be drawn, I say, by looking at the ideology of the 
realist. Their ideology contains the dyadic predicate ‘… instantiates …’ whereas the 
paranominalist’s does not. Indeed, nominalists of most varieties have an aversion to such a 
predicate as it involves ‘metaphysical glue’ that sticks universals and particulars together in a 
mysterious way. This ideological difference is one starting point which may help to undermine 
the objection. But Forrest has a reply to this move. The dispute between the paranominalist and 
the realist is actually set up using his brand of realism. To understand the reply we need to look 
at Forrest’s view in a bit more detail. 
Forrest puts forth an ontology of universals and particulars. Both ontological categories are 
fundamental in that neither ontologically depend on each other nor any other category. He rejects 
the Armstrongian thesis that all universals supervene on their instances and so are not separable 
from them. Some universals, for various reasons, are taken to be uninstantiated and so separate 
from particulars, particulars that could instantiate them. By contrast, Armstrong believes that 
there is one fundamental ontological category of states of affairs that grounds (thin) particulars 
and universals. They are ‘abstractions from states of affairs’ (Armstrong 1997b, 29).  
Forrest provides arguments for his position which need not distract us here (see 1993, §1). 
What is relevant is how we account for instantiation on his view. If universals are independent of 
particulars, then when related to particulars, we require that a instantiates F just because a and F 
are related by the instantiation relation R. Given that R is a universal, i.e., a repeatable entity, it is 
independent of a and F. Thus, it is related to a and F just because it is related to a by some 
relation R1 and related to F by R2. These further relations, given that they too are independent 
repeatable entities, require relations to be related to the things they are related to, and so on, but 
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in such a way that the explanation for why one thing is related to another is pushed back onto the 
newly introduced relation. The ensuing regress is a vicious one (Forrest 1993, 55). 
Forrest’s response to the regress is to say that the instantiation relation is not independent of 
its relata. He is entitled to say this because he holds the view that only some universals are 
uninstantiated. The universals that are instantiated presumably depend on their instances. He 
writes, ‘… if it be asked which properties or relations fail to be independent, then I reply that the 
threat of a regress shows that the relation of instantiation is not independent of what it relates’ 
(1993, 56). On this view, particulars are to be identified with what Armstrong calls thick 
particulars or ‘particulars-in-a-situation’ (ibid). To illustrate, consider that particular letterbox 
and the property of being red. The letterbox is the letterbox ‘in all its redness’ and not to be 
regarded as a bare entity ‘in itself’. The fact that the letterbox instantiates redness is, therefore, 
grounded in the essence of the letterbox and redness; the instantiation relation supervenes on the 
intrinsic nature of its relata. If it is dependent on what it relates, then the regress does not 
materialise. If a regress of relations were to be generated, it would be of internal relations that are 
‘nothing on top of’ their relata. In addition, facts about their instantiation would be explained in 
terms of the nature of their relata (see also Nolan 2008).19   
Forrest can reply that there is no ideological difference caused by the ‘instantiation’ predicate 
as it does not mark out some extra feature of the world (1993, 58). In short, there is no relation of 
instantiation. Instantiation facts can be made true or explained by the natures of universals and 
particulars. But I find the reply unconvincing. First, we commit ourselves to what Armstrong 
calls the doctrine of an ‘ontological free lunch’ (1997b, 12). Entity e is a free lunch just in case e 
                                               
19 Another solution is offered by starting with facts as the most basic entities and taking universals and particulars to 
be dependent on facts. But since I am discussing the issue within Forrest’s ontology of universals and particulars I 
leave this proposed solution to one side.  
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is no addition to being. If e is ontically entailed by the mereological sum of a and b, then e is no 
addition to being. But it remains to be seen why saying there is a relation of instantiation does 
not invite us to include it as an element of ontology when working within a Quinean framework 
that presupposes the distinction between ideology and ontology (cf. Benardete 2002, 357). It 
seems we cannot have it both ways. Second, the reply undermines the full extent of ideological 
realism. All pieces of primitive ideology even if they do not commit us or correspond to some 
entity nonetheless express facts about the world. It isn’t just a matter of what the ideology 
‘shows us’ according to the ideological realist. So, from this standpoint if the realist has an 
‘instantiation’ predicate they are committed to fundamental facts expressed in B that the 
paranominalist is not ideologically committed to. 
A possible response: if a piece of ideology is to be part of the fundamental language—and so 
a piece of primitive ideology—it has to be ‘unreduced’ to anything in the ontology. So, given 
that Forrest claims there is a relation of instantiation, the ‘instantiation’ predicate can be reduced 
and thus not included in the primitive ideology. As a result, the lack of a difference between 
Forrest’s realism and paranominalism is again secured. But this only moves the bulge in the 
carpet. We began with the assumption that for every predicate of the paranominalist there exist a 
corresponding universal in the realist’s ontology and vice-versa. However, if the paranominalist 
rejects the universal of instantiation, then we have undermined the initial assumption of a one-
one correspondence between the realist’s ontology and the paranominalist’s ideology.    
My last comment on the difference between Forrest’s realism and paranominalism is directed 
towards undetected pieces of primitive ideology in the paranominalist camp. For instance, if they 
introduce the monadic predicate ‘… is F’ and say that it applies to a in virtue of nothing, then a 
primitive ‘application’ predicate is required to express this fact or to be part of the sentence ‘‘… 
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is F applies to a’’ (see Armstrong 1978a, ch. 2). Thus, we have another ideological difference 
that undermines the conclusion that this metaphysical dispute is verbal. The realist’s ideology 
won’t have an ‘application’ predicate. 
The Forrest objection teaches us about an important aspect of ideological realism. The view 
is not primarily concerned with what can be ‘shown’ as opposed to what can be ‘said’. Rather it 
is concerned with expressing fundamental facts about the world. If a piece of ideology is taken as 
primitive, it becomes part of the fundamental ideology or ideology of the fundamental language. 
In this language the pieces of primitive ideology are involved in sentences that express 
fundamental facts about the world. The primitive ideology of some fundamental language when 
saturated in certain ways to form sentences expresses facts about the fundamental structure of the 
world. Forrest’s realism, therefore, posits extra structure to that of the paranominalist. Therefore, 
the ‘instantiation’ predicate is a further ideological commitment that is not held by the 
paranominalist. The dispute between paranominalism and realism is based in part on ideological 
disagreements. 
Ideology represents the world being a certain way and it is through this representation of 
reality that the theory posits structure. If the theory is true, then the world contains the structure 
posited by the theory.  In the next chapter we will look at the methodological consequences of 
ideological realism. In particular, we will discuss how the realist notion of ideology affects our 
understanding of the ideology/ontology distinction and how ideological realism interprets the 
virtue of ideological parsimony. 
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2 
Ideological Realism and Method 
 
According to ideological realism, the concept of ideology plays a crucial role in our 
metaphysical theorising and evaluation of theories. The notion of ideology however affects the 
way we understand the distinction between ideology and ontology. In light of ideological realism 
we need to determine how the ideology/ontology distinction is properly understood. This is the 
first concern of this chapter. Another goal of this chapter is to see ideological realism at work in 
certain metaphysical disputes. To this end I critically discuss an objection by Karen Bennett 
(2009) which concludes that in certain metaphysical disputes we have no grounds for adopting 
one competing theory over another. I provide a response to Bennett’s objection using ideological 
realism and the understanding of the ideology/ontology distinction argued for in the beginning of 
the chapter.  
 
2.1 Two Understandings 
 
In metaphysics we propose fundamental descriptions of the world which aim to ‘record’ what the 
world is really like.1 Ideological realism offers a particular conception of ideology that is 
connected to the notion of structure. Ideology gets at the world by representing reality’s 
                                               
1 The guiding intuition behind this general claim is the idea that ‘[l]anguage is a describer and recorder of reality, not 
its creator’ (Gottlieb 1980, 4). 
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structure.2 If ideology, according to ideological realism, is about structure, and primitive 
ideology ‘posits’ fundamental structure, it seems right to say that ideology is about the world and 
that it ‘gets at’ the world in some way. Indeed if we are metaphysical realists, we want to further 
say that there is a metaphysically significant description of the world. That is, there is an 
objective answer as to which ideology is the ideology that ‘carves reality at its joints’.  
Our notion of ideology determines to what extent we take seriously the virtue of ideological 
parsimony. It will be helpful to pause here to mention some methodological consequences 
surrounding this theoretical virtue. 
The currency of ideological parsimony is the primitive predicates or terms of a theory. 
Ideological complexity is understood usually in terms of the number of primitives. However, 
there is some precedent for believing that the argument places of a term also count as an increase 
in complexity. The ‘mysteriousness’ of primitives may also be a guide concerning the 
introduction of primitives, but perhaps not a guide for determining ideological complexity. The 
latter constraint tends to derive more from the intelligibility or lack thereof of a primitive.  
If we are happy with the phrase ‘ideological posit’, then an ideological razor is not far off: do 
not posit ideological primitives more than necessary. This razor is intended as an application to a 
single theory. If we had some fact that ought to be explained by our theory and no other 
primitive term could be used in the explanation of this fact, then we are entitled to introduce an 
extra primitive into our theory. For example, if our theory consisted of the ideology of first-order 
                                               
2 Ideology consists of linguistic expressions and is derivatively concerned with the expression of ‘ideas’ or concepts. 
One reason why the expressing of ideas is typically associated with ideology and linguistic expressions is that 
propositions may have concepts or ideas (following the Fregean tradition) as constituents. If propositions have 
concepts as parts, then the predicate in expressing an idea expresses part of a proposition. Or rather the sentence 
expresses the proposition. If propositions had objects, properties and relations as constituents (following the 
Russellian tradition), then the appeal to ‘ideas’ or the expressing of concepts would not be as relevant. I leave it 
open whether propositions are Fregean, Russellian, or some mixture of the two. 
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logic (with identity) and we were required to explain facts about composite objects and no 
logical primitive could explain these facts, then we would have good reason to introduce a non-
logical primitive such as ‘parthood’ or ‘overlap’ into our theory. (Assuming that ‘parthood’ is 
not already understood as a logical notion.) 
An application of ideological parsimony to two theories usually occurs when comparing the 
number of primitives of each theory. The theory with fewer primitives is to be preferred and 
perhaps in a strong epistemic sense. The theory with fewer primitives is more likely to be true. 
Sider (ms) assigns a strong epistemic status to ideological parsimony. He believes that 
ideological parsimony is a guide to truth. For instance, he thinks that a particular version of 
mereological nihilism is true because it has fewer primitives than competing theories. But what 
is our justification for this?   
Traditionally, ideological parsimony has been motivated by ‘aesthetic elegance’. Fewer 
primitives provide a theory with a tight-knit unity originating from just a handful of terms. The 
motivation of aesthetic elegance comes from the axiomatisation of logic and mathematical 
theories (Oliver 1996, 3). 
But if ideology is concerned about the world and if ideology (purportedly) represents the 
structure of reality, then our justification for reducing the number of primitives in our theory is 
more about the world than constructing an elegance system of primitive and derivative terms. 
This is so particularly when we are concerned with providing a fundamental description of 
reality. Presumably we are only concerned with the unanalysable terms. The nonprimitive terms 
are less important and drop out of the picture. Indeed in cases where we introduce talk of entities 
this ideology will be eliminated from our theory altogether. At any rate, we must be serious in 
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the theoretical activity of taking something as primitive. If we have the option to ‘resist analysis’ 
in order to stave off ontological commitment (say), then the choice cannot be taken lightly.    
Now, given this robust and serious conception of ideology, how should we understand its 
relationship to ontology? There are two ways to understand the ideology/ontology distinction and 
hence the relationship between the two.3 According to the first way, a piece of primitive ideology 
is taken as primitive because the entity that it names or refers to is fundamental. To illustrate, 
take the property being charged and suppose it is fundamental. If it is a fundamental property, 
then our theory must include the predicate ‘... is charged’ as a piece of primitive ideology. 
According to this answer we can understand how primitive ideology ‘gets at’ the world and ‘gets 
at’ its structure. Our ideology contains the primitives that it does because of what is in the world 
and what the world is like. Our ideology contains certain predicates because the world has 
certain properties; our ideology contains certain operators because the world has certain entities 
that are modified in certain ways. For each entity or kind of entity there is a corresponding piece 
of ideology. Call this interpretation of the ideology/ontology distinction, the reflectance 
understanding. 
A major consequence of this interpretation of the ideology/ontology distinction is that the 
ideological costs are aligned with the ontological costs of the theory. To illustrate, take Hud 
Hudson’s (2005) occupancy account of material objects. The theory consists of two ontological 
categories: regions of spacetime, and material objects that occupy regions of spacetime. 
According to the theory, there exists a relation of occupation that holds between region and 
object, and there are fundamental truths in the theory such as ‘there exists some material object 
O and a region R such that O occupies R’. Now, let’s look at its costs. The theory is ontologically 
                                               
3 There might be other ways, but I am limiting the discussion to two. 
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committed to regions (and hence, substantivalism about regions), material objects and a 
fundamental relation of occupation, namely, the being occupied by relation.4 However, in 
addition to these ontological costs, there are ideological costs. In particular, because the 
occupation relation is included in the ontology of the theory, we require as a piece of primitive 
ideology the two-place predicate ‘... occupies ...’. We ‘reflect’ this element of ontology in the 
ideology. Thus, the theory has the ‘occupation’ primitive as an ideological cost. A theory will 
therefore be economical and parsimonious at the same time, or violate both virtues at the same 
time.  
According to the second way, ideology is ontologically innocent and does not correspond to 
items in our ontology. In contrast to the first interpretation, it is not the case that a piece of 
primitive ideology is introduced because the entity it refers to is fundamental. Instead, primitive 
ideology is about figuring in sentences that express fundamental facts about the world and its 
structure. Call this the traditional understanding of the ideology/ontology distinction, if only 
because it adheres to the traditional (i.e., Quinean) standpoint that primitive ideology is 
ontologically innocent and the well rehearsed dictum that we must quantify over something for it 
to belong to our ontology. Ideological realism, on the traditional understanding, is about 
fundamental facts about the world. The job of the metaphysical realist is to provide a 
fundamental theory that has both a primitive ideology and a fundamental ontology (i.e., what 
there is fundamentally). If a theory contains as a piece of primitive ideology the predicate ‘... is 
charged’ and has an ontology of concrete particulars, then it is a fundamental fact that some 
particular is charged. If the introduction of the two-place predicate ‘... is present at ...’ or ‘... 
occupies ...’ is a piece of primitive ideology it does not correspond to a relation of occupation 
                                               
4 Hudson talks of a ‘primitive relation ‘present at’’ (2005, 3) and later says ‘as with parthood, occupation is here 
treated as a two-place relation’ (2005, 6). See also (Hudson 2005, 102).  
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that resides in the ontology of the theory. Instead it is a brute fact that some material object 
occupies some region of spacetime; the sentence ‘object O occupies region R’ expresses a 
fundamental fact in the theory. To be sure, there might be interesting metaphysical questions 
about how and when an object occupies a region, and of course these questions require answers 
in the form of explanations. But that objects occupy regions is a fundamental fact in the theory. 
A major methodological consequence of the traditional understanding is that the ideological 
cost of a theory does not imply an ontological cost or vice-versa. For instance, if the occupancy 
theorist introduces a two-place predicate ‘... occupies ...’ they incur an ideological cost, they 
have increased the number of primitives in the theory. But it does not follow that there is an 
ontological cost as primitive ideology is ontologically innocent. Furthermore, the traditional 
understanding makes room for ideology and ontology to be traded off one another. An 
ideological cost can be reduced by introducing talk of entities. It is true that if there is an 
ontological cost, then there is some ideological cost, but it is not a direct corresponding cost. So 
for example if there exists the fundamental property being charged, then there is no 
corresponding ‘… is charged’ predicate. Instead, any fundamental facts about the property lead 
to a cost in ideology. For example, the fact that being charged is instantiated requires the dyadic 
predicate of ‘instantiation’. More on this later. 
In what follows, I argue against the reflectance understanding (§2.2), provide some reasons 
to believe in the traditional understanding and discuss some of its advantages by discussing 
debates concerning the existence of abstract entities and possible worlds (§2.3). I finally discuss 
Bennett’s claim that in certain disputes there are no grounds for believing in one theory over the 
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other and argue that when ideological realism and the traditional understanding are taken into 
account we do have grounds for believing in one theory over the other (§2.4).5  
    
2.2 Against Reflectance 
 
One of the consequences of the reflectance understanding is that whenever there is an ideological 
cost there is a direct corresponding ontological cost, but not vice-versa. For example, for every 
primitive predicate there is a corresponding property. But why accept this sort of one-one 
correspondence? Indeed, I take the following to show us that it is not the case that whenever 
there is an ideological cost there is a direct corresponding ontological one.  
Firstly, we should be reminded that Quine’s original motivation for drawing the 
ideology/ontology distinction was to articulate a way in which the certain aspects of the 
sentences of a theory, such as predicates, did not correspond to properties. Ideology was said to 
be wholly distinct from ontology. Therefore, if a theory incurred an ideological cost it did not 
likewise incur an ontological cost. Indeed, to render the nominalist’s position coherent primitive 
ideology must be ontologically innocent. If the reflectance understanding is true, then we 
undermine our initial motivations for introducing the distinction. We also undermine the 
purported difference between ideology and ontology. In effect it becomes a distinction without a 
difference. 
                                               
5 Overall, I aim to show ideological realism at work with the traditional understanding of the ideology/ontology 
distinction. It must be further noted that some of the claims made in this chapter are normative. I argue, for instance, 
that the ideology/ontology distinction should be understood in a certain way. The arguments, however, are not to be 
seen as endorsing a particular metaphysical view. 
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Secondly, to say there is a one-one correspondence between predicates and properties might 
seem to suggest that for every predicate in our language there exists a corresponding property in 
the sense that there is a one-one mapping between a piece of language and a feature in the world. 
In what follows, let us consider some examples from ordinary language (which are mostly 
uncontroversial, but illustrative) and then consider cases from the fundamental language.  
For instance, the predicate ‘... is red’ in English would typically correspond to the property 
being red. But why think that ordinary language ‘gets at’ the world in this way? In fact we have 
reasons as metaphysical realists to think that the structure of the world, what is in it, what it is 
like, etc, is independent of what we say and think as well as independent of the subtleties of our 
language and its expressions therein. Many have argued for ‘sparse theories’ of properties that do 
not take properties as linguistic shadows of language. Suppose we have in our language the 
sentence ‘... accelerates through the speed of light’ and further suppose there is no property of 
being accelerated through the speed of light. There will then be no property to which the 
predicate corresponds (Armstrong 1978b, 10). Keith Campbell argued for the same conclusion 
but within a theory of tropes. According to Campbell, tropes (the ultimate ontological assay of 
reality) are not part of any semantic theory concerning the application of predicates to the world. 
If we have the sentence ‘a is F’ which is said to be meaningful, we do not require ‘there to be F 
tropes’ (Campbell 1990, 25).6  
In addition, it would be wrong to think the predicate ‘... is a unicorn’ corresponds to the 
property being a unicorn, or that Wittgenstein’s predicate ‘... is a game’ corresponds to the 
property being a game. In the first case there may not be any fictional properties of fictional 
                                               
6 Others have picked up on the disconnect between properties and predicates, see for example (Mellor 1991; Wilson 
1982, 558-61). 
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entities and in the second the properties that are said to be game-properties are distinct properties 
of specific games such that no unifying features exist to yield the property of being a game. The 
predicate remains primitive but there is no corresponding property. Last one: if we were 
expressivists in the best of moods, we would include the primitive predicate ‘... is good’ in our 
moral theory and we might say ‘the maximisation of well-being is good’ but it does not follow 
that there is a corresponding property of being good. We merely cheer for the content of the 
utterance of the sentence and recommend that others do also. I conclude that ideology does not 
determine the extent of our ontology and that it is not the case that whenever there is an 
ideological cost there is a direct corresponding ontological cost. Therefore, the reflectance 
understanding of the ideology/ontology distinction is wrong. 
You might object by pointing out that the examples employed above involve predicates from 
ordinary language. Predicates, such as, ‘... is a unicorn’, ‘... is a game’, ‘... is red’, ‘... is good’, 
etc, are to be culled from our fundamental language. That is, the language which provides a 
fundamental description of reality that ‘comprises a minimal basis’ non-redundantly. Therefore, 
semantically defective, fictional, systematically ambiguous, etc, predicates are to be eliminated 
from the ideology of our theory (see Dorr 2004, 157). If we endorse this kind of culling, then the 
examples above seem irrelevant and so do not give us a reason to reject any one-one 
correspondence between the primitive ideology of the fundamental language and the properties 
within its fundamental ontology. 
But I do not believe that eliminating predicates of this kind undermines our reason for 
rejecting this kind of one-one correspondence. The same issues that arise for ordinary language 
arise for the fundamental language—particularly when we reflect on more metaphysical reasons 
for rejecting this kind of one-one correspondence. For example, Armstrong (1978b, 11) argues 
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that one of the foundations of ‘a posteriori realism’ requires that we reject the existence of 
properties that are determined a priori to exist. This sort of reasoning if correct will apply to the 
fundamental language just as much as ordinary languages. For instance, consider the ‘identity’ 
predicate in the fundamental language B.7 There are truths in B, such as, ‘x is identical with 
itself’ where the ‘identity’ predicate applies to every particular. We know that this is the case a 
priori, and given Armstrong’s a posteriori realism, all purported entities that are known a priori 
are to be rejected as properties (or in his case, universals). What universals there are is 
determined a posteriori from science and whether or not they are causally efficacious. For 
instance, since the property of being self-identical is not causally efficacious, it does not exist (or 
is not a sparse universal). 
You might reject the Armstrongian project, so let us consider other reasons for denying that 
there is a relation of identity. We might think that intuitively some relation R exists just in case R 
holds between non-overlapping relata.8 If the relata overlap, there is no relation R. The identity 
relation, were it to exist, holds between one thing; the relata would be identical and so 
overlapping. Thus, no relation of identity. Of course, this kind of argument can be resisted. The 
point is that there are at least some reasons to deny that there exists a relation of identity. 
Therefore, to say that there is a relation of identity is not an uncontroversial thesis. If this kind of 
one-one correspondence holds, we have ruled out the position that the relation of identity does 
not exist from the outset and assumed by definition a contested ontological thesis. 
Here are two further examples. First, consider converse predicates. Take the predicate ‘x 
admires y’ and suppose it corresponds to a property/relation. This predicate also has a converse, 
                                               
7 It is common to take ‘identity’ as a piece of primitive ideology. 
8 The intuition here comes from understanding a relation as literally an entity that holds between two other entities. 
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namely, ‘y is admired by x’. But intuitively it is implausible to say that the converse corresponds 
to the distinct property of being admired by (Simons 2010, 207). We intuitively think it 
corresponds to the same property as ‘x admires y’. Second, logical examples arise in the 
fundamental language just as much as in ordinary language. ‘P or Q’ may be part of the 
fundamental language but fail to correspond to some disjunctive property being P or Q. This 
consideration can also lead to the conclusion that we should reject disjunctive predicates from 
the ideology of our theory. But then again, this proposal is up for discussion as ‘Ú’ may be used 
as a primitive predicate to define up conjunction and other logical predicates in the fundamental 
language. 
There are other ways to deny this kind of one-one correspondence between primitive 
ideology and ontology. Instead of looking at the primitive predicates of a theory let us consider 
primitive operators. If this kind of one-one correspondence holds, then not only primitive 
predicates correspond to properties, but other pieces of primitive ideology, such as operators and 
logical constants, correspond to portions of the world in the same way. Take the tense operator 
‘it was the case that ...’. What in the world does it correspond to? What is the worldly correlate 
of this tense operator? It could be a property, say, a property of a proposition as follows. Take 
the following sentence in which the tense operator figures: ‘it was the case that p’. This sentence 
expresses the proposition that p and the operator modifies the proposition accordingly. This 
modification can be understood as another feature or possible feature of the proposition, which is 
simply to say that the worldly correlate of the tense operator is a property. If so, then the same 
problems concerning one-one correspondence with predicates arises for operators (cf. Sider 
2011, 85-90).  
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Let us consider logical constants, e.g., ‘Ú’, ‘Ù’, ‘Ø’. If primitive ideology implies an 
ontological cost, what are their worldly correlates? One answer: relations. For instance, the 
primitive constant ‘Ù’ would correspond to the relation of conjunction. But if so, we can safely 
subsume this case under the issues surrounding predicates and properties. As above, we have no 
reason to think there is a relation anymore than we have reason to think that ‘... is F’ corresponds 
to F-ness. 
You might react to the suggestion that primitive ideology is not ontologically committing by 
saying: ‘sure enough some pieces of ideology are ontologically innocent, such as primitive 
predicates, but there are pieces of primitive ideology that do correspond to entities in our 
ontology. For instance, when discovering the nature of the parthood relation it is common to take 
the two-place predicate ‘... is part of ...’ as primitive and say that the primitive predicate 
expresses the relation of part. Likewise, the two-place predicate ‘... occupies ...’ expresses the 
relation of occupation that holds between regions and objects. So, although some predicates do 
not correspond to entities in our ontology, others do (as just illustrated)’. 
I reply that this admits a harmful confusion between a predicate expressing a property with 
expressing a concept. If anything we should say that a predicate expresses the concept of a 
relation or property. But it still fails to imply that the corresponding entity exists. I may have the 
concept of a leprechaun, which is a concept of an object, but it does not follow that it exists. 
Likewise, a predicate that expresses the concept of a relation does not imply that the relation 
exists.  
In addition, if we accept that two-place predicates correspond to relations but one-place 
predicates do not, then what grounds this demarcation? What reason do we have to say that two-
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place and not one-place predicates correspond to ontology? One reason might be the linguistic 
difference in adicity between the two predicates. But why think that a linguistic feature is enough 
to secure the connection between some parts of ideology to ontology? I submit it is hopeless to 
appeal to such linguistic differences. It is nothing more than a case of inspecting the features of 
language and mapping them in an objectionable way to the world (for proponents of this charge 
more generally, see (Dyke 2008; Heil 2003)). I admit that philosophers talk in ways that push 
them to freely talk about the world by reifying the entities they are said to be concerned with. 
But that they have this tendency is no reason to say we should adopt the methodological 
principle that primitive ideology (or some parts thereof) corresponds to ontology. 
In denying the claim that whenever there is an ideological cost there is a direct ontological 
cost I do not mean to reject the fact that some philosophers, such as Armstrong, argue that some 
predicates correspond to properties, that is, to sparse universals. According to Armstrong, 
predicates that do correspond to properties are called ‘pure’ predicates (Armstrong 1978b, 15). 
Lewis also claimed that the terms of a primitive vocabulary ‘express’ perfectly natural properties 
(1983, 368). The pressing question now is: how are we to interpret Armstrong and Lewis’ 
position on the assumption that there is no one-one correspondence between primitive predicates 
and fundamental ontology? Concerning Armstrong, we should interpret his claim that there are 
pure predicates as saying that pure predicates are not part of the primitive ideology of his theory. 
The fact that these predicates apply to certain particulars is in virtue of certain universals being 
instantiated by some particular(s). Therefore, these predicates are not primitive (i.e., unanalysed) 
because they have been analysed in terms of universals, the universals that explain why they 
apply to some particulars and not others. Similarly, we can interpret Lewis’ use of the term 
‘primitive’ not as ‘unanalysable’ in the sense that no analysis or account can be given of such 
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predicates, but rather as expressing perfectly natural properties. The sense of primitive here is 
different to its use concerning unanalysable ideology. As Cian Dorr remarks, ‘the question 
whether a predicate is primitive is quite different from the question whether a predicate 
corresponds to a universal’ (2004, 156, n. 4, his italics). 
And I think Lewis would agree that primitive ideology does not correspond to ontology, for 
in his theory of classes he requires a singleton operator that expresses the notion of a connection 
between concrete particular and unit set. This operator cannot correspond to a relation that holds 
between the two relata. The whole point, on his view, of introducing the singleton operator as a 
piece of primitive ideology is to say that there is no relation that holds between concrete 
particular and unit set (for discussion, see Lewis 2002, §5). If we interpreted him as believing in 
some kind of one-one correspondence between primitive predicates and fundamental ontology, 
his view of classes would be glaringly inconsistent.9  
To be clear, if we intend to offer an analysis of predication or of a predicate (of some type) 
by introducing talk of entities, then by giving this analysis the predicate that is part of the 
analysandum (what is being analysed) corresponds to a property (or ends up corresponding). But 
then the predicate ceases to be primitive, as we have given an analysis of it by trading it off for 
some ontology. We have ontologically committed ourselves to a particular property such that in 
our fundamental description of reality we are not required to say ‘… is F’ rather we say ‘there 
exists an F …’ or as I will suggest in chapter 4: ‘there exists some thing …’. 
We can now draw an interesting distinction between differing senses of the word ‘primitive’. 
We have identified two senses already at work in our metaphysical theorising. The first sense is 
                                               
9 Same remarks apply to his use of the primitive predicate ‘... is natural’ which applies to classes. 
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connected to unanalysability and ideology (the opposing side of ontology) and the second is 
connected to ontology. The first sense of ‘primitive’ means ‘unanalysable’ in a theory. Primitive 
ideology, in this sense, does not correspond to any items in the fundamental ontology. By 
contrast, the second sense of ‘primitive’ means ‘corresponds to an item in the fundamental 
ontology’. I reserve the use of the word ‘primitive’ for the first sense.  
 
2.3 The Traditional Understanding 
 
According to the traditional understanding of the ideology/ontology distinction primitive 
ideology is not ontologically committal and is not part of our ontology. Ideology, as the 
distinction tells us, is the opposing coin of ontology. But just because ideology is not 
ontologically committal or ‘ontologically significant’ it does not mean ideology lacks any 
metaphysical import. Ideology provides a serious descriptive function in any theory—whether 
one is a nominalist, realist or whatever. The way we are to understand the metaphysical import of 
ideology is to say that pieces of primitive ideology figure in sentences that express fundamental 
facts about the world. So although there is no one-one correspondence between ideology and 
ontology, ideology plays a part in ‘getting at’ the fundamental facts by being part of sentences 
that express fundamental facts. In light of ideological realism, there is a fact of the matter about 
what is the metaphysically privileged description of reality.  
We should adopt the traditional understanding for the following reasons. First, it retains a 
real difference between ideology and ontology that was lost on the reflectance understanding. 
Second, it allows the ideological and ontological costs of a theory to remain separate. Third, it 
rightly separates ideological parsimony and ontological economy such that an increase in the 
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number of primitives does not imply additional entities in our fundamental ontology. Fourth, it 
captures the fact that ideology and ontology (in many cases) can be traded off one another. I take 
all these reasons as supporting the traditional understanding and as reasons to reject the 
reflectance understanding. The remainder of this section discusses these reasons at length. (This 
section includes some mention of ideological realism where relevant.)  
One advantage of the traditional understanding is that it is able to capture the trade-off that 
occurs in some cases between ideology and ontology. By contrast, the reflectance understanding 
cannot capture cases of trade-off because whenever there is an ideological cost there is a direct 
ontological one. On the reflectance view if we attempt to introduce talk of entities with the hope 
of ‘reducing’ a primitive predicate so that it is no longer primitive, our attempt is undermined at 
the outset since the primitive predicate prior to the analysis already corresponds to the entity. So 
where is the trade-off to occur?  
Let us look at two common cases of trading ideology for ontology in relation to the 
traditional understanding of the ideology/ontology distinction. The first debate I consider comes 
from the philosophy of mathematics. The major disagreement concerns the existence of abstract 
entities, such as, numbers or sets. According to the nominalist about numbers and sets, for 
example, Hartry Field (1980) and Charles Chihara (1990), the truths of mathematics can be 
accounted for without quantifying over abstract entities. The apparent commitment to abstract 
entities is negated by the introduction of primitive modal ideology. So long as we introduce a 
primitive modal operator that does not ontologically commit us to anything, we can uphold the 
nominalist project. We uphold the nominalist project because by introducing a modal operator 
we are not saying that numbers of sets exists. Realists about abstract entities (numbers or sets), 
by contrast, believe in an ontology of abstract entities. They think the only way to account for the 
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truths of mathematics is to admit numbers or sets as values of variables of the theory. The 
dispute is one of embracing modal ideology versus abstract ontology (see Shapiro 1997, 218). 
Quine, the most famous realist of all, confesses that, 
‘[w]here there are such trade-offs to choose between, I am for positing the objects. I posit abstract 
ones grudgingly on the whole, but gratefully where the alternative course would call for modal 
operators’ (1990, 30-1). 
The trade-off in this debate turns on the epistemology of modal ideology and the acceptance 
of modal notions in our theory. Quine repudiated such notions and thereby excluded modal 
operators from his ideology. We might describe Quine as having an austere ideology. Since he 
rejected modal notions and modal operators but still wanted to accept the truths of mathematics, 
Quine was forced to introduce quantification over abstract entities. So, according to Quine our 
best theory in effect says that numbers (or sets) exists, and so he is ontologically committed to 
numbers (or sets).  
On the other hand if a nominalist thought that modal notions were after all respectable as 
pieces of primitive ideology, then they would not find Quine’s quantification over abstract 
entities necessary. They would be happy with the notion of a ‘possible structure’ as opposed to 
saying there exists abstract entities that exist outside of space and time. 
This debate shows us how the trade-off between ideology and ontology is important for 
understanding the realist and nominalist’s concerns. If modal ideology was just another 
ontological commitment, then the nominalist would have no justification for introducing it. The 
whole point of introducing modal ideology was to stave off ontological commitment simpliciter. 
Now, according to ideological realism, ideological commitments are on a par with ontological 
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commitments. Therefore, the nominalist’s modal ideology commits them to the view that modal 
facts are among the fundamental facts of the world. In other words, it commits them to saying 
that the world has an irreducible modal structure (see Sider 2011, ch. 12).    
If modal notions are acceptable and worthy enough to be in our modal ideology, there is of 
course the further question of whether such ideology can itself be reduced to further ontology. 
This leads me to the next metaphysical dispute, the dispute concerning the existence of possible 
worlds. Lewis provided an influential argument for the view that the actual world is just a 
concrete particular amongst many others in a vast plurality. Given that facts about modality are 
amongst the things that must be explained by our metaphysical theories, he argued that the modal 
operators of necessity and possibility are better off analysed in terms of quantification over 
worlds as follows: 
(W) possibly p just in case there is a world w in which p is true.  
Lewis argued that the postulation of worlds and the ontological roles they fulfil are 
indispensible in the context of providing explanations for modal predication and explanations 
that use modal terms or talk of possibilia and possible worlds. Lewis’ theory is ideologically 
parsimonious, it provides a reductive account of modality, it is qualitatively economical and has 
great explanatory breadth.10 The philosophical utility afforded by the view is a good reason to 
believe it is true (see Lewis 1986b, ch. 1). 
The trade-off here is between modal ideology and an ontology of possible worlds. But note 
that we are not trading the operator ‘possibly, …’ for ‘there exists an x such that x is a possible 
world’. If this is how the trade-off was understood, then we would not have a real gain in 
                                               
10 See (Daly 2005, §2) for a sceptical reaction to some of these supposed theoretical advantages.  
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ideological parsimony (i.e., we wouldn’t have reduce the number of primitive terms). Instead we 
would have merely swapped ‘possibly, …’ for ‘… is a possible world’. The way to understand 
the trade-off in Lewis’ case is to recall that by assuming a world as a value of a variable we are 
putting the world in the subject place of the sentence. We do not require the predicate ‘… is a 
possible world’. By quantifying over something we thereby refer to the entity in the theory.  
(Another interesting and important example of this trade-off appears in the metaphysics of 
properties. The realist about universals argues that their view when compared with ostrich 
nominalism is more ideologically parsimonious. The realist has an ontology of universals and 
particulars but only one non-logical ‘instantiation’ primitive as a piece of ideology. The ostrich 
nominalist has an ontology of particulars and no universals but has many more non-logical 
primitive monadic predicates as pieces of ideology. The realist argues that they can eliminate the 
monadic predicates of the nominalist by introducing talk of universals. The analysis might be 
something to the effect: the predicate ‘… is red’ applies to a just in case there is a property that a 
has. The realist in comparison with the nominalist reduces many predicates for just one (albeit it 
is obscure). We saw this sort of debate at length in chapter 1. Now, there is a concern here with 
whether the realist has eliminated any ideology. Suppose ‘… is red’ applies to a just in case there 
is redness which a instantiates. Haven’t we just swapped, as in the above case with possible 
worlds, ‘red’ for ‘redness’ since redness was used on the right-hand side of the analysis? How 
can this be a case of ideological parsimony for the realist? As in the above case with possible 
worlds, by assuming the property as a value of a variable it takes the subject place of the right-
hand side and so puts itself in a place of reference in the theory. We thus do not need any 
predicate to say the entity exists. In chapter 4 I take this sort of proposal to great lengths. I go so 
far as to say that the realist can solely rely on the ‘instantiation’ predicate and make no mention 
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or use of terms such as ‘particular’ or ‘universal’ (see pp. 140-41). The realist need only say 
‘everything is either instantiated by some entity or instantiates some entity’ as part of the 
fundamental description of reality according to the realist.)     
Let us return to Lewis and possible worlds. Lewis has a specific argument based on 
ideological considerations that is of relevance here. It goes something like this. If we accept facts 
about modality, then we have to take into account modal claims. So our theory will include 
modal predicates or operators. If these modal terms are left in the ideology as primitive, we will 
end up with a large stock of primitive terms which will result in a bloated and un-parsimonious 
ideology. However, if this ideology can be traded in for some ontology and ideological 
parsimony is taken as a guide to truth, we have reason to reduce these primitives.11  
Lewis introduces this argument by drawing an analogy with set theory. Typically understood, 
set theory contains a vast hierarchy of items, but at the same time a ‘very meagre primitive 
vocabulary’ which is ‘definitionally extended’ and satisfies our ‘needs for mathematical 
predicates’ (Lewis 1986b, 3-4). Set theory offers us great economy of primitive predicates in 
exchange for a myriad of items. Analogously, so the argument goes, Lewisian modal realism 
yields the same result. Lewis writes,  
‘It offers an improvement in what Quine calls ideology, paid for in the coin of ontology. It’s an 
offer you can’t refuse. The price is right; the benefits in theoretical unity and economy are well 
worth the entities’ (1986b, 4).12         
As with the debate in the philosophy of mathematics the question of more ideology versus 
more ontology is at the heart of this dispute. If we are happy with primitive modality, we can 
                                               
11 Cameron (2010b, 138-9) makes the point that what is relevant here is each instance as opposed to the modal 
operators in general. That is, it is about the modal operators applied to all its instances. 
12 See also (Melia 2008, 113). 
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stave off ontological commitment to possible worlds (whether they are concrete particulars, sets, 
or structural universals). Again, in light of ideological realism, the commitment to modal 
ideology is a commitment to fundamental modal facts and a commitment to fundamental modal 
structure. We can, therefore, characterise Lewis as an ideological reductionist as he provided an 
ideological reduction of modality.13 By contrast Quine can be characterised as an ideological 
eliminativist about modality, for him, such notions were not even worthy of explanation. To 
finish off the taxonomy, the nominalist about abstract entities and possible worlds in both cases 
can be called an ideological primitivist about modality.    
The phenomenon of trading off ideology for ontology or vice-versa occurs in more 
philosophical disputes than one might think.14 If we undermine these trade-offs we will make a 
mess of too many disputes. Given that the reflectance understanding undermines these trade-offs, 
it is committed to this unacceptable consequence.15 
There is one last issue concerning the trade-off between ideology and ontology which 
ideological realism provides a solution to. Admittedly, it seems the justification for our 
methodological reasons for reducing the number of primitive terms of our theory is disconnected 
from the justification of our methodological reasons for reducing the number of items we are 
ontologically committed to in our ontology. If ideology, as Sider puts it, is ‘psychologised’, then 
trading ideology for ontology or vice-versa is like trading ‘apples for oranges’ (Sider 2011, 14). 
As a result, we cannot adequately compare ideology with ontology. Disputes that involve such 
                                               
13 We can also characterise Lewis as an ontological reductionist about modality. But given that I am trying to 
classify certain views within the context of ideological realism, I put this characterisation to one side. 
14 Another debate where it features centre stage concerns the existence of holes. See (Lewis & Lewis 1970). 
15 One potential worry: in highlighting the trade-off between ideology and ontology do I thereby undermine the 
ideological realist’s claim that ideology and ontology are both ‘worldly’? No. The trade-off can be interpreted as a 
difference between facts that are taken as fundamental and facts that are explained by introducing talk of entities. It 
does not follow from simply highlighting the trade-off that ideology is not metaphysically significant or not about 
the world in a metaphysically interesting way. This was established in the previous chapter. 
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trade-offs hold no water. If we stave off ontological commitment to possible worlds by 
introducing as many primitive modal operators as necessary, how does this constitute a reason to 
not believe that possible worlds (whatever they are) exist? Moreover, if we reduce monadic 
predicates in terms of quantification over universals and thereby construct a theory with fewer 
primitives, how does this constitute a reason to believe in universals (based on eliminating 
predicates from our ideology)? So long as our justification for positing ideology and ontology 
are distinct, the trade-offs between ideology and ontology do not make sense. Oliver provides the 
following insight, 
‘[w]hat is needed is some way of connecting the justifications of ideological [parsimony] and 
ontological economy so that the trade-offs deal in a common currency’ (1996, 4).  
According to ideological realism, the common currency simply put is structure. The 
reduction of primitive predicates shows us that the world need not have a certain amount of 
predicational structure. Likewise, by positing multiple primitive modal operators we commit 
ourselves to excess amounts of modal structure.16 Ideological realism gives us a way to justify 
trade-offs between ideology and ontology. It provides the grounds on which we can understand 
the many metaphysical disputes that hinge upon trading off ideology for ontology and vice-versa.  
 
 
                                               
16 Taking structure as the common currency is a step in the right direction. But I fear that when we begin to insert 
extra details into a dispute the talk of structure becomes too coarse-grained. The realist about universals might argue 
that their theory is ideological parsimonious since they eliminate monadic predicates. Their theory posits less 
predicational structure. But as the nominalist is quick to point out, the realist still has a dyadic predicate, namely, ‘... 
instantiates ...’. Supposing the realist does not eliminate this predicate, does this mean that they haven’t reduced 
predicational structure? Or should we say that they have merely reduced monadic predicational structure? Similarly, 
if we get into debates about higher-order quantification, the talk of structure is less illuminating. How are we to 
understand different types of quantificational structure? These issues are left for future research. 
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2.4 Composition and Epistemicism 
 
Most people pre-theoretically believe that there are books, chairs, apples, etc, and therefore 
believe that there are composite objects—things that have parts which make them up. But there 
are metaphysicians who claim that there are no books, chairs, apples, even molecules or atoms. 
They say there are no composite objects, only simples—things with no proper parts (Dorr 2002; 
Merricks 2001; Sider ms; van Inwagen 1990).17 Call the latter view mereological nihilism 
(hereafter nihilism) and the former view anti-nihilism.18 Anti-nihilism comes in two varieties. 
The first version restricts the occurrence of composition to certain objects, usually based on what 
we ‘ordinarily intuit’ (Kriegel 2008). The second places no restriction on the occurrence of 
composition. There are composite objects which have as parts the most random of objects, e.g., 
my left foot and José’s thumb (for related examples see Lewis 1991, 7-8).  
The ontology of anti-nihilism includes tables, chairs, atoms, molecules, and simples. By 
contrast, the nihilist has an ontology of simples and nothing more. The ideology of anti-nihilism 
contains ordinary monadic predicates, such as, ‘... is a chair’, ‘... is an atom’, etc, that allow anti-
nihilists to characterise the composite objects of their ontology. For example, the anti-nihilist 
says ‘there is an x such that x is a chair’. The ideology of nihilism (as I am construing it) replaces 
                                               
17 To be fair van Inwagen does not believe there are no composite objects as he endorses the view that there are 
composite objects in virtue of some simples being caught up in a life somehow. And Merricks adopts the thesis that 
there are composite objects in virtue of some entities having causal efficacy somehow. So, it is strictly incorrect to 
classify them as nihilists.  
18 These labels are too broad to describe the more fine-grained positions that I am neglecting. Nihilism comes in two 
varieties. The first tells us that composition only occurs when one of the xs is identical to y. There is room on this 
view to say there is a composition relation but that it supervenes on every object it stands in the relation to. 
Composition would be an internal relation that supervenes on one of its relata. We can still say that simples have 
parts, they just have improper parts. The second tells us that there is no composition relation whatsoever and that 
nothing is a proper or improper part of anything since there is no parthood relation (see Sider ms). The fine-grained 
positions are not relevant here. Thanks to Josh Spencer for comments. 
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the predicates and singular quantification of the anti-nihilist’s ideology with plural predicates and 
plural quantification.19 To illustrate, 
1) ‘there is a book supported by a shelf’ 
is replaced with 
2) ‘those xs arranged book-wise are supported by those ys arranged shelf-wise’.20  
Now, the nihilist claims that their theory is more ontologically economical than anti-nihilism. 
Where the nihilist has entities with no proper parts, the anti-nihilist has entities with and without 
proper parts. If it is reasonable to draw a distinction between composite objects and their parts 
such that composite objects or (say) mereological sums are of a different kind to their parts,21 
then the nihilist can claim they have an ontology that is qualitatively economical, i.e., 
economical in virtue of having one less kind. The nihilist’s ontology is qualitatively economical 
since it admits nothing more than the distinct kind of object which lacks proper parts. The nihilist 
might also argue that their ontology is quantitatively economical in the sense that their ontology 
contains ‘fewer objects’.22 Regardless of the qualitative/quantitative distinction, the nihilist 
makes a charge from economy to reach the conclusion that their theory is in better shape, 
ontologically speaking.  
                                               
19 There are further ideological questions about nihilism that derive from whether we think ordinary sentences about 
composite objects are strictly false (Merricks 2001, ch. 12) or whether we think ordinary sentences about composite 
objects ‘describe the same fact’ as sentences about simples arranged in certain ways (van Inwagen 1990, 113). I do 
not discuss these issues here. 
20 van Inwagen’s project is an eccentric take on paraphrase which is not connected to the meaning of sentences. van 
Inwagen believes that the ordinary sentence ‘there is a chair in the next room’ means there is a chair in the next 
room. My illustration here does not presuppose any particular form of reduction or paraphrase. See (Liggins 2008) 
for discussion. 
21 But consider van Inwagen (2006, 617) who argues that the phrase ‘mereological sum’ does not ‘mark out a special 
kind of object’. 
22 Amie Thomasson (2007, ch. 9) presents the nihilist as citing quantitative economy as a reason to reject ordinary 
objects. See also (Merricks 2001, 40) for a statement of composite objects as ‘needless multiplications’. 
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The anti-nihilist on the other hand points out that the elimination of composite objects in 
terms of plural quantification over simples and the introduction of plural predicates is an 
ideological cost that ought to be acknowledged by the nihilist. The main ideological issue I want 
to focus on is the introduction of x-wise predicates.23 As Bennett (2009) has pointed out, the 
nihilist must account not only for sentences, such as, ‘there is a chair in the next room’, but also 
sentences such as ‘the chairs are arranged in a row’ and sentences from the sciences that employ 
predication of composite objects directly. For instance, in biology the sentence ‘the organism 
perfected the function of the eye through evolution’ requires the predicate: 
‘((((((those simples arranged atom-wise) arranged molecule-wise) arranged organelle-wise) 
arranged cell-wise) arranged organ-wise) arranged …)’ (Bennett 2009, 60). 
This complex ideology is not required by the anti-nihilist.24 Thus, in this sense anti-nihilism 
is ideologically parsimonious. In this debate, as I am sketching it, the moves available to each 
party involve some kind of trade-off between ideology and ontology. The nihilist reduces their 
ontology at the cost of ideology whereas the anti-nihilist reduces their ideology at the cost of 
ontology. 
Bennett has recently argued that there is ‘no compelling grounds for choosing between the 
competing positions’ of nihilism and anti-nihilism (2009, 43). The fact that there is this trade-off 
between ideology and ontology at the heart of the dispute should lead us to be suspicious that we 
can be justified in believing one theory over the other. Bennett’s official position is epistemicism. 
She writes, ‘[d]isputes about the truth-value of ‘there are Fs’ are not verbal disputes. But there is 
                                               
23 I put issues of quantification to one side. 
24 The sense of complexity can be understood in two ways. First, it is due to the number of primitive predicates, the 
fact that there are more primitive predicates than the anti-nihilist. Second, it is due to the complexity of the 
predicates themselves, that they are distributive, variably polyadic, and can be encased in one another as in 
Bennett’s biology example. Either way is sufficient to reach some kind of complexity the anti-nihilist will gladly 
reject. I stick with the number of primitives for now as the metric of ideological complexity. 
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little justification for believing either that it is true or false’ (2009, 42).25 She argues for this 
claim within the context of two disputes concerning composition and material constitution, the 
second of which we won’t discuss here. Her position should not be understood as suggesting 
across the board that all disputes in metaphysics provide little justification for believing one 
party over the other, but rather that in cases where ideology and ontology trade-off in a certain 
respect, the dispute provides no ‘compelling grounds’ to adopt one position over the other. 
Part of Bennett’s overall argument is that in the dispute between nihilism and anti-nihilism 
‘difference-minimising’ is undertaken by both sides. The nihilist will minimise the difference 
between their view and anti-nihilism by introducing an x-wise predicate for every object the anti-
nihilist quantifies over. If the anti-nihilist says ‘there is an apple in that basket’, then the nihilist 
will say ‘those simples arranged apple-wise are in those simples arranged basket-wise’. 
Likewise, the anti-nihilist will claim that the objects in their ontology are nothing over and above 
the relevant simples arranged in certain ways. The reason Lewis’ version of anti-nihilism does 
not commit him to an explosion of trout-turkeys, my-left-foot-José’s-thumb, etc, is because these 
objects are their parts (Lewis 1991, 81). Lewis tells us that ‘[a] whole is an extra item in our 
ontology only in the minimal sense that it is not identical to any of its proper parts; but it is not 
distinct from them either, so when we believe in the parts it is no extra burden to believe in the 
whole’ (1986a, 34). So, the mereological sum of this trout and that turkey is a non-identical but 
non-distinct item which is an ‘extra’ item only in some minimal sense. Of course we can 
quantify over the mereological sum and so it is part of our ontology in that sense (i.e., the 
Quinean sense) but that we can say it exists does not tell us anything about how it exists. The 
anti-nihilist says it exists in such a way that it is non-distinct but non-identical to other things in 
                                               
25 She provides two versions of epistemicism, which I call, strong and weak epistemicism. She argues for the weak 
version, which is silent on whether there is a fact of the matter about which side of the debate is right. 
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their ontology. Granted, this story is contentious, and in being dubbed the doctrine of the 
‘ontological free lunch’ (Armstrong 1997b, 11-12) has received criticism (see, e.g., Benardete 
2002, 357; Cameron 2008b, 7, n. 10; David 2005, 148; Melia 2005, 74). The point here is that 
anti-nihilism, just as much as nihilism, according to Bennett, hopes to minimise the difference 
between their opponents. 
This difference-minimising for Bennett shows us two things. First, it shows us that there is 
no real methodological gain that one theory has over the other. For every composite object, there 
is a plurality of simples arranged in a certain way. These simples satisfy the predicate ‘... are 
arranged x-wise’ or collectively instantiate the structural property of being x-wise. It seems then 
that the nihilist’s attempts to construct an economical theory are thwarted by exchanging fewer 
objects for more properties. Second, it shows us that something fishy is going on with the trade-
offs—small-ideology/big-ontology vs. big-ideology/small-ontology is akin to moving a bump 
around in the carpet. Her argument then is this:  
(P1) Nihilism is no simpler than anti-nihilism and the problems that the nihilist hopes to 
evade remain problems just as much for them as anti-nihilists.26 
(P2) If nihilism is no simpler than anti-nihilism and the problems that the nihilist hopes to 
evade remain problems just as much for them as anti-nihilists, then ‘[t]here does not 
appear to be any real grounds for choosing between the competing positions’ (Bennett 
2009, 71).  
                                               
26 The second conjunct of this premise, I leave to one side. I do not think it is the more important component of 
Bennett’s argument. However, I actually think the problems do not arise if the nihilism is explicit about their 
nominalism. Bennett’s claim that the nihilism has the same problems as the anti-nihilist depends on the assumption 
that nihilism has an ontology of simples and structural properties. If we drop the structural properties, and introduce 
an ideology of x-wise predicates, the problems don’t arise. She concedes this on pp. 73-4. I discuss this below. 
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(C) Therefore, there does not appear to be any real grounds for choosing between the 
competing positions, which is to say that ‘[w]e are not justified in believing either 
[nihilism or anti-nihilism]’ (ibid).  
Bennett calls the debate under question a case of underdetermination of theory by evidence. 
This underdetermination derives from the difference-minimising in the dispute. So, let’s focus on 
the difference-minimising first. I suspect that the issues surrounding difference-minimising that 
lead to the suspicion that we ‘are just riding a see-saw’ (Bennett 2009, 65) are really a symptom 
of the fact that both theories are attempting to account for the same facts or ‘philosophical data’. 
Both parties to the debate accept, for example, that there are facts about ordinary objects having 
parts. Anti-nihilism accepts ordinary sentences such as ‘there is a chair in the next room’ as 
exhibiting a logical form that leads us to say there is an x such that x is a chair (in the next room). 
The fact that is expressed by this sentence is captured in their ontology by admitting chairs and 
hence composite objects. The nihilist has to accept the same ordinary sentence and provide some 
account according to which they explain the truth of this sentence either by paraphrase, 
ontological reduction, an error theory, etc. What the nihilist will not do as Bennett points out is 
‘smile’ and say ‘nothing remotely in the ballpark of talk about composites’ (2009, 61, her 
italics), for this would be tantamount to undermining a central part of the ‘philosophical data’ 
that is to be explained by our leading theories on composition. Indeed, Bennett is aware of my 
diagnosis. She writes,  
My suggestion that these are cases in which the available evidence does not settle which side is 
correct should not be particularly surprising, given that I have argued that these debates are 
‘difference-minimizing’. They are debates in which everyone takes the data to be largely the 
same (2009, 72). 
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What is the available evidence here? I say we have reason to believe in the existence of a 
certain kind of entity if it does some explanatory work in a theory. We have reason to believe in 
universals if they ground or figure in explanations concerning the laws of nature, causation, 
resemblance, etc. In the most radical cases (although this case may be controversial), even when 
it comes to scepticism about the external world, our reason to believe in certain entities comes 
from the explanatory power derived from the theory at hand. We might think that we believe in 
the external world because our best theory postulates its existence, independent of you and I, to 
explain certain phenomena or data we take as worthy of explanation. However, if we have a 
competing theory that explains the phenomena or data equally well but postulates a different 
kind of entity, then we have no reason to believe in the existence of one kind of entity used in 
one theory over the other. So, I grant the conditional that if the dispute between nihilism and 
anti-nihilism is difference-minimising such that both parties have succeeded in accounting for all 
the facts, then the evidence on which we are justified in believing a certain theory is 
underdetermined. I shall contest instead the premise that the dispute is one of difference-
minimising. 
Let us return to the debate between nihilism and anti-nihilism. The nihilist, I claimed, is 
ideologically committed to an overly complex ideology because they introduced a large number 
of primitive x-wise predicates.27 Bennett however understands the nihilist’s theory as either 
introducing x-wise predicates which apply to pluralities of simples or postulating structural 
properties that are collectively instantiated by simples. Call the first version of nihilism, 
nominalistic nihilism and the latter property-nihilism (for lack of a better name). To secure the 
truth of the premise that the debate between nihilism and anti-nihilism is one of difference-
                                               
27 Perhaps the complexity is a result of the complexity of the predicates themselves—perhaps the number of 
argument places. See note 24.  
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minimising, Bennett requires property-nihilism since it is only with property-nihilism that she 
can claim the entities of one theory do the same explanatory work as the entities of the 
competing theory.  
But the debate between property-nihilism and anti-nihilism is not a debate between a small-
ideology/big-ontology theory and a big-ideology/small-ontology theory. This is the wrong 
comparison. What we need is nominalistic nihilism for the appropriate comparison. But the 
comparison between nominalistic nihilism versus anti-nihilism won’t result in a difference-
minimising case since the nihilist’s primitive ideology does no explanatory work. Indeed, 
Bennett needs property-nihilism to ground the claim that the entities of the competing positions 
explain the same philosophical data equally well. Therefore, the dispute between nominalistic 
nihilism and anti-nihilism is not one of difference-minimising. The fact that nihilism contains the 
unanalysable predicates that it does leads to the conclusion that there are some brute facts that 
are left unexplained according to their theory, facts which are not left unexplained according to 
anti-nihilism. The anti-nihilist for example can explain that the predicate ‘... are arranged table-
wise’ applies to some particulars and not others because of some composite object that has parts 
suitably arranged.  
Bennett accepts this as one legitimate response to her argument. If it can be shown that 
nihilism is ‘compatible with strict nominalism, and not committed to an ontology of properties 
that mirrors their opponent’s ontology of objects’ (Bennett 2009, 73-4), then we can resist the 
conclusion that there is no ground for believing in one view over the other. But I take 
nominalistic nihilism, from what is written in the literature, as more or less the standard view of 
nihilism that philosophers react to. van Inwagen’s Material Beings in setting the precedent for 
debates on composition does not mention anything about plural properties or structural 
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universals. He does not even mention sets as candidates for properties were they to be required 
for nihilism or for his organicism. His discussion is rightly restricted to predicates and the 
paraphrase of ordinary sentences using x-wise predicates and plural quantification. Furthermore, 
I have not seen any objections in the literature against the claim that an ontology of simples is 
incompatible with an ideology of x-wise predicates and plural quantification.  
If we take seriously the ideology of the theories under consideration, we can determine that 
property-nihilism has extra primitive ideology that the anti-nihilist lacks, and conclude that anti-
nihilism is the simpler theory. According to property-nihilism there are no composite (material) 
particulars. There are only simples, but these simples stand in relations and have properties. In 
order to account for certain facts countenanced by science and ordinary language which talk 
about composite objects, property-nihilists require complex properties that are collectively 
instantiated by certain simples.  If we take complex properties seriously, we need to say how 
they are made up of simpler properties. We also need a story about when one property is and is 
not a component of another. Such a story requires a distinct mode of composition that operates 
on properties to make (more) complex properties. This mode of composition is to be captured by 
a further device of expression in the ideology of the theory.  
Given that the nihilist does not believe in composite objects, they will have to introduce a 
primitive operator or predicate to characterise the structure of complex properties. Supposing we 
introduce an operator (following (Fine 2010) call it ‘∑’), we incur the extra ideological cost of 
imposing further structure on the world, structure that involves the nature of properties and how 
they are instantiated by particulars. Worse still complex properties do not behave like the objects 
of classical mereology since the same properties can be used to compose different structural 
properties. For instance, the property of being methane and being butane are both composed of 
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being hydrogen, being carbon, and being bonded to (Lewis 1986a, 36). Therefore, a single 
operation on properties that composes further properties is insufficient. What we need is to 
analyse ∑ into, say, three primitive operations, say, following Forrest (1986b, 17) ‘contraction’, 
‘product’, and ‘projection’. What was one piece of primitive ideology has now become three. If 
the nihilist is serious about complex properties, their ideology must reflect this fact by 
introducing further ideological complexity. Indeed, this is what ideological realism demands. 
Therefore, we can deny that ‘nihilism is no simpler than anti-nihilism’, i.e., the first conjunct of 
(P1). In fact, we have shown that it is more ideologically complex and so less parsimonious than 
anti-nihilism.28 
Bennett concedes that the acceptance of nominalistic nihilism along with the claim that 
ontological simplicity is a guide to truth and ideological simplicity is not a guide to truth, 
provides justification for believing in nihilism over anti-nihilism. The concession shows us that 
the epistemicism on offer will naturally fail when we rightly take into account methodological 
considerations. But given ideological realism our ideological commitments are on a par with our 
ontological commitments. Ideological realism tells us that the ideology of our theory represents 
the world as having a certain structure. Property-nihilism, we have found, posits more structure 
than anti-nihilism. Nominalistic nihilism, as articulated above, is more ontologically economical 
than anti-nihilism but is less ideologically parsimonious because it includes a large stock of 
primitive x-wise predicates. (Perhaps, both varieties of nihilism are committed to a certain type 
of quantificational structure based on the introduction of plural quantifiers, but set that aside.) 
So, anti-nihilism wins the end game? Not quite. The debate takes a further turn if we introduce 
                                               
28 Bennett also classifies property-nihilism as a ‘low-ontology’ but I find this odd since its ontology includes objects 
and properties (of a unique and controversial kind). It is nominalistic nihilism which exclusively deserves the name 
‘low-ontology’. 
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sets into the nihilist’s ontology. Sets can account for x-wise predicates but have accompanying 
ideological baggage, such as, ‘set-membership’ and the notion of a ‘singleton’. (See (Sider ms) 
for discussion and a defence of, what I call, set-theoretic nihilism.) The dispute when understood 
in these terms requires us to look at the precise ideology of each theory and determine what 
number of primitives each theory has. Only then can we make a methodological judgement that 
one theory is more ideologically parsimonious than the other. The dispute is alive and well, and 
we are yet to have a victor!      
In sum, any metametaphysical or metaontological judgement we make about certain debates, 
judgements such as ‘this dispute is not verbal, but provides no grounds for us to believe in either 
competing theory’, can only be made once methodological considerations are brought to directly 
bear on the dialectic. We cannot draw a metaontological conclusion or learn a ‘metaontological 
lesson’ from restricting or neglecting such methodological principles, for these are the principles 
that will affect our metametaphysical or metaontological judgement. We need to consider what 
ontological economy and ideological parsimony amount to, how the ideology/ontology 
distinction is to be understood, and whether the ideological or ontological component (or both) 
of our theories involves talk of structure.
 
 
 
 
82 
 
 
3 
Truthmaking 
 
The fact that Socrates is white is true because Socrates is white. Intuitively speaking truths are 
true because of the world and what it is like. This intuition is widely accepted amongst 
metaphysical realists but it is given radically different explanations. The truthmaker theorist 
provides an explanation of this intuition by introducing the ideology of truthmaking. Truthmaker 
ideology primarily involves the concept of a truthmaker and the concept of truthmaking. 
Truthmaker theorists have presented competing theories that attempt to explain how what is true 
depends on what there is and what it is like. In this chapter I survey some attempts to explain the 
concept of truthmaking, argue against the orthodox explanation, and consider the hypothesis that 
the concept of truthmaking should be taken as primitive. I assume from the outset that talk of 
truthmaking is legitimate. 
 
3.1 Truthmaker Overview 
 
The standard theory of truthmaking, championed by Armstrong, is comprised of two theses: 
(Truthmaker Maximalism) Every truth has at least one truthmaker (hereafter TM-M).  
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(Truthmaker Necessitarianism) T is a truthmaker for <p> just in case necessarily if T 
exists, then proposition <p> is true (hereafter TM-N).1  
TM-M is a thesis concerning the scope of truthmaking. It is about what range of truths are 
required to have truthmakers. TM-N on the other hand is an analysis of what it is for something 
to be a truthmaker, although it may not tell us about the exact nature of truthmakers. It is also an 
explanation of the ‘makes-true’ connection (broadly construed) that allegedly holds between 
truth and truthmaker.     
The literature surrounding truthmaking is mostly centred on TM-M. Defenders of 
truthmaking pursue a ‘research programme’ that focuses on finding truthmakers for recalcitrant 
truths such as negative existientials. Most opponents of truthmaking tend to reject the project just 
because they take TM-M to be manifestly false. TM-N on the other hand has received little 
attention and is regarded as the least controversial component of the standard theory of 
truthmaking (see Cameron 2008c, 109; Gregory 2001, 422). It is the orthodox explanation of 
truthmaking. 
Talk of truths being made true by truthmakers admits of an ambiguity between a truthmaker 
being connected to the truth of a proposition and being connected to the existence of a 
proposition. That is, a truthmaker can either be related to a proposition or truthbearer with 
respect to the truth of the proposition or with respect to the existence of the proposition. To 
illustrate the ambiguity, let us consider the following argument from Armstrong for the 
conclusion that primary truthbearers must be propositions and not sentence tokens or beliefs: 
                                               
1 See (Armstrong 1997b, 115). I will write propositions with angle brackets, e.g., the proposition that p is written as 
<p>. In addition, the term ‘fact’ is reserved for true proposition. I do not take a stand on what the bearers of truth 
should be. They might be sentence-tokens or propositions. In cases where the difference matters to the discussion I 
will explicitly state so. 
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True unexpressed propositions will be truths without any concrete truth-bearers. Some 
philosophers may think that we can ignore such cases. But in fact I think that this would be a 
mistake. They are, for me at least, conceptually very important. The reason for this is that the 
concept of such truths is needed to make sense of Truthmaker Necessitarianism. How can 
truthmakers necessitate truthbearers if the truthbearers are beliefs, statements and so on? How can 
something in the world, say the state of affairs of the dog’s being on the dog-bed, necessitate that 
I have a belief that this is the case, or that somebody states that it is the case? What is necessitated 
can be no more than the true proposition <the dog is on the dog-bed>. That is why propositions 
must be the true truthbearers, or at any rate the most fundamental truthbearers (Armstrong 2004b, 
15). 
For Armstrong, we cannot rely solely on sentence tokens or beliefs to make sense of TM-N 
because TM-N requires T to necessitate the truthbearer in the sense that T necessitates its 
existence. Sentence tokens are not the right candidates to capture this fact because the existence 
of sentence-tokens and beliefs are not necessitated by their truthmakers. But, propositions 
account for this fact. So, propositions are the primary bearers of truth. 
However, while a truthmaker does not necessitate that I believe the dog is on the rug, it does 
necessitate the truth of my belief. If necessitation is understood as entailing the truth of a 
truthbearer, then I do not see why the truthmaker cannot necessitate the truth of the sentence or 
belief so long as the sentence or belief exists (cf. Dyke 2008, 79). Supposing that beliefs are 
truthbearers (and are the only truthbearers for the following thesis), then we can revise TM-N as: 
(TM-N*) T is a truthmaker for belief P just in case necessarily if T exists and P exists, 
then P is true. 
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Given the disambiguation between the existence and the truth of a proposition standing in the 
truthmaking relation to a truthmaker, it does not follow that sentence-tokens are not appropriate 
entities for necessitation. If do not believe the dog is on the rug, my belief that the dog is on the 
rug does not exist. Therefore, if we take truthbearers to be sentence-tokens or beliefs, then if my 
belief does not exist, there is nothing around for the truthmaker to make true. However, if my 
belief exists, then there is something for the truthmaker to make true. (I should note here that 
TM-N* is not a distinct independent thesis from TM-N. It is rather a slight modification of the 
bearer of truth. The same relation is at work in both theories.)  
I am not endorsing this TM-N* but rather illustrating that the disambiguation shows us that 
we should not be concerned about the existence of truthbearers but rather concerned about their 
truth. The question of whether one thing makes true another is about whether one thing confers 
the property of being true on a truth-bearer by standing in some relation to it.  
Other explanations of truthmaking have been proposed. For completeness it will be 
instructive to briefly consider these accounts before directly discussing TM-N in the later 
sections. An account that is closely related to TM-N is: 
(TM-entailment) T is a truthmaker for <p> just in case T exists and <T exists> entails 
<p> (Bigelow 1988, 125; Fox 1987). 
According to this view, entailment is strict implication between two propositions. P entails Q 
just in case necessarily if P is true, Q is true. TM-entailment has a close affinity with TM-N (as 
we will see again much later). John P. Fox sees the difference between TM-entailment and TM-
N to be one of ‘terminology reflect[ing] merely preference about semantic ascent as an idiom’ 
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(1987, 189). Hence, ‘a’s existing necessitates that p just when ‘a exists’ entails p’ (ibid). 
However, there are problems with TM-entailment.   
First, the notion of entailment relates two propositions as opposed to some portion of reality 
and truth. Intuitively, the truthmaking intuition is one of entities that make truths true. Second, if 
TM-entailment is true, then every necessary truth is entailed by <T exists> since necessarily if 
<T exists> is true, then (say) <2+2=4> is true. To put the point another way, suppose I exist and 
<I exist> is true. <I exist> entails <2+2=4>. Therefore I am a truthmaker for the proposition that 
2+2=4. Indeed, every concrete entity is a truthmaker for every necessary truth. But intuitively I 
do not make true <2+2=4> or any other necessary truth. The semantic ascent has therefore taken 
us too far from the insight that truth is grounded in reality.2 
However, the same argument can be directly mounted against TM-N. According to TM-N, T 
is a truthmaker for <p> if and only if in every world in which T exists, <p> is true. We can write 
this as: 
(TM-N**) For all propositions p and all worlds w: if p is true at w, then there exists some 
x in w such that necessarily, if x exists then p is true (Schaffer 2010a, 311).    
Now consider the necessary truth <2+2=4>. Every world in which I exist, <2+2=4> is true. 
So it seems I count as a truthmaker for <2+2=4>. But intuitively neither I nor any other 
individual are truthmakers for <2+2=4> or any other necessary truths (Schaffer 2008, 12). 
Furthermore, there are interesting questions surrounding the status of necessary truths and how 
they are to be made true. It seems intuitively that they are true regardless of the world and that a 
                                               
2 See (Restall 1996) for an amendment to the notion of entailment using some kind of relevance logic that introduces 
a ‘relevant’ notion of implication. 
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truthmaker theorist should give an account perhaps of why this is so. But according to TM-N** 
these questions are rendered uninteresting or answered by fiat.  
In addition, there are issues with the relation of necessitation collapsing into the standard 
logical notion of entailment. Proponents of TM-N typically regard the relation of necessitation as 
a matter of ontological entailment between entity and truth. Armstrong for instance claims that 
truthmakers entail their truths. Ontic entailment seems to amount to: entity e1 ontically entails e2 
just in case necessarily if e1 exists, e2 exists. This is to be contrasted with the modal notion of 
entailment used in TM-entailment where <p> entails <q> just in case necessarily if <p> is true, 
<q> is true. But necessitation between entity and truth while a cross-categorial connection 
collapses into a relation between propositions. That is to say, TM-N collapses into TM-
entailment as follows:  
(P1)  if T exists, then <p> is true. (TM-N) 
(P2)  if <T exists> is true, then T exists. (assumption) 
(C) Thus,  if <T exists> is true, then <p> is true. (from 1, 2 transitivity of strict 
implication)3 
The conclusion is TM-entailment. Hence, the fact that T necessitates <p> collapses to <T 
exists> entails <p>. We do not have two notions of entailment: one between entity and truth and 
                                               
3 See (Cameron 2005, 44-5). One response is to reject (P2). There might be cases where <T exists> is true but is 
made true by a truthmaker that is not T. For instance, we might believe in mereological nihilism and hold that <the 
chair exists> is true but made true not by the chair but by a certain plurality of simples arranged chair-wise.  
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the other between two truths. Rather we have just one notion of entailment between two 
propositions.4 
More down-to-earth proposals have been presented, sometimes in the hope of watering down 
truth “making” to truth supervening on being. For instance, 
(TM-supervenience) T is a truthmaker for <p> just in case every world where T exists is 
a world where <p> is true (Lewis 2003, 28). 
TM-supervenience uses a discernability criterion of supervenience. If two worlds have a 
discernible supervenience base, then there will be a ‘difference-maker’ in both worlds5 that 
guarantees that the same proposition will be true at one and false at the other. As the slogan goes: 
no difference in truth without a difference in being. One benefit of TM-supervenience is that we 
can allow truths ‘to be true just because they lack falsemakers’ (Lewis 2001, 610). Therefore, we 
need not be committed to negative existentials being made true by some ‘positive’ entity—such 
as a second-order totality state of affairs. TM-supervenience respects the intuition that negative 
truths are not made true by something in the world but rather are true because something fails to 
exist.  
Despite its attractiveness, TM-supervenience has its dissenters. First, the notion of 
supervenience seems inadequate to capture the intuition that truth depends on being. 
Supervenience is a modal concept that merely consists in co-variation between the supervenient 
and subvenient entity. Supervenience just has the wrong logical properties to adequately capture 
truth’s dependence on reality, for supervenience is not irreflexive and not asymmetric. Second, 
                                               
4 Thanks to André Gallois for comments.  
5 Lewis goes into more detail than I am explicating here. For instance, he distinguishes one-way difference-making 
from two-way difference-making, claiming that if we adopt the first we are no longer required to adopt the second—
see (Lewis 2001, 610). 
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supervenience runs into problems concerning necessary truths akin to the objection raised against 
TM-entailment. The driving intuition for the truthmaker theorist is that truth depends on being, 
which suggests an asymmetric relationship between truth and truthmaker. The connection 
between truth and truthmaker is more intimate than supervenience.6 Third, the watering down of 
truthmaking has the potential to dilute the entire project completely. If supervenience holds 
between A and B such that B supervenes on A, then we only know that B co-varies with A. But 
this co-variation could be due to B being identical to A or perhaps B being constituted by A (Heil 
2000, 236). What we require to rule out other ways in which B supervenes on A is a story about 
in virtue of what B supervenes on A. Without a deeper story we risk losing what is distinctive 
about truthmaking.7 If we wish to retain what is unique about truthmaking, we might be better 
off not introducing supervenience. (More can be said on behalf of TM-supervenience. I mention 
it here for completeness and because it one of the standard views that gets separately discussed in 
the literature. My focus is on TM-N and the proposals I am about to mention.)  
A recent proposal that addresses the issue of intimacy is: 
(TM-grounding) T is a truthmaker for <p> just in case the truth of <p> is grounded in T 
(Schaffer 2008, 2010a). 
A formulation in the same spirit is: 
(TM-in virtue of) T is a truthmaker for <p> just in case <p> is true in virtue of T 
(Rodriguez-Pereyra 2002, 34; 2005, 18). 
                                               
6 This objection is all too familiar. So I will not dwell on it here. See (Beebee & Dodd 2005, 4; Daly 2005; Forrest & 
Khlentzos 2000, 7; Merricks 2007; Rodriguez-Pereyra 2005). 
7 One deeper story proposed by Schaffer is to postulate a relation of grounding. This is one independent route to talk 
of grounding in the project of truthmaking. 
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Both proposals provide an analysis of what it is for something to make true a proposition—
that it is grounded in some entity or is true in virtue of some entity. Both proposals are 
metaphysically bold hypotheses given that they postulate (i.e., say there is) a fundamental 
relation that holds between truth and truthmaker. These two views are relevant in later sections.  
But before we move let us contrast these two views with one last proposal. The last proposal 
on offer is inspired by Melia’s remark that ‘makes true is as ontologically innocent as and, or, 
and not’ (2005, 79, his italics). Let us state it as follows: 
(TM-truthmaking) T is a truthmaker for <p> just in case T makes true <p>. 
According to this proposal the concept of truthmaking is primitive. We do not provide a 
further story about how T makes true <p> in terms of necessitation, supervenience or grounding. 
The notion of truthmaking is instead captured by the primitive two-place predicate ‘… makes 
true …’. Call this ideological primitivism about truthmaking. This view is compatible with the 
claim that it is not the case that necessarily if T exists then <p> is true. It is possible that T exists 
and <p> is false. However, this proposal does not exclude necessitation as a necessary condition. 
It is compatible with necessitation as a necessary condition, but as I will argue we do not have 
good reason to accept TM-N and this is partly due to necessitation. So, we need not include 
necessitation as part of primitivism. Also note that TM-truthmaking is a different view to TM-
grounding and TM-in-virtue-of. The major difference lies in the fact that TM-truthmaking has a 
kind of nominalist stance towards the truthmaking relation, where TM-grounding (for instance) 
actually postulates a relation of grounding.        
In what follows, I critically discuss the main reasons for adopting the orthodox account of 
truthmaking, i.e., TM-N (§3.2) and consider objections against the view (§3.3). Having narrowed 
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our options down to TM-grounding/TM-in-virtue-of and ideological primitivism, I provide a 
further sketch of both views and explore whether ideological primitivism has any benefits over 
TM-grounding/TM-in-virtue-of (§3.4).  
 
3.2 Truthmaker Necessitarianism 
 
Why believe in TM-N? Cameron says ‘even if we can’t prove necessitarianism I think it is a 
pretty attractive doctrine’ (Cameron 2008c, 112). But what makes it attractive? Cameron argues 
that without TM-N we won’t be able to capture the intuition that explanation ‘bottoms out’ in 
basic existence propositions. To see this, suppose that for God to provide a complete description 
of the world He need only rattle off propositions about what there is. Everything else will be 
made true by these basic propositions. If TM-N is false, then God would have to say more than 
<T1 exists>, <T2 exists>, …, and so on. He would have to not only say what there is but also 
what it is like—<Fa1>, <Fa2>, …, <Fan>. But according to Cameron, claiming that God has to 
say predicational truths in addition to existential truths goes against the ‘whole spirit of 
truthmaker theory’. Therefore, TM-N is required to capture the intuition that explanation is 
ultimately grounded in basic existential truths. 
This sort of reasoning can be resisted. First, if TM-N were false and we adopted some other 
explanation of truthmaking, it wouldn’t necessarily follow that God would have to add 
fundamental predicational facts, such as, <Fa>, <Gb>, etc, to the fundamental account of the 
world. For instance, if we adopted TM-grounding, we could hold that all truths are grounded in 
reality and that God still says no more than <T1 exists>, <T2 exists>, ..., and that all other truths 
are grounded in these fundamental existential truths. 
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Second, if we assumed that TM-N is true, then we require something more than a list of what 
exists to capture all truths. The mere existence of an entity will be insufficient for predicational 
truths such as ‘there is something red’. We require the state of affairs of the teacup’s being red to 
make this truth true. If so, then we require states of affairs in our ontology. But if we require 
states of affairs in our ontology, then God will have to say that states of affairs exist. If God says 
states of affairs exist, he will be saying something about the structure of states of affairs and 
hence will be saying more than what there is. So, explanation does not bottom out at what there 
is given TM-N.  
Elsewhere (2008a), Cameron provides an argument for TM-N based on the fact that ‘it is a 
matter of convention that certain [sic] of the true propositions get labelled as necessary and 
others as contingent’ (2008a, 301). Following Sider’s (2003) neo-conventional view of modality, 
Cameron argues that a modal constraint can be introduced to count facts (true propositions) 
about truthmaking to be necessary. He continues: 
So we consider facts of the form ‘A makes p true’ to be objective facts about the world and let it 
be a constraint on our usage of modal vocabulary that when that is true it is also necessary that if 
A exists then p is the case. In that case we get an explanation for why truthmaker necessitarianism 
holds: it is simply analytic of the term ‘necessary’ (Cameron 2008a, 301). 
On the face of it, this argument goes against the realist intuition that initially motivates 
truthmaker theorists to believe in truthmaking. To say that we can stipulate a constraint that 
makes facts about truthmaking necessary in order to secure the truth of TM-N goes against the 
core realist intuition of the truthmaker theorist. I understand that this neo-conventional view 
secures some kind of objectivity about modality. I am not objecting to the view based on distaste 
for saying all (modal) truths are subjective. What I am objecting to is that the principled reason 
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being employed here is based on our interests despite the fact that it is objective which truths are 
necessary and which are contingent. In addition, why do we have reason to stipulate that facts 
about what makes true what are necessary? Why not introduce the convention that facts about 
truthmaking are contingent? Cameron has provided no reason to suggest that convention will 
favour the decree that facts about truthmaking are necessary over the decree that facts about 
truthmaking are contingent.8 
There is an argument for TM-N implicit in the literature which states that it is a conceptual 
truth that it is impossible for T to make true <p> without <p> being true. This is allegedly a 
conceptual truth since it is part of the concept of a truthmaker that if <p> has a truthmaker, then 
<p> must be true. Thus, if we claim there is a world in which T makes true <p> and yet <p> is 
false, we have failed to grasp the concept of a truthmaker and so failed to grasp the very core of 
truthmaking (Rami 2009, 3-4).9 I believe Lewis has this sort of argument in mind when he 
writes:  
We might be tempted to redefine truthmaking so as to make it easy to find ‘truthmakers’ for 
intrinsic predications. Call a a truthmaker* for P just in case every world where a exists with no 
change in its intrinsic properties is a world where P is true, in other words just in case every 
world where a has a counterpart that is also an intrinsic duplicate of a is a world where P is true 
(Parsons 1999). Long himself is a truthmaker* for the truth that Long is black, and for every other 
true intrinsic predication with Long as subject. 
                                               
8 There might be legitimate responses on behalf of the defender of the neo-conventional view of modality. But this 
only shows us that the disagreement has shifted to a disagreement about the correct view of modality. The defender 
of TM-N will therefore be committed to an unpopular view of modality that most of us qua metaphysical realists 
will naturally reject. 
9 Cf. (Milne 2005, 223). 
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Truthmaking* is all very well. But what would it take to give us truthmakers for predications 
without having recourse to redefinition? (2003, 30). 
The thrust of Lewis’ argument is that if we provide a different account of what it is for a 
truthmaker to make a proposition true that is not in terms of necessitation, then we have 
‘redefined’ truthmaking. There is something about the concept of truthmaking itself that leads 
Lewis to suggest that an account of truthmaking where truthmakers are understood in terms of 
intrinsicality is tantamount to changing the subject.10 But, this stance on the project of 
truthmaking, I say, is too extreme. It seems drastic to say that in rejecting TM-N we have 
embarked on a project distinct from truthmaking. It is more appropriate to suggest that in this 
case one of the main theses of the standard theory is being challenged. Such a situation is not 
uncommon in metaphysics.  
We should also distinguish the concept of a truthmaker from the concept of truthmaking. 
Although it is a conceptual truth that if <p> has a truthmaker, <p> must be true, nothing follows 
about the condition under which <p> is made true. The conceptual truth that if <p> has a 
truthmaker, then <p> must be true is compatible with the suggestion that facts about truthmaking 
are contingent. That is, there could be worlds in which T makes true <p> and other worlds in 
which T exists and <p> is false and yet it would still be true that if <p> has a truthmaker, then 
<p> must be true. Thus, it is not analytic that the concept of a truthmaker entails the concept of a 
relation holding between truth and truthmaker that implies a specific form of necessity 
connecting truths and reality. The concept of a truthmaker is distinct from the concept of 
truthmaking. Therefore, conceptual truths about the former won’t necessarily tell us anything 
about the latter. 
                                               
10 On Josh Parsons’ (1999) view, which is a clear rejection of TM-N, truthmakers have their truthmaking features 
contingently (cf. Nolan 2008, 171). 
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There is one last argument that might account for the idea that truthmakers are supposed to 
be necessarily sufficient and so necessitate the truth of the propositions they make true.11 We 
want an argument for the conclusion that truthmakers necessitate the truth of the propositions 
they make true. We have already discovered that we cannot argue from a conceptual truth about 
the notion of a truthmaker to secure this conclusion, and it seemed equally bizarre to explain 
such necessity in terms of conventions set by us. But perhaps it is more promising to look at the 
nature of the truthmaker and argue that given what truthmakers are they necessitate their truths. 
Let us suppose that all truthmakers are states of affairs. States of affairs are complex entities 
that are made up of universals and particulars. For instance, the state of affairs of a’s being F is 
made up of the universal F and the particular a. A unique mode of composition operates on such 
entities to compose a’s being F, also written as [Fa].12 States of affairs are entities that have their 
constituents essentially. Take [Fa] and call it ‘B’. If B were to lose its universal constituent for 
example, B would cease to exist (see Reicher 2009). But, for reductio let us suppose that 
essentialism about states of affairs is false. B could exist with the universal constituent G such 
that it is made up of a and G. We can write this as B[Ga].13 Now suppose that in world1 B[Fa] and 
<Fa> exist. Further suppose that B makes true <Fa>. In world2, B[Ga] and <Fa> exist, but <Fa> is 
false. B is insufficient for the truth of <Fa> because B has its constituents contingently. In order 
to secure the claim that a truthmaker is ‘necessarily sufficient’ for the truth of a proposition, we 
have to postulate essentialism about states of affairs. B will be necessarily sufficient for the truth 
                                               
11 I thank André Gallois for detailed discussion here. 
12 For more detailed principles on the unique mode of composition that operates on states of affairs, see (McDaniel 
2009). 
13 This is short hand for B has as its constituents particular a and universal G. 
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of <Fa> only if B possesses its constituents essentially. Thus, truthmakers necessitate the truth of 
the propositions they make true only if there is something essential about their nature.14  
But this argument for TM-N presupposes that truthmakers are states of affairs. We are given 
a reason to adopt necessitarianism but only by appealing to the essentialist nature of truthmakers. 
If we do not think states of affairs exist or that they are the only truthmakers, this argument won’t 
be compelling. There might be reasons to reject the thesis that all truthmakers are states of 
affairs. For example, (the existence of) Socrates seems to be a sufficient truthmaker for the 
proposition <Socrates exists>. We do not need the state of affairs of Socrates’ existing to make it 
true.15 Similarly, <Socrates = Socrates> seems to be made true by the existence of Socrates and 
not the state of affairs of Socrates’ being self-identical.16  
At any rate, if we find the final argument for TM-N attractive, we must accept the ontological 
cost of states of affairs or entities with essentialist natures. If we do not like this consequence, we 
won’t find this argument for TM-N convincing.   
 
 
 
                                               
14 Contingent or transferable tropes would also fail to support TM-N. Non-transferable tropes would on the other 
hand support TM-N and my same point would apply as in the case of states of affairs. 
15 You might think that ‘the existence of Socrates’ refers to something more than just Socrates. If we adopted the 
view that existence is a first-order property had by individuals, we can add weight to the plausibility that Socrates’ 
existing is a state of affairs or that the property of existing had by Socrates makes true <Socrates exists>. I do not 
have space to discuss these issues here however. 
16 Armstrong calls properties such as being identical with a ‘third-class properties of particulars’. He writes, ‘Being 
identical with a is undoubtedly true of a. But there is no state of affairs involved, no genuine ‘is’ of predication. So it 
is a third-class property of a’ (Armstrong 1997b, 44). 
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3.3 Against Truthmaker Necessitarianism 
 
What reasons do we have to reject TM-N? John Heil (2000) has suggested it is possible that T 
exists and <p> is false. Consider the following counterfactual proposition: 
 (P) <Were you to drink this cyanide-laced tea, you would die>. 
Suppose that in the actual world states of affairs of the molecular make-up of the tea make 
(P) true. Call the conjunction of these states of affairs ‘T’. If TM-N is true, then T necessitates 
the truth of (P), and so there are no worlds in which T exists and (P) is false. But this is surely 
false, for it is possible that T exists and (P) is false because you may possess the antidote to the 
cyanide-laced tea (Heil 2000, 232-3).  
The objection may be refuted by rejecting the initial assumption that T makes true (P). Why 
think that categorical properties or states of affairs of the molecular make-up of the tea make true 
propositions about the dispositional features or powers of the tea? This assumption depends on a 
further thesis about the relationship between categorical and dispositional properties. I do not 
have time to consider debates surrounding this issue.17 I therefore rest content with Heil’s first 
objection as containing a potential counter-example to TM-N. 
Mellor presents the following argument against TM-N. Suppose there is a world (call it w1) 
in which the only entities that exist are [Fa] and [Fb]. Now,  
… as ‘there is no particular that is neither a nor b’ is a negative truth, it needs no truthmaker. All 
it needs is that no truthmaker for its negation exists, i.e. that no particular other than a or b exists. 
                                               
17 For debates about dispositions and powers, see (Bird 2007) and (Armstrong, Martin, & Place 1996). See also 
(Cameron 2005) for discussion of this objection. This objection also requires the falsity of TM-M. 
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So if a and b are indeed the only particulars, whatever makes ‘Fa’ and ‘Fb’ true will also make 
true ‘everything is F’, even though it will not necessitate [‘everything is F’] (Mellor 2003, 214). 
Indeed, all generalisations are made true by first-order states of affairs in a given world but 
they do not thereby necessitate the truth of such generalisations. That is to say, it is not the case 
that in all worlds in which [Fa] and [Fb] exist they make true <everything is F>. [Fa] and [Fb] 
could exist with [Gc] in world w2. Contingent states of affairs are sufficient but not necessarily 
sufficient truthmakers. Therefore, it is not the case that truthmakers necessitate the truths they 
make true. 
Mellor’s argument employs the premise that the negative truth <there is no particular that is 
neither a nor b> does not require a truthmaker. Mellor appears to assume that this truth and 
perhaps all negative truths need no truthmakers to be true. They simply need ‘no truthmaker for 
their negation’. If we thought that this negative truth does require a truthmaker, then we need 
something else besides [Fa] and [Fb] to make true <everything is F>. Perhaps, if we adopt 
Truthmaker Maximalism (or TM-M)—i.e., every truth has at least one truthmaker—we have 
some motivation to deny that the negative truth <there is no particular that is neither a nor b> 
does not require a truthmaker. In other words, if TM-M is true, then we require a truthmaker for 
the negative truth <there is no particular that is neither a nor b> (see Cameron 2005, 54). The 
truthmaker for such a truth is typically regarded as a totality fact that states that there is nothing 
more in the given world other than the first-order states of affairs that exist in the given world 
and the totality state of affairs (see Armstrong 2004b, ch. 6). 
So, the obvious response to Mellor’s argument employs TM-M. But now we have to weigh 
up our options. If we accept TM-M, we must embrace totality states of affairs—fundamental 
higher-order states of affairs. This also has the counter-intuitive consequence of making negative 
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truths true in virtue of some entity where we intuitively judge that a negative truth is true just 
because it lacks a falsemaker (cf. Lewis 1992, 216). If we reject totality states of affairs, we have 
reason to deny TM-M. If we deny TM-M, we have no defence against Mellor’s argument for the 
falsity of TM-N (it appears).18 But we can equally argue that we should accept TM-M and 
tolerate the ontological consequences. So, why accept TM-M? Cameron (2008c) provides us 
with an all-or-nothing affair. If we accept truthmaking, we embrace the goal of providing a 
general theory that tells us what it is for a proposition to be made true. If we acknowledge the 
burden of providing a general theory, Cameron concludes, we must go all the way and accept 
that each and every truth has a truthmaker. If we do not go all the way and therefore reject TM-
M, then we shouldn’t accept truthmaking (Cameron 2008c, 107-8). But why think this? Our line 
of reasoning could legitimately proceed as follows. We first come across a garden variety truth 
and realise that for it to be true it must be true because of the world in some way. We then 
consider other cases and conclude that what is true in general depends on being and that our 
theory should explain this phenomenon. But in attempting to provide a general theory we realise 
that there exist stubborn cases that intuitively do not depend on the world in the same way. For 
example, intuitively, a negative truth is true because of something the world does not have. At 
                                               
18 There are further issues with Mellor’s argument that I am overlooking here. First, we might point out that his 
argument is self-defeating. If <there is no particular that is neither a nor b> requires no truthmaker, then why suggest 
that <everything is F> requires a truthmaker? The proposition <everything is F> is equivalent to a negative 
existential, say, <no F isn’t G>. So, we should accept that <everything is F> requires no truthmaker. But then how 
can we conclude that <everything is F> has a truthmaker in w1 but is not necessitated by this truthmaker? Second, 
we might react to Mellor’s argument by saying that for the argument to go through we need to assume TM-M since 
we need to suppose <everything is F> requires a truthmaker. But if we assume TM-M, then we cannot say that 
<there is no particular that is neither a nor b> needs no truthmaker. And this claim is the key premise in his 
argument. On further reflection however, I do not think Mellor’s argument requires TM-M. He could simply assume 
that generalisations require truthmakers but that other truths such as necessary propositions do not require 
truthmakers. So, TM-M is not needed. But, even the weaker assumption that generalisations require truthmakers 
won’t help, since generalisations are equivalent to negative existentials. My final thought is to say that in the context 
of Mellor’s discussion we can interpret him as considering the issue of generalisations and whether they need 
truthmakers and whether they are necessitated by truthmakers were they to have truthmakers. On this reading, we 
suppose for the sake of argument that generalisations require truthmakers. We then see that, given his argument, 
were they required to have truthmakers they are not necessitated by their truthmakers. But what we should really 
conclude is that generalisations do not require truthmakers and that necessitation fails for generalisations. 
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this point there are many avenues in front of us, one of which is TM-M. Another is to postulate 
that there are ways of truthmaking (Mumford 2005, 269). Garden variety positive truths are 
made true one way while negative truths, general statements, mathematical truths, etc, are made 
true in another way, or perhaps are made true in their own particular ways. These other ways of 
truthmaking may not require truthmakers. Such a view might sound implausible, but it is one 
path we can take. Another avenue is to say more about the particular truths and provide an 
explanation as to why mathematical truths (say) are not true because of the world. Determining 
whether they are analytic for instance may provide an explanation that does not force us to adopt 
TM-M.19 We could also provide an explanation for why some truths do not require truthmakers 
based on truth-conditional semantics or truth-functional constructions out of primary 
propositions (Mellor 2009). Therefore, the demand for a general theory of truthmaking does not 
entail the acceptance of TM-M. And so I conclude we should not tolerate TM-M’s ontological 
consequences. If we do not accept TM-M, Mellor’s argument seems convincing.     
   
3.4 Ideological Primitivism about Truthmaking 
 
None of the arguments against TM-N imply that we must abandon the project of truthmaking, or 
deny that entities make truths true. Moreover, it does not follow from the rejection of TM-N that 
we have thereby redefined the notion of truthmaking. Given that we have set aside TM-
entailment and TM-supervenience, we are left with the following: 
(TM-grounding) T is a truthmaker for <p> just in case the truth of <p> is grounded in T. 
                                               
19 For instance, Rodriguez-Pereyra (2005) restricts the range of truths that require truthmakers to synthetic 
propositions.  
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(TM-in virtue of) T is a truthmaker for <p> just in case <p> is true in virtue of T. 
(TM-truthmaking) T is a truthmaker for <p> just in case T makes true <p>.   
All three views are not subject to the objections that plague the earlier accounts of 
truthmaking. For instance, all three views capture the intuition that truth depends on being 
correctly. They do not succumb to the untoward consequence that every necessary truth is made 
true by every contingent entity since necessary truths are not grounded in or made true by 
contingent entities. Facts about what makes true what are contingent according to TM-
truthmaking, it is possible that T exists even if <p> is false (given worlds in which they both 
exist). In some worlds T makes true <p> and in others T makes true other propositions. In 
addition, all three views are not committed to or require support from TM-M. But they are 
compatible with TM-M. Thus, if we are motivated to adopt TM-M, then these three views can 
accept TM-M as a component of their theory of truthmaking.  
The first two views (shortened now to TM-G and TM-IVO respectively20) invoke the notion 
of ‘grounding’ or ‘in virtue of’ in their analysis of what it is for T to be a truthmaker for <p>. 
Some proponents of TM-G also talk of a relation of grounding that is said to hold between truth 
and truthmaker (see Schaffer 2008, 17). The idea here is that grounding is a relation that holds 
between truth and truthmaker. We should regard TM-G theorists as introducing a further 
ontological cost into their explanation of truthmaking because they say there is a relation of 
                                               
20 I will now regard TM-G and TM-IVO as interchangeable and when I refer to one I mean to refer to both unless 
stated otherwise. 
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grounding that holds between truth and truthmaker; this is to be literally understood as an entity 
that is the grounding relation.21  
Contrast TM-G and TM-IVO with TM-truthmaking. TM-truthmaking is inspired in part by 
the following pessimism of Heil: 
‘I have no positive account of truthmaking to offer. I am doubtful that it is possible to explicate 
truth making in an illuminating way, that is, in a way that employs simpler, clearer concepts’ 
(Heil 2000, 236). 
I take the suggestion to be that the concept of truthmaking ought to be taken as primitive, 
especially because we have found no illuminating explanation of the concept in terms of the 
concept of necessitation, supervenience or (logical) entailment. The second piece of inspiration 
comes from a suggestion by Melia: 
‘makes true is as ontologically innocent as and, or, and not’ (2005, 79, his italics). 
Thus, given that the concept of truthmaking is primitive, we retain ‘... makes true ...’ as a 
primitive predicate of the ideology of the theory. This can equally be understood as ‘... makes it 
true that ...’. Melia’s insight is that this predicate does not ontologically commit us to some 
relation. The ‘makes true’ predicate is therefore an ideological commitment of the theory. This 
does not undermine claims about what makes true what however. We can still say that ‘T makes 
it true that p’. T and <p> are sufficient for this truth; no relation is required. Call this ideological 
primitivism about truthmaking (hereafter in this chapter, primitivism).  
                                               
21 There is an interesting question whether the grounding relation is internal or external. If it is internal, then it might 
be plausible to say it is not fundamental. 
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Melia’s preferred view is an account of truthmaking ‘without truthmakers’ given his 
‘sensible nominalism’.22 He writes, ‘the phrase ‘makes true’ is treated as a predicate, a predicate 
which takes names of states of affairs on one side and names of sentences on the other’ (2005, 
78, his italics). Therefore, Melia writes truthmaking claims as follows: 
 (*) ‘a is red makes true the sentence ‘a is coloured’’  
According to Melia, the ontological commitments of (*) are the particular a and the sentence 
‘a is coloured’. This subtlety of Melia’s view is made more explicit with the introduction of a 
truthmaking operator ‘TM(   ,   )’ that makes a new sentence from two other sentences. In 
Melia’s case ‘TM’ makes the sentence ‘TM(‘a is red’, ‘a is coloured’) from ‘a is red’ and ‘a is 
coloured’. Strictly speaking this operator is a sentential connective. Hence we can dispense with 
the idea of a truthmaking claim having relata. But there is nothing built into primitivism that 
says our theory needs to be nominalist through and through. We can easily take the ‘makes true’ 
predicate as relating states of affairs and propositions. The upshot of primitivism is that we are 
not forced to say there is a relation of truthmaking that holds between truth and truthmaker. 
Can we say more about truthmaking according to primitivism? According to Melia, 
truthmaking requires a ‘more intimate connection’ than the explanations of TM-N, TM-
entailment, or TM-supervenience. The connection should be one of ‘constitution’, as Melia 
notes, ‘that which makes a truth true should be constitutive of the truth’ (2005, 82, his italics).23 
For example, it is necessary that if Manchester is dreary, then 2+2=4. Necessary truths can 
supervene on any concrete individual, therefore, according to TM-supervenience, the state of 
                                               
22 His nominalist ontology contains ‘rich individuals’ such as red cars, blue letterboxes, purple roses but no 
universals, sets, classes, state of affairs, possibilia, etc. See (Melia 2005, 71-2). 
23 Mill might have had the same thought when he asked: ‘What is that which is expressed by the form of discourse 
called a Proposition, and the conformity of which to fact constitutes the truth of the proposition?’ (Mill 1843, book 
1, ch. 5, §1, my italics). 
104 
 
 
affairs of Manchester being dreary makes true 2+2=4.24 Every world in which this state of affairs 
exists, the mathematical statement above is true. But, intuitively, Manchester being dreary does 
not make true 2+2=4. The state of affairs is not constitutive of 2+2’s equalling 4. 
Melia does not provide further detail as to what this more intimate connection is but it seems 
the intuition is equally captured by TM-G and TM-IVO insofar as we have arrived at the idea 
that truth is intimately related to being in some asymmetric way. It seems he is compelled to 
leave the thought at that since he is not willing to countenance a relation that holds between two 
entities. This lack of ‘ontological’ explication is no fault of Melia’s view or the less nominalistic 
variant I mentioned above. We can easily understand the notion of ‘makes true’ through various 
examples and it seems we can understand sentences that involve the ‘makes true’ connective or 
predicate just as we can understand sentences that involve ‘and’, ‘or’, etc.  
For the remainder of the section I compare TM-G and primitivism (the less nominalistic 
version which takes ‘makes true’ as a primitive predicate that applies to T and <p>). I argue that 
we are better off choosing primitivism over TM-grounding because of the extra ontological 
commitments of the latter. But I do not have a decisive objection here.  
First we need to be clear on the two views I am considering in this debate. In one corner we 
have ‘makes true’ as a piece of primitive ideology that applies to truthmaker and truth. (This is 
distinct from Melia’s ‘TM’ operator that makes a truthmaking sentence from two other 
sentences.) Let us restate primitivism as follows: 
(TM-TM*) For all propositions p and all worlds w: if p is true at w, then there exists 
some x in w such that p is made true by x. 
                                               
24 This point was established earlier. The example here is more for contrast. 
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In the other corner we have TM-G which is committed to a fundamental relation of 
grounding that holds between truth and truthmaker. We should be clear that it is the truth of the 
proposition and not its existence that is grounded in the truthmaker. We do not want to say that 
what it is for a truth to be made true is for it to be grounded in some entity. Rather we want to 
say that the truth of the proposition is grounded in some entity. Once we disambiguate between 
the grounding of the existence of the proposition and the truth of the proposition, it is clear that 
the notion of grounding is not grounding of entities on entities. Instead it is one of entities ‘truth-
grounding’ propositions. The proposition itself may be existentially grounded in more 
fundamental features of reality since propositions are typically regarded as nonfundamental. But 
this is not the relation we should be interested in. Call the relation we are interested in truth-
grounds.25 
According to Schaffer, TM-G requires more than just the postulation of the grounding 
relation. It requires the background metaphysics of substances and posteriors which are in 
general related by ontological dependence. Truth is just like any other derivative entity 
ontologically dependent on substance or the substances. Truth is a ‘dependent abstraction’. Thus, 
the truthmaking relation is a subset of the more general relation of ontological dependence. As 
Schaffer writes,  
Thus I assume that the truthmaking relation is to be identified with certain instances of the 
dependence relation, namely, those which relate substance to truth: 
A5. Truthmaking is truthgrounding: the truthmaking relation is the relation of grounding between 
substance and truth. 
                                               
25 As we will see below, if truth-grounds is a restriction of ontological dependence in general, it is unclear how we 
can distinguish between the grounding of the truth of a proposition and its existence. 
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(A5) is thus a twice-heavy assumption, for invoking a neo-Aristotelian metaphysical framework, 
and for explicating truthmaking within this framework of truthgrounding (Schaffer 2010a, 310).  
We can restate TM-G as follows: 
(TM-G*) For all propositions p and all worlds w: if p is true at w, then there exists some x 
in w such that p’s truth at w is grounded in x.    
Now this is not exactly Schaffer’s account of truthmaking since he claims that truth is 
grounded in ‘the world’. Worlds are the grounds of truth rather than some particular portion of 
reality. His reasons for this assumption are based on spelling out (and defending) a monistic 
metaphysic where what fundamentally exists is the One or the actual world as a whole. The One 
then grounds everything else. Schaffer’s monistic goals here are not relevant. So we put to one 
side the assumption that worlds are the grounds of truth and instead focus on portions of reality 
grounding certain propositions. I discuss two tentative worries for TM-G* below. 
First, (A5) specifies that the relation between truth and truthmaker is just the relation of 
ontological dependence. What makes it the truthmaking relation or what allows us to call it ‘the 
truthmaking relation’ or an instance of the truthmaking relation is that one of the relata is a truth. 
But it seems that truth-grounds or the truthmaking relation is really not that special. It is simply a 
restriction of the broader metaphysics of ontological dependence. Furthermore, if it is just a 
restriction of the general relation of ontological dependence we fail to capture the content of 
propositions when finding truthmakers and have lost the difference between grounding the truth 
of a proposition as opposed to its existence. Intuitively there is a difference to be drawn here. In 
addition, it is plausible to think that truthmaking is about subject matters and that what 
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propositions are about plays a central role. By subsuming truthmaking under ontological 
dependence we lose this important part of the theory of truthmaking (cf. Sider 2011, 162-3). 
But I find this objection only partially compelling since I am somewhat sceptical that what 
propositions are about plays a central role in truthmaking. If we are to accept that most truths 
have truthmakers, then many truths will be made true by truthmakers that they are not about. If 
<the rose is red> is true, then it is most likely made true by states of affairs about microphysical 
particles. If <the proton is charged> is true, it may be true because of some more fundamental 
particles. If <the chair exists> is true, it may be made true by some plurality of simples arranged 
chairwise and not the chair. At any rate, if we are attracted to subject matters playing a role in 
truthmaking, then we have at least one reason to be sceptical about TM-G*.26 
Second, this view comes with extra ontological costs. Not only are we to accept a relation of 
grounding and then identify a restriction on it to truths as the truthmaking relation, but we must 
accept the metaphysic of ontological dependence generally speaking. If we are adverse to this 
general metaphysic, we will be adverse to this account of truthmaking. Further, when comparing 
TM-G* and (A5) with primitivism we have an ontologically economical theory on offer. But 
primitivism has ideological costs that we cannot gloss over. I think the costs here are worth it in 
the face of positing the ontological complexity of TM-G* and A5.27 In sum, I am content to exit 
the discussion with the claim that TM-G and primitivism are our best candidates for an account 
of what it is for a truthmaker to make true a truth. 
                                               
26 Schaffer has a response to a similar worry about subject matters in relation to his monistic truthmaking. But it 
relies on the assumption that propositions are sets of worlds, and that truthbearers are propositions. See (Schaffer 
2010a, 316). This issue will resurface in the next chapter. 
27 To be fair, primitivism has its own ontological costs as well. A fuller treatment of the view will most likely lead us 
to admit states of affairs or tropes, etc. We may want to know whether they incur further ontological or even 
ideological costs. 
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4 
Truthmaking as a Theory of Fundamentality 
 
The metaphysics of fundamentality concerns the realm of the fundamental and the relationship 
between the fundamental and the nonfundamental. Thus, a theory of fundamentality must say 
something about what is fundamental as well as how it is related to the nonfundamental. 
Metaphysicians present different accounts of fundamentality based on their different approaches 
to metaphysics. Some have put forth purely ontological accounts of fundamentality that attempt 
to understand fundamentality solely in terms of entities being related to other entities (regardless 
of their ontological category). Others have presented linguistic accounts that attempt to 
understand fundamentality through the expressions of a fundamental language and the truths 
expressed therein. The theory of truthmaking as a theory of fundamentality is an attractive mix of 
both the ontological and linguistic approach. In this chapter I consider truthmaking as a theory of 
fundamentality. I explore two differing accounts and discuss problems and objections with each. 
Much of the discussion is a reaction and response to Sider’s recent work on fundamentality.  
 
4.1 Fundamentality 
 
Metaphysicians understand the notion of fundamentality in various ways. (I take the notion of 
fundamentality to be both about the fundamental and its relationship to the nonfundamental.) 
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According to Schaffer (2009), the realm of the fundamental consists solely in the entities that are 
ungrounded, that is, entities that do not ontologically depend on anything else.28 The 
fundamental entities are connected to the nonfundamental entities in virtue of grounding 
relations that hold between the fundamental and nonfundamental. This type of theory is spelled 
out completely in terms of talk of entities. Call it a purely ontological account of fundamentality 
since the theory understands fundamentality solely in terms of entities. In addition, it is important 
to note that the term ‘fundamental’ is being applied to entities here and not to truth. 
At the other end of the spectrum are full-blooded linguistic accounts of fundamentality. 
These accounts understand fundamentality solely in terms of language and semantics. According 
to Sider (2011), the realm of the fundamental is understood in terms of the fundamental 
language, the expressions of which are said to perfectly carve reality at its joints. (We should 
note here that the sense of the word ‘fundamental’ is about truths and expressions and not 
entities. This is one major difference between Sider and Schaffer’s approach to fundamentality.)  
It will be helpful to discuss some of the details of Sider’s understanding of ‘joint-carving’. 
Sider’s main thesis is that we should include as a piece of primitive ideology the following 
operator ‘S’ (Sider 2011, 91).29 This operator operates on expressions from all ideological 
categories (from predicates to quantifiers and itself). For instance, the predicate ‘... is F’ when 
operated on by ‘S’ yields ‘S(‘... is F’)’.30 For now we might say this sentence means ‘‘... is F’ is 
structural’ or, ‘‘... is F’ carves reality at the joints’. For Sider, ‘fundamental’ just means 
                                               
28 Schaffer’s (2010a, 2010b) preferred position is that there is only one fundamental entity, namely, the One. 
29 In Writing the Book of the World Sider uses a specific symbol for the ‘structure’ operator that requires a font I do 
not have. I instead use ‘S’. 
30 More precisely, Sider uses ‘dummy variables’ to make up complete sentences which he attaches to ‘S’. Thus, ‘Fx’ 
(where x is a dummy variable) is attached to S to yield ‘S(Fx)’. The use of dummy variables is more for grammar’s 
sake. The goal is still to ‘query’ the predicate or other pieces of ideology. See (Sider 2011, 94).  
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‘perfectly carves at the joints’. The whole point of postulating ‘S’ as a piece of primitive 
ideology that is applied to other pieces of primitive ideology is to capture the idea that a 
fundamental language is structural or carves reality at the joints. A fundamental language 
contains ‘all and only’ primitive expressions (Sider 2011, 8).31 The notions or concepts that are 
expressed by pieces of primitive ideology are also said to be structural or carve at the joints. 
According to Sider, structure is primitive. But what is structure? We might expect to hear not 
a definition or analysis but some kind of elucidation, for there is an air of paradox surrounding 
the very practice of primitivism. By taking something as primitive, we thereby corner off any 
deeper insight into the very nature of the primitive, an insight that we receive when providing an 
analysis. At any rate, we are told the following about structure. Structure is a ‘worldly’ matter, 
not something linguistic, conventional, etc. If a concept is said to be structural it is structural just 
because it is expressed by the appropriate term of a theory. The appropriate term is itself 
structural. More negatively, the word ‘structure’ is not a noun; it does not name anything (Sider 
2011, 5, n. 5). Structure is not an entity of any kind, nor is it stuff. Further, ‘structure’ and its 
cognates are not predicates, such as, ‘... is structural’. Moreover, ‘structure’ is not a predicate of 
properties, ‘nor of any other sorts of entities’ (ibid). So, on Sider’s view ‘... is structural’ does 
not apply to properties, particulars, sets, states of affairs, etc. We do not say, strictly speaking, 
there are structural properties, relations, or structural particulars as ‘structure’ does not apply to 
ontology. ‘Structure’ applies to ideology (cf. Sider 2011, 94). 
For Sider, the relationship between the fundamental and the nonfundamental is understood as 
a connection between the fundamental language and nonfundamental languages. The connection 
                                               
31 On page 8 Sider only states this as a sufficient condition. However, he provides the necessary and sufficient 
condition on p. 92, n. 14. 
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itself involves the linguistic notion of metaphysical semantics. Metaphysical semantics is a 
certain kind of semantic theory which attempts to spell out meanings in purely joint-carving 
terms. Sider also says that ‘if the semantic theory takes the form of a truth-theory, then the truth-
conditions must be stated in perfectly joint-carving terms’ (2011, 112). A metaphysical 
semantics for some nonfundamental language would then consist in metaphysical truth-
conditions for statements in some nonfundamental language. That is, a sentence S of language L 
is true in L just in case f, where f is phrased in purely joint-carving terms (Sider 2011, 113). But 
there are other forms that a metaphysical semantics may take such as the assignment of 
expressivist assertion-conditions to normative discourse or the assignment of proof-theoretic 
assertion-conditions to mathematical sentences. Sider’s view of fundamentality (which attempts 
to account for what is fundamental and how it is related to the nonfundamental) has two main 
components. First, regarding the fundamental, Sider postulates a monadic ‘S’ operator that tells 
us when something is joint-carving or fundamental. Second, regarding the nonfundamental and 
its relation to the fundamental, Sider introduces an undefined notion of metaphysical semantics. 
In sum, Sider’s view (to the degree that I understand it) is ‘structure’ plus ‘metaphysical 
semantics’. 
There are less extreme approaches that lie between linguistic and purely ontological 
characterisations of fundamentality. One less extreme approach to fundamentality is found in the 
project of truthmaking. Typically speaking, a theory of truthmaking begins with the general 
claim that every truth has a truthmaker (a claim I do not subscribe to). Thus every truth stands in 
the truthmaking relation to some truthmaker. The truthmaking relation intuitively speaking 
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relates entities and truth.32 On one construal, the realm of the fundamental entities is the realm of 
truthmakers. (The sense of ‘fundamental’ here is applied to entities.) Call them fundamental 
truthmakers. Suppose further that truths are ‘highly dependent’ entities—perhaps objects grafted 
from our utterances and beliefs. The relationship between the fundamental and nonfundamental 
is understood in terms of every truth having a fundamental truthmaker. For instance, the truth 
that Obama will be re-elected is (or will be) made true by a complex conjunction of fundamental 
truthmakers that involve fundamental properties and relations distributed across the spacetime 
region of America.  
(Later in this chapter I defend a more refined version of truthmaking that can be classified as 
a hybrid approach that conjoins Sider’s notion of metaphysical semantics for nonfundamental 
truths with a theory of truthmaking that restricts what truths have truthmakers. The above sketch 
of truthmaking as a theory of fundamentality is intended to be a rough sketch of one theory of 
truthmaking as a theory of fundamentality. I do not accept the rough version just sketched.) 
These approaches to fundamentality are meant to provide answers to the following questions: 
what is the realm of the fundamental? What is the relationship between the fundamental and 
nonfundamental? As we saw, the differing approaches to fundamentality have differing senses of 
the word ‘fundamental’. Schaffer’s approach understood ‘fundamental’ as applied to entities, 
while Sider applied it to truths and expressions. 
A theory of fundamentality needs to provide us with more than just answers to these 
questions. There are three adequacy conditions that I think can be identified for a theory to be a 
candidate theory of fundamentality. These conditions are not uncontroversial. So, part of the 
                                               
32 There are of course other accounts of the truthmaking relation that understand the connection to be strictly 
between propositions. The example here is for illustrative purposes. 
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discussion that follows is concerned with how we should formulate a given condition and 
whether we should accept it as a genuine and general constraint on our candidate theories of 
fundamentality.  
Let us revisit a now hackneyed metaphor. Suppose all God has to do to give a complete 
account of reality is to write a story that contained all the truths about the world concerning what 
there is and what it is like.33 Intuitively, God would include just the truths necessary to provide a 
story that accounted for everything non-redundantly. If God can account for everything about 
Olympic-size swimming pools with a description that merely includes micro-physical truths, 
then God would not mention Olympic-size swimming pools. It seems the micro-physical truths 
are enough to account for truths about Olympic-size swimming pools. Truths about Olympic-size 
swimming pools in this respect are redundant.  
The metaphor is latent with several interrelated concepts. First, there is the concept of 
‘completeness’. God in giving his ‘account’ provides a complete account, one that is in some 
sense ‘responsible’ for everything else (Sider 2011, 105). Second, there is the notion of 
‘redundancy’. God’s ‘account’ is non-redundant (cf. Lewis 1983, 346). Nothing is described or 
mentioned twice, and nothing else is required except what is needed to account for everything 
else. Third, there is the concept of some ‘relationship’ between what is responsible for 
everything else and ‘the stuff’ that is redundant.34  
The first adequacy condition is concerned with the concept of completeness. Sider gives us a 
plausible starting point for a relatively theory-neutral conception of completeness: ‘every 
nonfundamental truth holds in virtue of some fundamental truth’ (2011, 105, his italics). This 
                                               
33 For this metaphor, see inter alia (Crane 1991). 
34 This does not suggest that what is redundant is not real or does not exist or exists in some other way, etc. Such 
issues are distinct from the general concept of redundancy. 
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statement has little content on its own. So it needs to be made more precise based on one’s 
approach to fundamentality. For instance, Sider fills out completeness as follows: ‘every 
sentence that contains expressions that do not carve at the joints has a metaphysical semantics’ 
(2011, 116). Since for Sider ‘fundamental’ means ‘carves at the joints’, completeness amounts to 
the claim that every sentence that contains nonfundamental expressions has a metaphysical 
semantics. A typical truthmaker theory fills out completeness differently. A truthmaker theorist 
(which I don’t endorse) may fill out completeness as: every truth has a fundamental truthmaker. 
The condition of completeness seems relatively uncontroversial. But each theory of 
fundamentality will fill out completeness based on their specific framework. 
We also have a constraint that derives from the notion of a fundamental description involving 
nothing more than fundamental truths. This is the constraint of purity: ‘fundamental truths 
involve only fundamental notions’ (Sider 2011, 106, his italics). The idea behind the constraint is 
that all God has to do to provide a complete account of reality is to provide the fundamental 
description of reality. This fundamental description won’t mention (or use) any nonfundamental 
terms or refer to any nonfundamental entities, etc. The description is pure. As with the constraint 
of completeness, purity needs to be filled in according to one’s approach to fundamentality. 
According to Sider, the purity constraint comes out as trivial since he defines the notion of a 
fundamental truth as one that consists of fundamental terms (Sider 2011, 116). If completeness is 
understood as: every truth that has one or more nonfundamental notions holds in virtue of some 
truth that involves only fundamental notions, then truths that involve only fundamental notions 
better involve only fundamental notions (which is just what purity says). 
How is purity supposed to work? To take Sider’s example, consider the truth ‘there exists a 
city’. According to the theory-neutral version of purity (viz., fundamental truths involve only 
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fundamental notions), this truth is not fundamental since ‘city’ is nonfundamental. Now consider 
‘there is a city in virtue of T’. This too is a nonfundamental truth. This simple test enables us to 
determine whether a truth is pure or impure. But in addition to this test, purity is supposed to be a 
general and sweeping constraint: ‘it requires facts about the relationship between the 
fundamental and the nonfundamental to be themselves nonfundamental’ (Sider 2011, 107, his 
italics). If we include a piece of primitive ideology— again following Sider’s example—say, ‘’ 
in our theory, it follows that truths which involve ‘’ and nonfundamental notions, such as a city, 
will also turn out nonfundamental. But if ‘’ is involved in a truth that only has fundamental 
notions, say, C, then the corresponding truth will turn out fundamental. For instance, ‘ all Cs 
are Cs’ is fundamental (Sider 2011, 108). So, purity tells us that according to our theory—
whatever the primitive ideology—so long as a truth involves only fundamental notions it will be 
fundamental. 
For Sider, purity yields the general conclusion that ‘connecting truths’, viz., facts about the 
relationship between the fundamental and nonfundamental, cannot be fundamental. By definition, 
Sider claims, connecting truths are about relating fundamental and nonfundamental notions, and 
so given our simple test turn out impure. It is wrong-headed to proceed by way of positing some 
relation or connection between truths or truths and the world to account for the relationship 
between the fundamental and nonfundamental. He writes, 
The point of using the method of posit would be to claim that the connecting truths involving the 
posited notion are fundamental truths, thereby obviating the need to say in virtue of what such 
connecting truths hold. But purity implies that the connecting truths could not be fundamental 
(2011, 110). 
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The relationship between the fundamental and nonfundamental must be sought some other 
way. Sider’s preferred approach is to posit an ‘undefined but nonfundamental notion’ of 
metaphysical semantics that connects nonfundamental truths such as sentences of a 
nonfundamental language with fundamental facts. As mentioned earlier, we might say sentence S 
of language L is true in L iff f, where f is phrased in purely joint-carving (i.e., fundamental) 
terms. The truth that ‘sentence S of language L is true in L iff f’ involves nonfundamental 
notions. Hence the truth is nonfundamental. This is the correct result according to Sider, for he 
claims that the notion of metaphysical semantics is nonfundamental. So, any connecting truths 
on his view will also be nonfundamental.  
If we take metaphysical semantics as a form of truth-theory, then the metaphysical semantics 
of sentence S is the truth-conditions of S which are assigned to S by some metaphysical 
semantics for the language it is a part of. Metaphysical semantics further involves definitions of 
the predicates of some nonfundamental language in terms of the predicates of the fundamental 
language. Predicates of the fundamental language are predicates that perfectly carve at the joints 
or are structural. More precisely, the fact that, say, predicate ‘Fx’ carves at the joints is 
understood in terms of Sider’s structure operator ‘S’ such that if ‘Fx’ carves at the joints, then 
‘Fx’ is structural or ‘S(Fx)’. Furthermore, the corresponding notion of metaphysical semantics is 
a ‘suitably undefined but nonfundamental notion’ (Sider 2011, 112). This last characteristic is 
important to avoid violating purity. Sider’s metaphysical semantics avoids the violation of purity 
because Sider takes the facts about the connection between nonfundamental and fundamental 
truths to be nonfundamental. Sider can takes these connecting facts as nonfundamental because 
he invokes the nonfundamental notion of metaphysical semantics to explain the connection 
between fundamental and nonfundamental truths. 
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On the other hand, any theory that contains fundamental facts that are about the connection 
between the fundamental and the nonfundamental violates purity. The violation of purity by 
theory T is a reason to reject T. In sum, purity is a constraint on our candidate theories of 
fundamentality.  
The third adequacy condition derives from the way the ‘all God has to do’ metaphor was 
presented (and from completeness). In the metaphor what God has to do is provide an ‘account’ 
or a ‘description’ of some kind. This implies—for lack of a better name—a propositional or 
truth-like constraint on our theories of fundamentality. Simply put, the constraint is: our theories 
of fundamentality must be able to answer why a fundamental or nonfundamental sentence, 
proposition or truth holds according to the theory. This constraint seems to follow from 
completeness insofar as completeness is concerned with a relationship between fundamental and 
nonfundamental truths. If our theory of fundamentality does not implement the notion of a truth, 
then it cannot answer questions about why certain nonfundamental truths hold. If this is a 
legitimate constraint, then purely ontological theories of fundamentality that offer an account of 
the fundamental and its relationship to the nonfundamental solely in terms of entities are 
disqualified as accounts of fundamentality (Sider 2011, 162). According to this constraint the 
explanandum must be a truth of some kind and its content must be explained in the given theory. 
This constraint has a distinctive explanatory element. A theory of fundamentality that grounds 
propositions qua entities in fundamental substances cannot satisfy the constraint since we are not 
concerned with grounding the proposition as an entity but rather concerned with explaining its 
content or what it represents (Sider 2011, 165). We might respond on Schaffer’s behalf by saying 
that the truth of nonfundamental truths is grounded in entities, but that this just means 
propositions about these entities are true. 
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But in general we can ask: is this condition too stringent? On the face of it the propositional 
constraint only follows from our formulation of completeness in terms of truths. A possible 
remedy is to reformulate completeness according to Schaffer’s theory. Completeness comes out 
as: every nonfundamental entity is grounded in some fundamental entity (or entities). Is this 
formulation permitted? If not, why not? If ‘it is natural to assume that the fundamental must be 
complete’ and so ‘responsible for everything’ else and that it ‘would be a non-starter to say the 
fundamental consists solely of one electron’ (Sider 2011, 105, my italics),35 then why can’t 
completeness be cashed out in terms of entities? What independent reason do we have for saying 
that fundamentality cannot be solely understood in terms of entities? Is not the fundamental at 
least for some just objects in our ontology?36 I raise these problems in the form of questions to 
show that while our adequacy conditions are supposed to be universal constraints on competing 
theories, their content is understood in terms of how a theory formulates the requisite condition. 
In addition, the discussion is confronted with differing senses of the word ‘fundamental’, and this 
too is partly a cause of metaphysicians operating with different metaphysical systems. Having 
said that, let us accept all three adequacy conditions. 
In what follows, I focus on articulating and assessing two differing accounts of truthmaking 
as theories of fundamentality. First, I present a recent account by Cameron (forthcoming). 
According to Cameron, the list of fundamental truths contains only the truths that are true in 
virtue of no other truths. The truths that are not true in virtue of any further truths are labelled as 
brute. All other truths are true in virtue of the brute truths. I then discuss some objections to 
Cameron’s view (§4.2). I articulate the second account which has been hinted at by Forrest and 
                                               
35 My italics here are meant to highlight that the paraphrasing of Sider is only alluding to talk of entities and not talk 
of truths. 
36 When I say ‘objects’ here I mean entities of every ontological category; so a property counts as an object. 
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Drew Khlentzos (2000) and further developed by Mellor (2009) and highlight some of its 
advantages over Cameron’s view (§4.3). According to the second view, as I articulate it here, 
only certain truths have truthmakers. The truths that have truthmakers are called primary truths. 
All other truths, i.e., the truths that are not primary (following Sider) have a metaphysical 
semantics. The second account is very similar to Sider’s theory of fundamentality. The 
difference between the views is that where Sider posits an unanalysable ‘structure’ operator the 
proponent of the second truthmaking account posits an unanalysable two-place ‘makes true’ 
predicate (or operator). In the final section of this chapter I compare Sider’s account with the 
second truthmaking view and defend the second truthmaking account against some objections. 
My overall claim is if we adopt truthmaking as a theory of fundamentality, we should adopt the 
second account. 
 
4.2 Cameron on Truthmaking 
 
Cameron (2008c, forthcoming) defends a theory of truthmaking that can properly be said to 
count as a ‘truthmaking theory of fundamentality’.37 On his view the locution ‘in virtue of’38 is 
taken as a piece of primitive ideology (forthcoming, 3). This locution is meant to express the idea 
that one truth is true in virtue of some other truth or plurality of truths.39 The locution ‘in virtue 
of’ only applies to truths; it does not relate entities and truths.40 For Cameron, truthmaking 
                                               
37 Other truthmaker theorists, such as, Armstrong do not load their truthmaking with heavy talk of fundamentality.  
38 Cameron takes the converse of ‘in virtue of’ to be ‘grounds’. I take this use of ‘grounds’ to be ‘truth-grounds’ 
since the use of ‘in virtue of’ is really ‘is true in virtue of’. The locution ‘truth-grounds’ is to be distinguished from 
‘entity-grounds’. Cameron writes ‘in virtue of’ claims using ‘Þ’ such that ‘qÞp’ means ‘<q> grounds <p>’ or ‘<p> 
is true in virtue of <q>’. 
39 I ignore the complication of one truth being true in virtue of many truths. 
40 Cameron does not say anything about the constituents of propositions. It seems he is silent on this issue. I do not 
think it affects any part of his theory. 
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literally encapsulates the idea that truth is grounded in ontology; what is the case depends on 
what there is. He writes, ‘explanation only bottoms out at existence facts: for God to give a 
complete plan of the world He needs [sic] only make an inventory of what is to exist’ (2008c, 
112-3). Why is this account beneficial? According to Cameron, it provides us with a small class 
of brute truths. Brute truths are truths that have ‘no ground’, or rather are not true in virtue of 
anything. Every other truth is true in virtue of some truth. The latter truths he calls ‘derivative’. 
He now writes: 
Call the set containing all and only the brute propositions P.  If P is empty then every proposition 
is derivative, in which case no proposition has an ultimate ground.   
Consider also the set – call it S – of propositions whose entire content is that some thing, or some 
things, exist(s): call these propositions pure existence claims.  E.g., ‘a exists’. 
... 
Truthmaking:  A proposition <p> is made true by X, or the Xs, just in case either (i) <p>ÎP & 
<p>ÎS & <p> says that X (or the Xs) exist(s) or (ii) $x(xÞp & xÎP & xÎS & x says that X (or 
the Xs) exist(s)).  
That is: a proposition is made true by some things, the Xs, if and only if it is the brutely true pure 
existence claim that the Xs exist or it is true in virtue of the brutely true pure existence claim that 
the Xs exist. (forthcoming, 5) 
The brute truths, he further states, are a subset of the existential sentences, e.g., ‘a exists’. 
But, if we add the claim that every truth is either brute or is true in virtue of some brute 
proposition (perhaps through some chain of ‘in virtue of’ statements), then we have arrived at the 
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idea, according to Cameron, that each and every truth has some truthmaker or truthmakers 
(Cameron forthcoming, 6). This is the doctrine of truthmaker maximalism. 
Another part of Cameron’s account is his commitment to TM-N (see Cameron forthcoming, 
§3). Although this extra condition is not entailed by his definition of truthmaking he seems 
happy to add it to his account, and it seems at first glance that his definition of truthmaking is not 
incompatible with TM-N.  
Cameron’s truthmaker theory of fundamentality is attractive. As Sider describes the view, 
‘the realm of the fundamental is exceedingly sparse’ (2011, 157). In addition, the fundamental 
ideology of the theory does not involve primitive negation, primitive tense operators, or 
primitive modal operators. Brute truths need only be stated using quantification, names and the 
identity predicate, e.g., ‘there is an x such that x = a’. In addition, the ‘in virtue of’ connection 
connects the fundamental and the nonfundamental. Thus we have an account of fundamentality 
in terms of truthmaking. The realm of the fundamental is the collection of truths that are true in 
virtue of nothing and they relate to the nonfundamental just because the nonfundamental truths 
hold in virtue of the fundamental truths. On this view, completeness is understood as follows: 
every nonfundamental truth holds in virtue some (brute) truth. From completeness we can 
formulate purity and satisfy the propositional constraint.41  
For the rest of this section I evaluate some problems and objections against Cameron’s view. 
Although I do not think all the objections are decisive we will see in the next section how the 
second account of truthmaking can respond to the objections that pose a genuine problem for 
Cameron’s account. 
                                               
41 It is possible to formulate completeness in terms of purity. But I leave this to one side here. 
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The first problem comes from a well-known consequence of truthmaker-maximalism. 
Consider the proposition <there are no bunyips>.42 If each and every truth has a truthmaker, then 
there must be a truthmaker for this truth. The project of finding truths for negative existentials 
usually leads to postulating a totality state of affairs that tells us which first-order states of affairs 
there are and that they are the only first-order states of affairs that exist (see Armstrong 2004b). 
But if we introduce a totality state of affairs into our ontology, we will presumably introduce 
some accompanying ideology.43 According to Sider, this requires introducing the functor ‘the 
state of affairs of x’ that ‘turns a sentence into a singular term naming a state of affairs’ (2011, 
157). If the functor is not analysed in terms of anything else, then it will have to be taken as 
primitive. Hence, if this kind of truthmaking advertises itself as a theory of fundamentality that 
purports to consist in fundamental facts that are purely existential, then it has (following Sider) 
‘smuggled in’ extra primitive ideology.  
The second objection concerns the viability of truthmaking as an explanatory theory. Given 
that the fundamental truths are solely existential truths, it seems we are denied any explanatorily 
satisfying explanations of the complexity of the world we experience or the patterns and 
mechanisms found in nature. An ‘ultimate’ or fundamental explanation, one that only involves 
the fundamental truths of our theory, can only be explanatorily satisfactory (according to Sider) 
just in case we cite ‘detailed general laws or patterns or mechanisms’ (Sider 2011, 159). 
Cameron’s theory of truthmaking cannot provide this kind of structured fundamental 
explanation. As Sider concludes: 
                                               
42 Bunyips are mythical creatures that are said to lurk in billabongs and creeks throughout Australia. 
43 Elsewhere Cameron (2010a) takes states of affairs as ontologically basic. 
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‘Ultimate explanations [on Cameron’s view] always terminate in the citation of entities; but since 
a mere list of entities is so unstructured, these “explanations” cannot be systematized with 
detailed general laws, patterns, or mechanisms’ (2011, 160).  
Given that we require ‘ultimate’ or fundamental explanations to be more illuminating, we 
should reject Cameron’s account of truthmaking. But, what exactly does an illuminating 
explanation look like? What is required to satisfy ‘general laws, patterns and mechanisms’? We 
need, it seems, ‘structured and plentiful fundamental truths’ and ‘detailed stories’ about how 
nonfundamental truths hold in virtue of fundamental truths (Sider 2011, 161). The structured and 
plentiful fundamental truths will be truths with predicational and quantificational structure. Such 
truths will allow us to properly explain the complexity of the world that we think needs to be 
accounted for in a fundamental explanation. 
I think this objection has some force. But on Cameron’s behalf we can question the 
assumption that fundamental truths need to explain the ‘complexity of the world we experience’ 
and the ‘detailed patterns and mechanisms found in nature’. The detailed patterns and 
mechanisms ‘found in nature’ for all we know may not themselves be fundamental. If they are 
not fundamental, why do they require a fundamental explanation? It would be like demanding an 
economist to provide fundamental explanations of the fluctuation of the price of crude oil solely 
in terms of micro-physical facts. If the patterns of the fluctuation of the price of crude oil are 
nonfundamental, why must we demand a fundamental explanation of this pattern? It is possible 
that the world fundamentally has the kind of existential structure posited by Cameron’s theory of 
truthmaking and that the relevant patterns and mechanisms are nonfundamental. So, I do not see 
why a requisite explanation needs to account for them using only fundamental truths. However, 
Sider can insist that given completeness everything needs a fundamental explanation. So 
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although we may accept that, for instance, the complexity we experience is not fundamental, it 
nonetheless needs a fundamental explanation.  
The last objection that remains is the centrepiece of Sider’s sweeping critique not only of 
truthmaking but of many other theories of fundamentality. This is the objection from purity. The 
main move in the argument is: if a theory violates purity, the theory should be rejected. A theory 
violates purity just when the theory contains a fundamental fact that involves nonfundamental 
notions. In other words, a fact which should be nonfundamental is really fundamental according 
to the theory in question. But recall that if each competing theory can fill out its own conception 
of completeness, then it should be able to fill out its own conception of purity. This should be 
uncontroversial if completeness can entail purity. We will come back to this point.  
First, let us attempt to mount the objection from purity against Cameron’s view. The 
constraint says that fundamental truths must not involve nonfundamental notions/entities/terms, 
etc. But what we need to find is a fact that is said to be fundamental according to Cameron that 
involves a nonfundamental notion. Let us consider the following: 
 (B1) <there exists a city> is made true by the Xs 
On Cameron’s view, (B1) is equivalent to: 
 (B2) <there exists a city> is true in virtue of <there exist the Xs>44 
(B1) is equivalent to (B2) because all nonfundamental truths (such as <there exists a city>) 
are truths that involve an ‘in virtue of’ connection between propositions. This holds for (B2) as 
well. (B2) is also nonfundamental. In fact, any fundamental truths will be of the form: 
                                               
44 There might be a longer chain of ‘in virtue of’ statements that I am suppressing here. 
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(B3) <the Xs exist> is made true by the Xs. 
Thus, we cannot say according to Cameron’s view that the nonfundamental notion of a city is 
involved in a truth that is said to be fundamental. So let us consider (B3). Does it involve any 
nonfundamental notions? Indeed it does, for ‘is made true by’ is nonfundamental. It is analysed 
in terms of ‘in virtue of’. So, (B3) is not purported to be a fundamental fact according to 
Cameron. Given that ‘is made true by’ is analysed in terms of ‘in virtue of’, (B3) is equivalent to: 
 (B4) <the Xs exists> is true in virtue of nothing.45 
Does (B4) violate purity? <the Xs exists> is a fundamental truth and ‘in virtue of’ is 
fundamental. So it appears (B4) is pure. There is no violation of purity here since this 
fundamental fact does not involve any nonfundamental notions. What Sider’s objection from 
purity is designed to banish is connecting truths that are fundamental. Purity requires that 
connecting truths should be nonfundamental. But on Cameron’s view there are no fundamental 
connecting truths. What would be connecting fundamental truths such as (B4) are truths that are 
negatively defined as some truth (i.e., <the Xs exists>) that is true in virtue of nothing. I 
conclude that Cameron’s theory has some problems but the violation of purity is not amongst 
them.     
 
 
 
                                               
45 The extra condition I left out is <the Xs exist> say that the Xs exist. This should not matter here. 
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4.3 Moderate Truthmaking 
 
Let us attempt to construct a more moderate theory of truthmaking, one that will in part be a 
reaction to the problems Cameron faces and the concerns Sider raises, but also with an eye 
towards providing a theory of fundamentality.  
First, recall that Cameron endorses TM-N. In the previous chapter I argued that TM-N should 
be rejected. I suggested that one possible alternative is ideological primitivism about 
truthmaking.46 This view was given two interpretations. On the first interpretation ‘makes true’ is 
a piece of primitive ideology that applies to truthmaker (entity) and truth. On the second 
interpretation, ‘makes true’ is understood as a non-truth-functional operator that produces 
sentences of the form ‘TM(T, S)’ where the ontological commitments of ‘T’ are whatever ‘T’ 
refers to and ‘S’ is just a sentence (Melia 2005, 79). On both views ‘makes true’ captures the 
intuition that truth depends on reality in an intimate way, it expresses the notion of a more 
intimate connection than supervenience, necessitation or entailment. It is also cross-categorial 
and thus better captures the intuition of truthmaking than Cameron’s view. An entity makes true 
a proposition not because the proposition is true in virtue of nothing (or better in virtue of no 
other proposition), but precisely the opposite. I take this to be one of its advantages over 
Cameron’s approach for we have upheld the intuition that the world makes propositions true. 
Moreover, the moderate truthmaking account, as I will develop it, is not committed to 
truthmaker-maximalism (or TM-M for short). As we saw above, TM-M forces us to introduce 
ontological oddities we are better off without. Such ontological oddities include the totality state 
of affairs which forces us to include an extra piece of ideology that Cameron at least initially is 
                                               
46 However, ideological primitivism about truthmaking is not built into moderate truthmaking. And necessitation is 
not precluded from being a necessary condition of truthmaking. 
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not willing to countenance. On the moderate view such primitive ideology need not be foisted 
upon us.47   
In what follows, we will be up front about our ontological and ideological commitments.48 I 
outline moderate truthmaking with an ontology of universals and particulars. As a result, I depart 
from Melia’s nominalist truthmaking and adopt the ‘makes true’ predicate view. But where 
appropriate I mention Melia’s variant. Let us begin. States of affairs are concrete entities that are 
composed of universals49 and particulars.50 For example, Jim’s being late and this pen’s being 
red. These states of affairs have as constituents universals and particulars. The particular 
component of Jim’s being late is Jim and the universal component is being late. Likewise, the 
particular component of this pen’s being red is this pen and the universal component is being 
red. Users of states of affairs have numbered high. Such philosophers include: (Armstrong, 
Forrest, Mellor, Russell, and Wittgenstein). In this tradition, states of affairs are often called 
facts.51 Mellor introduces the novel term ‘facta’ for states of affairs. Whereas Armstrong thinks 
‘states of affairs’ is a more appropriate term since it properly captures the fact that ‘states of 
affairs’ is a technical term of philosophical art. The word ‘fact’ and the locution ‘the fact that’ 
are all too common in ordinary language and have a variety of differing senses, ranging from 
                                               
47 It will not be foisted upon us in the sense that we won’t advertise our theory as such-and-such and then later admit 
that other entities need to be introduced into our ontology. We are up front with our ontological and ideological 
commitments (which I discuss shortly). 
48 One caveat: the ontology I develop here may not be accepted by all moderate truthmaker theorists. 
49 The use of the word ‘universal’ here includes relations. 
50 Since they are concrete they exist in space and time. But how states of affairs exist in space and time and 
questions about their exact relationship to space and time are not relevant in what follows. But see (Armstrong 
1997b, 137) who claims that states of affairs constitute spacetime. In other places he says that spacetime points can 
instantiate universals (1989, 99). It might be helpful to simply say that states of affairs are spatio-temporal entities 
and leave it at that. 
51 To make matters worse, some people use the word ‘fact’ as ‘true proposition’ as I have been doing. When there is 
an ambiguity between understanding fact qua true proposition and fact qua state of affairs, I will make it explicit 
what use of the term ‘fact’ I have in mind. 
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‘something is the case’ to ‘an event that has passed’.52 I will use the term ‘states of affairs’ and 
regard states of affairs as concrete entities. Such entities are also contingent and causally 
efficacious. Jim may have shown up on time, so it is contingent that Jim’s being late exists.53 
Jim’s being late however caused me to have the universal being upset. So, Jim’s being late 
caused Anthony’s being upset. So, states of affairs can enter into causal relations. Indeed this is 
one role they have been signed up for in a theory of states of affairs (see Armstrong 1997b, ch. 
14; Mellor 1995). I also assume that the postulation of universals is well motivated and appeal to 
the work of others who have argued for this claim. 
On the view I adopt there are only sparse universals and particulars, only the entities that are 
required to play whatever roles are needed to be played. To illustrate, one refined property role 
that needs to be filled is the role of objective similarity. Intuitively, it seems that two Higgs 
bosons go together in a different way than two Higgs bosons and a bison. The two bosons 
resemble each other in a way that is distinct from the bosons and the bison. Of course the bosons 
and the bison share many properties. But the bosons exactly resemble each other in virtue of 
sharing a universal. They go together in this ontologically important way. The fact that the 
bosons exactly resemble each other is explained by the fact that they both share a universal. The 
bosons and the bison do not share this unique universal and this is why they do not exactly 
resemble each other.54 Universals therefore fill the refined property role of objective similarity.  
                                               
52 See (Olson 1987, ch. 1) on the origin of the term ‘fact’. One of Olson’s interesting claims is that the term ‘fact’ 
preceded the locution ‘the fact that’ rather than the other way round. 
53 We might also say that Jim’s being late obtains. But the obtaining/non-obtaining distinction is only useful if we 
further suppose that states of affairs are necessarily existing abstracta of the Chisholm-Plantinga variety. However, I 
am supposing that states of affairs are not of this variety. So, all existing states of affairs obtain according to the 
Armstrongian tradition, whereas only some existing states of affairs obtain according to the Chisholm-Plantinga 
tradition. The latter believe that there exist states of affairs that do not obtain.   
54 Of course, the bosons and the bison might share other ‘properties’ but the specified role here is about exact or 
perfect resemblance. It is about properties not ‘properties’, that is, about properties which carve at reality’s joints. 
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The nature of a state of affairs is usually understood in one of two ways. On one view, states 
of affairs are more basic than universals and particulars. According to Armstrong, universals are 
actually ‘gutted’ states of affairs, where a’s being F is the state of affairs and the universal is 
__’s being F (Armstrong 1997, 29). Armstrong further claims that universals are ‘abstractions 
from’ states of affairs. On the second view we have the reverse: universals and particulars are the 
more basic entities that ground states of affairs. In what follows, I adopt the latter position. States 
of affairs ontologically depend on particulars and universals. As a result, there are two 
ontological costs: two fundamental ontological categories.55 The category of states of affairs is 
however derivative, it depends on the more fundamental categories of universals and particulars. 
For this reason it is not considered an ontological cost.56 
The metaphysics of universals and particulars has corresponding ideological costs, which are 
just as important as the ontological costs of a theory and so ought to be recognised. This was one 
of the main points established in chapters 1 and 2. The main ideological commitment of the 
theory is the ‘instantiation’ predicate. It is a piece of primitive ideology that figures in sentences 
that express fundamental facts about instantiation. The fact that particular a instantiates F is a 
fundamental fact. If states of affairs are taken as ontologically basic, then facts about 
instantiation have a good chance of being reduced (see Nolan 2008). But since I am taking 
universals and particulars to be ontologically fundamental entities, this route is unavailable.  
The perils of vicious regress are close at hand if universals and particulars are taken as 
distinct categories. If a instantiates F, it seems that some further relation is required between a 
and the relation of instantiation; call it instantiates*. But another relation will be required 
                                               
55 We will see later that we might be able to get away with one fundamental category of entities. 
56 I am attracted to Cian Dorr’s (2004) simple account of states of affairs, which I discuss below.  
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between instantiates, instantiates* and a, ... , and so on.57 Again, if we invoke states of affairs as 
fundamental, the regress can be stopped (see Armstrong 1997b, 118; Hossack 2007, 41-5; Olson 
1987, ch. 3). But, I submit, the regress can be stopped without taking states of affairs as 
fundamental entities. First, we realise that there is no relation of instantiation between particular 
a and F. If there is no relation, there is no regress of relations (cf. Quine 1980, 451). The 
predicate ‘... instantiates ...’ as a piece of primitive ideology suffices to state that a instantiates F 
and nothing more is to be said about the matter. If we attempted to state the regress in terms of 
predicates, we might get the question: why does ‘instantiates’ apply to a and F? A regress ensues 
if we reply by saying ‘instantiates*’ applies to ‘instantiates’, a and F. But, the correct answer to 
the initial question is to say it is in virtue of nothing that ‘instantiates’ applies to a and F. This 
might sound inadequate, but that is just the view. It is recognised as a cost.58 
The items of the ontology are truthmakers.59 The ‘truthmaking’ predicate applies to an entity 
and some truth. Truthmakers need not be identified with states of affairs. For example, <Socrates 
exists> can be made true by Socrates,60 yet <the paper is white> can be made true by a fusion of 
fundamental states of affairs.61 A universal may be a truthmaker, but it simply depends on 
whether we need universals to directly play such a role.  
On the moderate account, the only truths that are made true by truthmakers are the ‘primary’ 
truths. A truth is primary just in case it requires a truthmaker or some plurality of truthmakers. 
                                               
57 There are several ways to run the regress. I am glossing over them here. 
58 There are more things to say about instantiation that we could explore. But I do not have time to address them 
here. But see Armstrong’s (2004a) treatment of instantiation as the ‘intersection’ of universals and particulars, and 
Don Baxter’s (2001) view of instantiation as partial identity. 
59 I have articulated an ontology containing only universals, particulars, and states of affairs. You might think I 
should not rule out tropes, events or other candidate truthmaking entities. I assume here that universals, particulars 
and states of affairs can do the work other candidate entities are said to do.  
60 As was noted in the previous chapter, this example is controversial.  
61 These are simply illustrative examples. On the moderate view, we will see that the only truths that have 
truthmakers are primary propositions.  
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All other truths are derived from primary truths using a suitable notion of metaphysical 
semantics that we can adopt from Sider. What particulars and universals exist determines which 
truths are primary, for primary truths are the truths that have truthmakers. So, if a certain set of 
universals and particulars does not exist, then the corresponding set of truthmakers does not 
exist. If a truth has no truthmaker, then it is not a primary truth. Moderate truthmaking has its 
advocates. For instance, Forrest and Khlentzos state that,  
... God knows only the primary truths and that the truths derivable from these by semantics are 
human truths. Extraterrestrials, nay postmodernists, could then have a different semantics from 
ordinary human beings and provided it was grounded on the same primary truths it would be as 
true but not necessarily as good as ours (2000, 6). 
Mellor (2009) develops the moderate account by specifying the ways in which we are to 
determine which propositions are primary and therefore which propositions are to have 
truthmakers. On his view, whatever our first-order quantifiers range over will determine which 
particulars exists, while whatever our second-order quantifiers range over in relation to the laws 
of nature will determine which properties exist (see Mellor 2009, 286; cf. Mellor 2012). For our 
purposes, we can interpret this as the fundamental sense of first-order and second-order 
quantification.62 Primary truths include <Fa>, <Gb>, <Rab>, <a exists>, <b exists>, etc. 
Negative, conjunctive and disjunctive truths will be excluded along with necessary truths (Mellor 
2009, §8). Some molecular truths such as counterfactuals may be primary and so require 
truthmakers if it is true that the only world that exists is our own (Mellor 2009, 288). I won’t 
discuss these matters further.  
                                               
62 The fact that second-order quantification is required to state that properties exist is a further ideological cost. I 
doubt second-order quantification can be reduced to other pieces of primitive ideology. 
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According to moderate truthmaking, the relationship between fundamental truths and 
nonfundamental truths is accounted for by a suitably undefined but nonfundamental notion of 
metaphysical semantics. Following Sider, metaphysical semantics can take the form of a truth-
theory, and so become a project of providing metaphysical truth-conditions for statements in a 
nonfundamental language. This approach, as Sider admits, is ‘vague’ and ‘perhaps not even 
uniquely correct’ (2011, 115). But let us proceed anyway to the formulation of the moderate 
conception of completeness. But first, recall completeness in its theory-neutral form: every 
nonfundamental truth holds in virtue of some fundamental truth. Moderates presumably state 
completeness as: every non-primary proposition (or statement) has a metaphysical semantics. 
We will come back to completeness shortly. 
Moderate truthmaking also has the benefit of directly confronting the objection that 
fundamental explanations are not explanatorily satisfying. Earlier we raised the objection against 
Cameron’s theory that fundamental existential truths cannot provide a satisfactory explanation of 
the complexity of the world we experience and the patterns and mechanisms found in nature. A 
long list of existential truths is glaringly inadequate. According to moderate truthmaking we have 
two responses available. First, fundamental truths are not purely existential. The list of 
fundamental truths involves predicational truths, quantificational truths, perhaps truths 
concerning the laws of nature, etc. These types of fundamental truths are sufficient to provide 
satisfying explanations. Second, the truth-conditions for nonfundamental truths—aping Sider—
can tell us the detailed stories about how nonfundamental truths hold because of fundamental 
truths. If metaphysical semantics is able to secure satisfying explanations, then the moderate 
truthmaker just as much as Sider can dodge this objection. 
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A possible reply: ‘the truthmaker theorist in general cites entities as the explainers of truths. 
Entities however lack the appropriate structure to provide adequate explanations. Since the 
moderate conception is just another version of truthmaker theory, it cannot provide adequate 
explanations’. This objection, however, is misplaced. We need only consider the fundamental 
truths to realise that they have the requisite structure for adequate explanations. But let us set this 
aside and assume that truthmakers (i.e., entities) are the ultimate explainers.63 They do after all 
make true the primary propositions. Suppose it is true that a is F and further suppose that it is 
made true by T. It seems that merely citing T or saying ‘T exists’ to explain that a is F is wholly 
unsatisfactory. Moderate truthmaking agrees with this verdict. Moderate truthmaking, as spelled 
out above, does not have an ontology of Ts, it has an ontology of universals and particulars. The 
universals, when instantiated by particulars, provide truthmakers capable of bridging the gap 
between mere entities and the propositions we need explained. As Sider admits, such an ontology 
plays a ‘structural role’ that can be used to provide satisfying explanations (Sider 2011, 164). 
Mere entities are not the right explainers, but entities, such as particulars that are instantiated by 
universals and stand in various fundamental relations to one another in a vast array distributed 
across spacetime are pretty good candidates for adequate explanations. This is the sort of 
complexity that is endorsed by moderate truthmaking.  
   
4.4 In Defence of Moderate Truthmaking 
 
Let us begin with the objection from purity. Purity, in its general terms, tells us that every 
fundamental truth must involve only fundamental notions. It is important to note that the test of 
                                               
63 Some moderates will reject this claim because they think explanations only have propositions as relata. Hence, 
the primary propositions are the ultimate explainers. 
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purity is operating at the level of notions. As Sider rightly points out, purity concerns ‘the 
concept of a fundamental notion’ (2011, 106, his italics). Some of the discussion becomes 
difficult to follow when differing metaphysical theories employ differing senses of the word 
‘fundamental’. I think that thinking of purity as operating at the level of notions helps with this 
worry about shifting senses of ‘fundamental’.  
Now, if <there exists a city> is made true by some plurality of truthmakers, then the truth that 
 (A1) ‘<there exists a city> is made true by some plurality of truthmakers’ 
involves the nonfundamental notion of a city. So, (A1) is nonfundamental. The moderate 
truthmaker can accept this result since the moderate’s conception of completeness entails that the 
truths that involve nonfundamental notions do not have truthmakers. They instead have a 
metaphysical semantics. This is a similar move to Sider’s conception of completeness where 
every expression that involves non-joint-carving notions requires a metaphysical semantics. 
Thus, moderate truthmaking does not claim that (A1) is fundamental. Mounting the objection 
from purity against moderate truthmaking in this way misses the target (as it did against 
Cameron’s view). The notion of metaphysical semantics accounts for the relationship between 
the fundamental (the fundamental truths of the fundamental language) and the nonfundamental 
(the truths of the nonfundamental language). 
Perhaps we should apply the objection from purity directly at truths that have truthmakers. 
Let us single out <Fa>. <Fa> is fundamental given that it involves the notion of a particular and 
the notion of a universal and nothing more. <Fa> is also made true by a truthmaker or plurality 
of truthmakers. Let us suppose <Fa> is made true by a’s being F—written as [Fa]. Now, 
consider the following: 
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 (A2) ‘[Fa] makes true <Fa>’. 
Is (A2) fundamental? (A2) is a connecting truth. It connects a truthmaker (an element of 
fundamental ontology) to a truth. Purity requires that fundamental truths only involve 
fundamental notions. If a truth is said to be fundamental according to some theory and we can 
show that this purported fundamental truth involves a nonfundamental notion, then the theory 
violates purity. Supposing that (A2) is a fundamental connecting truth, does it involve a 
nonfundamental notion that would lead to a violation of purity? My first reaction is to say no, 
since it is plausible to suggest that, according to moderate truthmaking, the notion of a 
fundamental truthmaker, the notion of a fundamental truth,64 and the notion of ‘makes true’ are 
all fundamental in the sense of being unanalysable notions in a theory. Therefore, purity is not 
violated even though (A2) is a fundamental connecting truth.  
I think this response has its greatest chance of success on Melia’s nominalist truthmaking 
approach.65 Let us revisit Melia’s nominalist truthmaking which invokes the ‘TM’ operator. 
Consider the following: 
(A3) ‘T makes true the sentence S’ 
We can write this as: ‘TM(T, S)’. If ‘T’ and ‘S’ are fundamental and ‘TM’ is fundamental, 
then (A3) is pure. We can compare (A3) with other cases that involve fundamental operators 
such as: 
(A4) ‘ (all sounds have timbre)’ 
                                               
64 We can further suppose that the content of <Fa> is fundamental. 
65 I am leaning towards saying that this response only works on Melia’s view. 
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If the notion of ‘sound’ and ‘timbre’ are fundamental and ‘’ is fundamental in the sense of 
being primitive or unanalysable notions in the theory, then (A4) is pure. If (A3) is analogous to 
(A4), then it is equally harmless. The most likely reply is to reject that ‘S’ is fundamental. But 
what motivation do we have for saying that? It is true that in the case of (A1) (viz., ‘<there exists 
a city> is made true by some plurality of truthmakers’) we have the intuitive reaction that if (A1) 
is said to be fundamental, then something has gone wrong. (A1) should not be fundamental on 
anyone’s account of fundamentality. We lose this intuition, I say, or at least the degree to which 
it is made vivid when we consider fundamental truthmakers connected to fundamental truths 
using a fundamental relation, two-place predicate, operator, or whatever.66  
The purity objection was meant to show that connecting truths for the truthmaker theorist 
must be by definition fundamental in the sense that connecting truths do not hold in virtue of 
other truths. But a connecting truth such as (A1) involves a nonfundamental notion (i.e., a non-
primitive notion). Thus, if (A1) is a fundamental truth, then it violates purity. Another possible 
response on behalf of the moderate truthmaker is to say that connecting truths do not have to be 
by definition fundamental. We could question Sider’s insistence that the ‘method of posit’ by 
definition makes connecting truths fundamental and show that the moderate truthmaker has 
resources to account for truthmaking facts as being nonfundamental. I consider two possibilities 
with the added note that there may well be more.67  
First, (A2) is nonfundamental because it is not a primary truth and hence does not require a 
truthmaker. (A2) is after all about some proposition being made true and it has some proposition 
as a constituent or at least contains the notion of a proposition. (A2) is not a primary truth on this 
                                               
66 We should remind ourselves that Sider in mounting the objection from purity against truthmaker theorists only 
charges them with violating purity based on cases like (A1) and not (A2). 
67 If we accepted that there is a relation of truthmaking and said it is internal, then truthmaking facts could supervene 
on their relata. See (Armstrong 2004b, 50).  
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proposal because <Fa> is derivable from the conjunction of <[Fa] exists> and some statement 
<L> of a law of nature L. The first conjunct let us suppose is made true by [Fa] and the second 
conjunct is equivalent to a negative existential and thus needs no truthmaker. Likewise, the 
conjunction is not primary and does not require a truthmaker. (This response relies on 
independent theses about the laws of nature, which I do not have space to discuss here.) 
Second, given that (A2) is about some proposition, we can attempt to explain why <Fa> 
refers to the truthmaker that makes it true, supposing now of course that (A2) does in fact need a 
truthmaker. The following strategy I take it is similar to what Sider calls ‘entrenching’, where the 
truthmaker theorist when asked about the truthmaker for (A2) provides the answer: [Fa]. 
However, instead of simply saying [Fa], we say the sum of [Fa], whatever makes it true that ‘a’ 
refers to a and whatever makes it true that ‘F’ applies to the Fs. If this sounds trivial, consider 
‘[Fa] makes true <Gc>’. This is made true by [Fa], whatever makes it true that ‘c’ refers to a, and 
whatever makes it true that ‘G’ applies to the Fs. The latter truthmakers will require some further 
story about reference, which might be filled in by a theory of reference borrowings or the 
doctrine of reference magnetism. Whatever the further details, I do not see why the moderate 
truthmaker does not have something to say in response to purity on this score. They have the 
resources of semantics at their disposal. 
Let us consider some other objections, for example, the charge of smuggling in unadvertised 
ideology. First, we need to be clear on what is being advertised and what is not. For one thing, 
the ontology of universals and particulars involves primitive predication of some kind. We 
require at least the ‘instantiation’ predicate. So, unlike Cameron’s theory we are not advertising a 
truthmaking theory of fundamentality that solely consists of existential truths. Thus moderate 
truthmaking is closer to Sider’s conception of fundamentality.  
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This raises the question of how controversial the moderate theory really is. Let us revisit the 
comparison between the moderate truthmaker and Sider. Sider’s view of fundamentality has two 
main components: 1) ‘structure’ and 2) ‘metaphysical semantics’. The moderate truthmaker 
theory of fundamentality also has two main components: 1) ‘makes true’ and 2) ‘metaphysical 
semantics’. If we restrict the word ‘fundamental’ to truths, then Sider and the moderate 
truthmaker have almost the same accounts of the relation between nonfundamental and 
fundamental truths. The real difference lies in the ideology of structure versus the ideology of 
truthmaking. The former characterises fundamental truths in terms of truths involving non-joint-
carving or non-structural expressions, while the latter characterises fundamental truths as 
primary propositions.  
The real debate between Sider and the moderate truthmaker will come down to the 
disagreement over the first component, and hence a dispute between ‘structure’ and ‘makes true’. 
This debate is unfortunately beyond the scope of this chapter and dissertation. I leave it for future 
work that will no doubt be discussed in the literature over the coming years.  
I will say however one thing in favour of moderate truthmaking in this context. Moderate 
truthmaking accounts for at least two differing senses of the word ‘fundamental’ where other 
theories of fundamentality only account for one. The moderate truthmaker gets at the intuition of 
fundamentality as something about entities in the world. These entities are the truthmakers, 
universals instantiated by particulars. But at the same time the moderate truthmaker captures the 
intuition that there is something important about the description of the world that is given by the 
truths that are made true by truthmakers. Therefore, moderate truthmaking nicely captures these 
two senses of ‘fundamental’ at the same time. Given the shifting sense of the word ‘fundamental’ 
throughout the entire discussion, I take this to be an advantage on some level over theories such 
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as Sider’s that accounts for fundamentality solely in terms of truths and Schaffer’s that accounts 
for fundamentality solely in terms of entities. As noted at the outset, the truthmaking approach is 
an attractive mix of the linguistic and ontological accounts of fundamentality.  
There are two more objections to consider. Moderate truthmaking, as advertised above, does 
not claim that states of affairs are part of the fundamental ontology. Hence, states of affairs are 
not fundamental truthmakers. Yet (A2) involves the notion of a state of affairs. Have we 
smuggled in the ideology of states of affairs? This is one accusation Sider directs towards 
Cameron-like theories of fundamentality, since they claim to have an ideology of ‘identity’, 
quantification and names. Although (A2) involves the notion of a state of affairs, talk of states of 
affairs can be reduced to particulars instantiating universals. After all, we took the categories of 
universals and particulars as fundamental. Dorr (2004) has put forth a useful hypothesis that is 
relevant here. He calls it the simple theory of states of affairs. On this view we have the two 
primitive predicates ‘... is a particular component of ...’ and ‘... is a universal component of ...’ 
and we analyse ‘the state of affairs of a’s being F’ as ‘there is an s such that a is the only 
particular component of s and F is the only universal component of s’ (see Dorr 2004, 158).68 
This seems to be one way for the moderate conception to respond to the charge of smuggling 
unchecked ideology. 
There is one last objection I want to address concerning the ontology that was used in 
defending the moderate truthmaking conception of fundamentality. The objection is levelled 
against the precise nature of the entities in question. Recall that particulars instantiate universals 
and universals are instantiated by particulars. For instance, the Higgs boson instantiates the 
universal being 125 giga-electron volts. Presumably, universals and particulars obey modal 
                                               
68 Cf. (Dorr 2004, 188-9). We are also quantifying over a and F. 
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principles, such as, ‘particulars can only instantiate universals’, and ‘universals can only 
instantiate universals of higher orders’. It is not possible for Plato to instantiate Socrates and it is 
not possible for being red to instantiate being purple (see MacBride 1999, 487). Plato can only 
instantiate universals such as being wise, and being red can only instantiate being a colour. In 
addition, since the categories of universals and particulars are taken as fundamental, the entities 
that are members of one category cannot become a member of the other category. It is not 
possible for Plato to suddenly become the universal being wise.  
Fraser MacBride (1999) argues that given these kinds of modal principles the concept of a 
universal and the concept of a particular are riddled with modal notions.69 If the concept of a 
universal and the concept of a particular are modal, then the ideology of the theory involves 
primitive modal notions and thereby ideologically commits us to some collection of fundamental 
modal facts. This type of ideological commitment, however, ought to be avoided (cf. Sider 2011, 
ch. 12). There should not be any pieces of primitive ideology that are modal in any way, whether 
they are modal operators or modal predicates.  
Our first reaction is to say that although there are modal truths that must hold for an entity to 
be a universal, it simply does not follow that the relevant modal notions are themselves part of 
the notion of a universal or particular.70 Therefore, we can deny that necessity is part of the 
concept of a universal and the concept of a particular. 
                                               
69 MacBride (1999) further argues that a reductive account of modality cannot be based on universals and 
particulars. This objection is irrelevant here since I am not offering an account of modality. What is of interest is the 
major premise of his argument. 
70 André has said in correspondence: “It would be like saying if a person is necessarily conscious, it follows that 
necessity is part of the concept of a person.” Or that the concept of a person is modal. Thanks to André Gallois for 
comments. 
141 
 
 
However, we have another response available. It is not the case that the concept of a 
universal and the concept of a particular are taken as primitive in the theory.71 Let us now say 
there are entities and some instantiate others and this is taken as a fundamental fact. Since the 
two-place predicate ‘… instantiates …’ is taken as a piece of primitive ideology it is a brute fact 
that some things instantiate others. Thus, there is really one fundamental category of entities. But 
amongst the instantiated entities are items that we can call universals and amongst the 
uninstantiated entities are items that we can call particulars (cf. Sider 2011, 292).72 (I assume that 
there are no uninstantiated universals. If there were uninstantiated universals, then amongst some 
of the uninstantiated entities there would be uninstantiated universals.) The type of fundamental 
story, as told now, does not require the principle that particulars can only instantiate universals or 
that universals can only instantiate universals of a higher-order. Thus, our ideology does not 
contain any primitive modal notions. 
In summary of the main points of this chapter, I claim that if we are to adopt a theory of 
truthmaking, then we should accept the moderate truthmaker theory of fundamentality. Although 
Cameron’s theory can meet the purity objection, I find that the lack of structured truths results in 
a fundamental description of reality that is too unstructured. In addition, the objection that 
Cameron’s account smuggles in extra primitive ideology by introducing a totality state of affairs 
via truthmaker-maximalism is an extra ideological cost that goes unadvertised in his theory. 
Without some deeper explanation of the structure of totality states of affairs, Cameron should 
explicitly admit into his ideology expressions that help describe facts about states of affairs. By 
                                               
71 I adopt this response from (Forrest 1986a, 91). 
72 Compare this to Sider’s ‘worldview’ which contains an ontology of sets and points of spacetime with an ideology 
of set-membership, physical predicates e.g., ‘... is open’, and first-order logic. Notice that Sider does not include the 
primitive predicate ‘... is a set’. He writes: There is exactly one thing that has no members but is not a member of 
any open thing [this is the null set]; everything else either has a member [and so is a set], or is a member of some 
open thing [and so is a point of spacetime] (2011, 292). 
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contrast, moderate truthmaker gets around the worries concerning smuggled ideology and gets 
around the problem of not having unstructured truths to explain laws and patterns in nature. In 
both cases, moderate truthmaker explicitly highlights the ontological and ideological costs of his 
view. The ontological costs are an ontology of universals and particulars and the ideological 
costs are an ‘instantiation’ and ‘makes true’ predicate. In the end I think the real debate will be 
between Sider and moderate truthmaking. The disagreement will arise between the ideology of 
‘structure’ versus the ideology of ‘truthmaking’. This is an ideological disagreement between 
Sider’s ‘S’ operator and the moderate truthmaker’s ‘makes true’ predicate, or using Melia’s 
nominalist variant the ‘TM’ operator. This debate however must wait for another day.  
To conclude the dissertation as a whole, I have established that metaphysics should take 
ideology seriously in metaphysical theorising and in particular metaphysical debates. In chapter 
1 we saw how ideology was important to understanding the debate between realism about 
universals and nominalism. In chapter 2 we saw how ideology made a difference to the debate 
between mereological nihilism and anti-nihilism. In chapter 3 I applied the methodological 
conclusions of chapter 1 and 2 to theories of truthmaking to show that primitivism about 
truthmaking is a serious contender alongside Schaffer’s grounding theory of truthmaking. And in 
chapter 4 we have seen that the real disagreement between Sider and the moderate truthmaker 
concerns some piece of primitive ideology that helps describe reality in some fundamental way. 
Ideological realism explains why disagreements about ideology should not be taken lightly. In 
fact, in many cases the ideology matters more than what the theory quantifies over. 
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